The Commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor

> viz. Inu the apprehension of each of the terms of which a syllogism Consists.

+ i. εἰ To Jupiter the Demiurgus of the world.

BOOK 11. ἘΙΜΞΟΒΟΟΣ PLATO. 189

that of accident into essences; for these are the species of division which some persons are accustomed to applaud. It is ridiculous therefore, to divide being and generation, cither as accident into essences, or as essence into accidents. For accident by no means pertains to perpetual being. Nor again must they be divided as a word into its significations. For what word is there which Plato assuming as common, divides into perpetual being, and that which is generated ; unless some one should say that τι, 1. e. α certain thing, is thus divided by him? This division however, is not Platonic, but is derived from the Stoic custom. Is the division therefore, as that of a whole into parts?) But what is that whole which consists of perpetual being, and that which is generated? Or how can paradigm and image give completion to one composition! How likewise can perpetual being be a part of a certain thing, since it is impartible, united, and simple? For the impartible is not a part of any thing which does not consist of all impartibles. But that which is generated is not impartible. lence there is not a common genus of perpetual being, and that which is generated. For perpetual being precedes according to cause that whichis generated ; and the former is when the latter is not. But perpetual being not existing, which it is not lawful to suppose, ceneration also would vanish. How likewise, is there one genus of the first, and the last of things? For the division of genera into species, takes place in the middle psychical reasons {i. e. productive powers}. But things prior to soul, subsist in more excellent genera; and things posterior to soul, have their essence in co-ordinate natures. How therefore, can being itself and that which is generated, be arranged under one genus? What also will this genus be? For it is not being, lest that which is generated, and which never [truly] is, should be arranged in being. Nor will being itself be the oxe. Because every genus is divided by its proper diflerences, and antecedently assumes the differences, either in capacity, or in energy. But it is not lawful that she ove should have differences either in capacity, lest it should be more imperfect than secondary natures 3 or in energy, lest it should have multitude, But as it is in short demonstrated to be superior both to power and energy, it cannot in any way whatever have diflerences ; so that neither will there in short, be a division of the one.

What then shall we say?) Must it not be this, that Plato does not now make any division whatever, but that he proposes to detine separately what cach of these two, perpetual being, and that which is generated, is? For it appears to me that the word é:aszereov has the same signification with διακρινητεον. For since he discourses about the world, the Demiurgus, and the paradigm of the world, he

p. 190

For it appears to me that the word é:aszereov has the same signification with διακρινητεον. For since he discourses about the world, the Demiurgus, and the paradigm of the world, hep. 190 wishes separately to define perpetual being, and separately that which is generated, in order that through the given definitions we may know where the world, where the Demiurgus, and where the paradigm are to be arranged 3 and that we may not confound the orders of things, but may separate them from each other, so far as they are severally adapted to be separated. He likewise docs the very same thing in the Philebus. For inquiring concerning intellect, pleasure and the mixed life, which is the best of these, he assumes the genera of them, viz, bound, infinity, and that which is mingled from bound and the infinite. For thus the order of each will become apparent, and he will manifest the peculiarity of them trom their genera, There however, hound and infinity beginning from the Gods, proceed throuzh all beings of whatever Kind they may be. Mor these also were in intelligibles according to the stable and generative cause of intelligibles. They were lkewise in the intellectual order according to the paternal and material principle of the intellectual Gods. And they were in the supermundane order, according to the demiurgic monad and vivifie duad, and in the last place, according to effective and prolific powers, Here however, being and that which is generated, do not bevin from the Gods; for the unities of the Gods are superior to being, and prior tu these the one itself is exempt from all beings, because the first God is one,” but the other Gods are wniticy. Nor are being and that which is generated) things which are participated by the Gods, in the same manner as the unities which are posterior to the Gods, are said tobe and are participated by being. Nor do they extend as faras to the last ofthings, For neither is it possible to say that matter is perpetual being, since we are accustomed to call it non-being ; nor that which is generated, which is not able even to sufler being, lest perishing by so doing, it should entirely vanish. This therefore, will again be asserted by us. It is however, [evident]* that the division is not of one certain thing, and that the proposed theory has necessarily, prior to other things, the definition of these two-fold genera, in order that the discussion proceeding as if from geometrical hypotheses to the investigation of things consequent, may Giscover the nature of the universe, and the paternal and paradigmatic Catse ofit. For if the universe was generated, it was generated by a cause. ‘There is therefore a denuargic cause of the universe, [fthere isa Demiurgus, there is also a paradigm of the world, with reference to which he who constituted the universe fabricated. And thus in a consequent

’ For ov here, itis obviously necessary to read er,