The Commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor

Por if he did, he would not have an invariable sameness of subsistence, and immutability. Βα εὐ he always fabricates, that which is fabricated by him always exists. For why, being willinaly at rest for an Infinite time, did he at leneth convert: himself to fabrication? Was it because he apprehended it to be better? But was he, prior to this, tznorant that itwas betteror not? Por itis absurd, betae intellect, that he should be ignorant; since there will be about him both tooraice and hoowledge. Bat ithe ον this, why did he not before begin to generate and produce the world? Numa it it was better, why did he not persevere in this enerey, iit be lawful so to speak ! For it is not holy to conceive that, being intellect and al God, he would) pursue that which os fess instead of that whieh is more beautiful Dt is necessary, however, to admit these things, Wf the world is generated according to ime, and is net consubsistent with the infinity of time. Those also appear to me to sin against

V Instead of ἀλλὰ ry ἀπειρίᾳ tou κυσμον συνηλεστων ait this place, it is necessary to read «ἀλλὰ μὴ τῇ απειρίᾷτου KPUdUU GUM OTWS.

nook χε] ΓΜ ΠΝ OF PLATO, 243

the Deminrgus of the world, in another way, who say that the world once was not. For if it once was not, there was a time in which the Demiurgus did not make it. For that which is made, and that which makes, subsist together. But if there was atime in which he did not make, he was then a maker in capacity. And if he was in eapacity, he was imperfect, and afterwards perfect when he made. Tf, however, there is prior and posterior about him, itis evident that he docs not belong to natures which energize eternally ; but that he passes from not making aceording to tine, to making. Moreover, he produces time. How therefore having an energy which is in want of tine, does he produce it through this energy?) For he once produced tine, of which he is indigent, in’ order that by his eflective energy he may produce time. This, therefore, cannot be otherwise.

Moreover, he produces time. How therefore having an energy which is in want of tine, does he produce it through this energy?) For he once produced tine, of which he is indigent, in’ order that by his eflective energy he may produce time. This, therefore, cannot be otherwise.

After this opinion, however, let us direct our attention to Severus, who says that the world stmply considered is indeed perpetual, but that this which now exists, and is thus moved, was eenerated. For there are twofold circulations, as the Elean euest has shown; one of whichis that which the universe now circumvolves, but the other the contrary to it. The world therefore is cenerated, and originated from ἃ eertain principle, which is) the eause of this cireulation. Bat supply considered itis net generated. This interpretation, however, we shall oppose, by observing, that itis net proper to transfer fabulous enigmas to phy- Siology. For how is it possible that the soul which moves the universe, should be weary, and change the ancient circulation? [Tow also is the universe pertect, and suflictent to itsclf fit desires mutation? Pow ean there be an alternate change of circulations, when both that whichis moved, and that which moves, preserve their proper hab? And bow does Timiens say, that the circulation of the nature which is characterized by sameness, is moved to the right hand, according to the demiurgie will, but that which is characterized by ditlerence, to the left hand ? Por ifit is necessary that the works of the Deminrgns should remain invariably the same, and be perpetnal, iis likewise necessary that the circulations should be always the same ; and that the period characterized by sameness should be moved to the right hand, bat that which is characterized by diderence, to the left.” For they proceeded at one and the same time from the Demiurgus, and were allotted this circulation. Barther sull, is id not necessary, that inequability must thus be mtroduced to the

' The words την de θάτερον ex’ apecrepa, are omitted ia the original, but evidently ought to be inserted in this place, p. 244sS ON ΤῊΣ

[took 1,

Barther sull, is id not necessary, that inequability must thus be mtroduced to the

' The words την de θάτερον ex’ apecrepa, are omitted ia the original, but evidently ought to be inserted in this place, p. 244sS ON ΤῊΣ

[took 1, motion of the universe’ For every thing which is about to cease from its former motion, and to pass on to another, hastens to the contrary, Le. to rest, and causes the precedaneous motion to waste away. For if it continued tived in the same energy, What Is the cause of the second circulation?" By no means, therefore, are these interpretations which are not physical to be admitted. Nor again, must such explanations be adopted, though they are more rational, as those which asenibe generation to the world, mm conception only, Por thus we may also infer according to conception, aud not according to truth, that there isa Demiurgus of the universe. Por from admitting that the world was generated, it is demonstrated that there is a producing and demiurgic eause of it. Orit may be said, that the universe is admitted to be generated * for the sake of perspicuity, and the doctrinal method, in order that we may Jearn what the numerous goods are, of which it participates, from the demiurgic providence. Por this is mdeed ina certain respect true, yet is not sufficient to the theory of Plato. Por the perspreaous, says Tamblichus, is venerable, when itis adapted to scienee. Por admittines also that the universe is perpetual, it is possible to point out the goods imparted to it by the Gods. And thus much tn opposition to these interpretitrons,

Again, however, let us show from the beginning, after what manner the universe is said to be generated. Por itis neither so according to ὅπ τὸ, through the before mentioned arguments, nor simply because it proceeds froma eause ; since itis not sufficient to say this, Por intellect also ts from: the first eause, and all things after (he one are froma cause, ΜΟῚ 41} things are not generated, Por where does the eternal subsist, fall: things are generated? Por the one is prior to eternity, After what manner therefore, ttmay be said, is the universe generated) As that which now is always becoming to be, and at the same tine always was becoming to be, or rising into existence. For itis not that whieh ts partial Body there. fore, (i. e. partial body) is not only generated, but there is also a time when it was generated. But the whole world alone subsists in becoming to be, and is not at the same time that which was generated. Ttis also according to Aristotle always in the end, the always being temporal, according to temporal infinity, Por as the solar-form light: proceeds from its) proper fountain, thus also the world is always venerated, and always produced, and is always becoming to be, and at the