The Commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor

It likewise is not separated from the instrument of sense,’ and is therefore on this account irrational. For thus in the Georgias,

* Instead of διακέκριται δε ro acaOnrnpior in this place, it is necessary to read ov &caxexpiraa δὲ τὸν αισθητηριον.

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irrational knowledge is defined to be not scientific, but conjectural. [n the fourth place, sense is alone irrational, because it is the boundary ofthe whole series of knowledge, possesses an essence most remote from reason and intellect, pertains to externals, and eflects its apprehension of things through body. For all these particulars demonstrate its irrationality.

Every thing generated therefore is apprehended by opinion in conjunction with sense; the latter announcing passions, but the former producing from itself the reasons of them, and knowing the essences of sensibles. And as reason when in contact with intelligence sees theintelligible, thus also opinion co-arranged with sense, knows that which is generated. For since the soul is of a middle essence it gives completion to a subsistence between intellect and irrationality. For by its summit it is present with intellect, but by its ultimate partit verges to sense. Hence also Tiinwus in the former conjunction, arranges intelligence prior to. reason, as being more excellent; but in the second he places opinion before sense. For there indeed, reason is posterior to intelligence, as being a less intellect; but) here opinion is prior to sense, as being rational sense. Opinion however, and reason circumscribe the whole breadth of the rational essence. But intellect is our king, and sense our messenger, says the great Plotinus. Reason indeed, togetuer with intellect, sees the intelligible; bat by itselfit: surveys reasons or forms that have a middle subsistence, And opinion in conjunction with sense, sees that which is generated ; but by itself it contemplates all the forms it contains, concerning which we have elsewhere spoken, have shown how these forms subsist, how the place of them is the doxastic part of the soul, and that the intelligible ix apprehended by reason, but by opinion, the intelligible is seen as a doxastic object. For the object of its knowledge is external to, and not withinit, as the intelligible is within reason. Hence the object is not comprehended by it, but is called epinable aud not sensible; because opinion knows indeed the essences of things, but sense does not. [lence too, it receives the appellation of a clearer knowledge, which knows wha¢ a thing is, but not alone ¢hat it is, which latter we say is the employment of sense; and in’ consequence of this Timieus very pro-- perly calls that which is generated the object of opinion. For this is Pythagoric ; since Parmenides also considered the discussion of sensibles, ἡ as a discussion according to opinion; sensibles being in their own nature perceptible by this

For this is Pythagoric ; since Parmenides also considered the discussion of sensibles, ἡ as a discussion according to opinion; sensibles being in their own nature perceptible by this

' Instead of exec και o ev Llappercder, την περι των αἰσθητων xpayparcwy in this place, it is necessary to read eres caco Παρμενίδης, την πέρι των αἰσθητων πραγματειαν.

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power of the saul. Hence it is not proper to call that which is generated sensihie alone, because sense is not gnostic of any essence, nor the object of opinion, without the addition of sense.

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power of the saul. Hence it is not proper to call that which is generated sensihie alone, because sense is not gnostic of any essence, nor the object of opinion, without the addition of sense.

Ifere however, Aristotle particularly blames the second assertion of Timzus. For where is it [universally] true that what is perceived by opinion in conjunction with sense is generated and corrupted?) — For heaven is uabegotten and indestructible, though itis perceived by opinion in conjunction with sense. And Timiwus inthe course of this dialogue, inquires whether the whole heaven was venerated. At present, therefore, it must be said by us, that generation and corruption subsist according to analogy in the heavens, not only according to the motions and mutations of figures, but also because a celestial body is not preduced by itself, but alone subsists from another cause. [ence it is generated as having the cause of its subsistence suspended from another thing (different from itself. Since, however, it not only subsists from, but is connected by another, not being able to connect itself, and is corrupted according to its own proper reason, on this account it assumes generation co-ordinately with corruption. — Por truly existing and) eternal beings generate themselves, and are connected by themselves, whence also they are said to be in their own nature unbegotten and indestructible. Tf, however, truly existing being is unbegotten, and therefore subsists from itself, that which does not subsist from itself will not) be truly unbeeotten. And if that which is truly indestructible is naturally adapted to connect itself, that which is not naturally adapted to connect itself will not be truly indestructible. Heaven, however, but I mean by heaven the corporeal-formed nature of it alone, is neither adapted to produce nor to connect itself, ΕῸΓ every thing of this kind which produces and connects itself, is impartible, Hence it is neither truly unbegotten ' nor truly indestructible, but so far as pertains to its corporeal nature, It is generated and made. Farther still, as Aristotle himself says, and clearly and generously demonstrates, no finite body possesses an infinite power. But the eclestial body is finite, and therefore does not possess an infinite power. The indestructible, however, so far as indestructible, possesses an infinite power. Hence body, so far as body, is not indestructible. So that from the reasoning of Aristotle 11 is demonstrated to be a thing of this kind. But after what manner the heaven is unbegotten and perpetual, will be manifest to us

* Instead of ove apa οντων γενητὸς ἐστιν in this place, it is obviously necessary to read ove apa orrws ayernros ἐστιν.

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