The Commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor
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* Proclus says this, alluding to the Chaldean oracles, in which Saturn is called ence beyond, and Jupiter twice beyond.
p. 351
“This being determined, let us consider what is consequent to these things; viz. according to the similitude of what animal, the constituting artificer constituted the world.”
Plato clearly exhibits to us through what is here said the connexion of the problems, and the suspension of secondary from primary natures. For the words, “ this being determined,” and ‘ let us consider what is consequent to these things,” indicate the connexion of what has been with what will be said; and that through the truth of the former, the latter receive the principle of investigation. For since it has been shown that the universe was rendered an animal conformably to the providence of God, it is necessary that it should be assimilated to intelligible animal. For where did the Demiurgus look when he made the world to be an animal, except to the intelligible? Por it was one of the things pre-demonstrated, that the world being most beautiful, was generated according to an eternal paradigm. If therefore, the Demiurgus making it to be an image of the intelligible, constituted it an animal, the paradigm itself will be an intelligible animal, For if that was not an animal, how could that which was generated an image of itt be rendered an animal? For so far as it is similar to that, it was generated an animal. For it is sensible indeed, not as similar and separate [but as visible and tangible}. These however, (i. e. visibility, and tangibility,] it obtains through a corporeal nature. But it is an animal, as being similar to intelligible animal. And if itis similar, it is from thence allutted the morphe of animal. For images also, have not only their forms, but their appellations, so far as they are formalized, from their paradigms. So that if life 15 imparted to the world through the paradigm, it is also similarly called an animal and animated from it, because the cause of its whole animation pre-exists in intelligibles. For the same reason likewise, itis endued with intellect. It may however, in a greater degree be called an animal, on account of the most principal cause, because the paradigm is the cause of animation, of the supply of intellect, and as I may say, of all life. For every thing enducd with intellect, is also animated, and every thing animated ts also an anunal ; but the converse is not true. For every animal is not animated. For that
* Instead of πως τον ro exewo yeyovos εἰκων in this place, it is necessary to read πων τὸ κει ον yeyorns «ιλων.
* The words αλλ᾽ ws eparov καὶ axroy are omitted in the original, but, as it appears to me, ought to be inserted,p. 452 which participates of a rational soul is animated. Nor ts every thing which is. animated endued with intellect. For the genus of men that participate of intellect, which participates of a rational soul is animated. Nor ts every thing which is. animated endued with intellect. For the genus of men that participate of intellect, is small ; so that animal 1s more comprehensive than all the rest. And with those things indeed, with which the rest are present, animal also is present; but it is not necessary that the rest showld be inherent in those things with which this is present, That however, which iy more comprehensive, is nearer to the first principle. But that which is nearer? to it, is of a more causal nature, since the first principle 15 the cause of all beings. That Plato also? not only knew intelligible animal, but also the intelligible animated, ἰδ manifest from what he says in the Sophista, Por placing tite and soul in being, and wishing likewise to give to it motion, he adds, * But that which hay intellect and soul, if it ts not animated, must remain entirely immoveable.” Wence there are, intelligible life, and intelligible animal; the cause of soul, and the animated ; the cause of intellect, and that which is endued with intellect. And animal itself is beyond all the intelligible paradigms. Hence, Plato says, that the discussion of the similitude of the world to intelligible animal, is consequent to the problem concerning the composition of it. For because the universe being assimilated according to the form itself of similitude, was rendered an animal by the Demiurgus, ἐλ may more properly be called an animal, with reference to which the aniverse was generated an animal. For it exists as an animal on account of the intelligible, and not on account of that which is moved in a confused and disorderly manner. [1 ts necessary however, that animal should be present with the universe, either from matter or from form; so that if the world is not an animal from its subject matter, itis so from form. If however from form, that which is primanly animal is the cause to it of form.
It remains therefore, to survey in the next place after this problem, to what animal the universe is assimilated. For that it is assimilated, is evident from what has been already said, but to what it 15 assimilated, must next be considered. For there is a multitude of intelligible animals, which Plato also indicating, inquires to what animal the Demiurgus constituted the world similar. Por beginning supernally from intelligibles, animal proceeds through all the middle orders τ in one of these orders, subsisting intelligibly alone; in another intelligibly
" For avOpwxwe yap yevos, poayyu ἐστιν οὐ μετέχον, it is necessary to read, αὐ flpwawy yap 7Ev0s, ἤραχυ ἐστιν του vou μετέχον. Vor Plato says this in the latter part of this Dialogue.
* For αλλον here, it is obviously requisite to read ey yurepor.
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indeed, but as in intelligibles and intellectuals ; and) in another intellectually
Vor Plato says this in the latter part of this Dialogue.
* For αλλον here, it is obviously requisite to read ey yurepor.
nook We] TIMEUS OF PLATO, 353
indeed, but as in intelligibles and intellectuals ; and) in another intellectually alone. And in one of these orders indeed, animal subsists intellizibly alone, but as in intellectuals; but in another vitally. And thus in each of the intellects there is intelligible animal, subsisting appropriately in each. For every intellect has a conjoined intelligible. Very properly therefore, does Plato investigate what kind of animal is the paradigm of the universe, whether it is super-mundane, or intellectual only, or intelligible, and at the same time intellectual, or intelligible only. For the nature of animal’ proceeds according to all the orders of intellect.
But Plato admits that the differences always subsist in the first animal itself: according to union, and gives a progression to them according to appropriate numbers. For as the first animalis tetradic, thus a different animal is defined according to a diflerent number. And in those things in which there is the same number, in these there is a variety of subsistence according to the peculiarities of animals, Lor itis necessary that in animal also, there should be the monadic prior to the multiplied ; because this * is more allied to (he onc. And universally, every divine multitude begins from a monad. As therefore, the Demiurgus is the monad of all eflective causes, though the effective peculiarity is in many Gods, thus also animal itself is the monad of all animals; in which Tihewise the most total paradigms of mundane natures, and the one cause of the whole world preeNist.
Whi. however, some one may say, does Plato call the intelligible paradigm animal? Because itis the supplier of life, as T have before observed 5 and because it generates the causes of the whole vivilie series, and the fountains themselves of lite. Because likewise, itis replete with the first and intelligible life. For the one being, or being characterized by the one, is beyond life. But the middle order of intellizibles is the first life, and is one and infinite. Animal itself) however, being full of intelligible life, is very properly called animal. For as it is eternal, on account of being filled from eternity, thus also it is aw animal, on account of its reception of life. For it ts intelligible, as being arranged [immediately} after intelligible lite. Tt is therefore called an animal, not as sensitive, nor as having impulse, but as being vital. For every thing which lives, is according to Plato, an animal.‘ For because it has life, says Timeus, it may be justly called ananimal.” Hence also, Plato calls plants and seeds animals, characterizing the
' For ἢ τὸν vow gums here, it is necessary to read ἡ τὸν ὥνου peas. * For roury here, read τοῦτον
Zim. Plat. Vor. J. Ye ὦ
p. 554
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