The Commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor

It is necessary, however, that all [materialj forms perishing, the full perfection of the world should still remain. Such therefore is the solution of Porphyry. |

The divine Tamblichus however reprobates this solution, as dissolving no one of the doubts, For let, says he, the whole sensible world possess impartible natures partibly, indivisibles divisibly, and monadic natures multitudinously, yetp. 372 why do some things in it still remain monadic, but others not? For this is what was dubious from the beginning. He therefore adduces a certain solution of the doubt, which is indeed admirable yet is inwant of assistance. For he says that of forms some rejoice in sameness and permanency, but others in motion and difference. And that some, indeed, are the causes of monadic and perpetual natures, but others of such as are mutable and multitudinous. And this indeed is very admirably asserted, but requires a certain admonition, which it is necessary to make, by considering that atter the one two principles proceed, bound and infinity, as Socrates asserts inthe Philebus. And as of numbers, some are more monadic but others are dyadic, though all numbers derive their subsistence from the monad and at the same time from the duad, thus likewise, though all forms subsist according to these two principles, yet at the same time some are the progeny of bound, but others of infinity. And what occasion is there to speak of forms; since of the Gods themselves, some belong to the co-ordination of bound, but others to that of infinity, both according to their whole orders and according to parts? According to total orders indeed, because every paternal, connective, and demiurgic series is defined according to bound; but every vivitic and effective series, according to infinity. But according to. parts, because of the paternal and of the vivilic series, some belong to the order of bound, but others to that of infinity. If, therefore, this is the case with the Gods, why is it wonderful that of forms some are more than others allied to bound, but others to infinity? And according to this analogy some forms give subsistence to monadic things, but others to those that proceed into multitude. After this manner, therefore, it is requisite tu assist this solution.

And according to this analogy some forms give subsistence to monadic things, but others to those that proceed into multitude. After this manner, therefore, it is requisite tu assist this solution.

Our preceptor, however, dissolves this doubt after another manner, multifarious. ly. Tle says, therefore, that every intelligible nature is uniform and_ eternal, but that of mundane things, some are able to be more, and others less assimilated to the essences of intelhgibles. For such things as are more 1mmaterial and pure, are capable of being assimilated ina greater, but such things as are more material and gross, in a less degree. As all paradigms therefore subsist in monadic and eternal essences, the more excellent natures in the universe especially imitating the causes of themselves, are generated in all things most similar to their paradigms, viz. according to the monadic, the essenual, and the perpetual; but the less excellent, being allotted a secondary form of similitude, are in a certain respect assimilated to their causes, and in ἃ certain respect not. Hence, as there are these three things in intelligible forms, viz. the monadic, the essential, and the eternal, whether do mundane natures imitate the monadic and perpetual peculi-

p. 373

Hence, as there are these three things in intelligible forms, viz. the monadic, the essential, and the eternal, whether do mundane natures imitate the monadic and perpetual peculip. 373arity of intelligibles, but not the essential? By no means.’ For it has been demonstrated that it is requisite the things which proceed from them should be essences, since they produce by their very being. Will mundane natures therefore be imitations of them according to the monadic and the essential, but not according tothe eternal?) This however is impossible. For each of them will perish ; being monadic indeed, but not perpetual. For because not perpetual, it will vanish into non-entity ; but in consequence of being monadic, there will not be that from which it may be generated. Besides, every thing which subsiste from immoveable causes, is immutable in essence. But forms are immoveable, for they are intelligible. Either therefore itis possible for all things to imitate them in all things, or in certain things. But it is impossible for all things to imitate themin all things. For the natures which are more remote from their principles are in a less degree assimilated to them. Just as with respect to Pythagoras, who possesses all sciences, he who is nearer to him, receives all his knowledge secondarily, but he who is more remote from him, learns some of his sciences, but is unadapted to the reception of others. Ifitis impossible therefore, for all things to imitate them in every respect, it remains that this must be effected by them in certain things. And ifin certain things as there are three peculiarities which are characteristic of intelligible forms,’ either imitating the extremes, they become destitute of the middle, or receiving the two first, they will appear to have resinquished the third, or not partaking of the first, they will participate of the two which are posterior to it. It has however been shown, that neither the first nor second is true. T/ence it is necessary that they shoulg not express the monacic peculiarily of forms, but only the essential and the eternal. On this account all mundane Sorms indeed are essences, and are always invariably the same, but all of them are not monadic. For all mundane forms do not subsist commensurately to ali the powers of their paradigms. But that every intelligible form, and whole paradig- Taatic cause having a primary subsistence, is monadic, eternal, and essential, is evident. For whatever is not essence, will be an accident. Every accident, however, subsists about matter, and is conversant with things which are in matter, but not with those which are in separate causes. If likewise an intelligible form is not eternal, neither will the image of it be perpetual. It is necessary however that it should, if the world always consists of allforms. But the principle perish-