The Commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor

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animated and an animal; and according to all these and intellect, he causes it to be endued with intellect. For union accedes prior to other things, and posterior to other things. Animal energizes prior to, and in conjunction with other thaigs, And the gift of life generates and proceeds together with, and prior to intellect.

From what however is now siown, and from what has been before demonstrated, you may assume, that at the same time, the paradigm of the universe is unical, and the whole multitude of intelligibles. And neither is the simplicity of ewithout multitude, nor the multitude of it divided; but it has the all-various at once consubsistent with ¢he one, the monadic with the all-perfect, and the uniform with the multiform. For because it proceeds indeed from the good it is united. But because it pre-establishes in itself the order of intelligible ideas, it is ἃ}}- perfect. And as infinite, it unfolds the multitude of intelligibles ; but as contained by bound, it is only begotten. As proceeding likewise from being characterized by unity, it has the relation of a monad ; but as being the third from it, it produces in itself all the intelligible Gods, and on this account is demonstrated to be all-perfect. These things, however, we shail more fully unfold as we proceed.

But there is a controversy with the interpreters about the text. For to some of them it appears that two things are now distinguished by Plato, the one, and all multitude. And the word whether being applied by the ancients to two things, seems to testify in favor of their opinion, But to others, it appears that there is a division into three things, the one, finite multitude, and the infinite. And the patrons of this interpretation are Porphyry and Jamblichus, who speak conformably both to the things themselves, and to the doctrine of Plato. For shortly after he takes away two things, but assumes one thing from division. But from three things, an ablation of two and the position of one is eflected, and not from two things alone. Nevertheless the word whether’ seems to contradict what they assert. It may be remedied however by saying that cither whether signifies the same as shall we therefore ; (zw ap ow τὸ πότερον orci ταυτον) for it is frequently thus assumed by the ancients; or that the words, or not (ἢ ov) are wanting to the sentence; and that it will be perfect by reading, whether do we rightly assert that there is one world, or not? And if not, whether there arc many, or infinite worlds ? Plato omitting to ‘say this through conciseness. Perhaps too; you may say, it is not without design that he omitted the words much and finite.

* For πρότερον here, read sorcpor,

Tim. Plat. | Vou. i, ZA

p. 870

And if not, whether there arc many, or infinite worlds ? Plato omitting to ‘say this through conciseness. Perhaps too; you may say, it is not without design that he omitted the words much and finite.

* For πρότερον here, read sorcpor,

Tim. Plat. | Vou. i, ZA

p. 870

For to say how many, or so many, is to speak in a way that gives completion to what is said. And as ifthe paradigm is not monadic, s0 as to be the cause of one thing, the things generated are intinite 5 after this manner itis probable that there are infinite worlds, if there is not only one. For the vacaum being infinite, will be the recipient of infinite worlds.

“ One [i. e. there will be but one world,] if it be admitted that it is fabricated according to the paradigm.”

Again Plato in concord with himself, announces the whole of the conclusion prior to the demonstrations, previously to beltef, dissolving the doubt. For the word one is uttered analogously to, if seas generated, and to he was wood,‘ and the demonstration on account of it, is conformable to the proper method. | For it is himself who doubts, himself who dissolves the doubts, and himself who demonstrates. Through the doubt, indeed, converting himself to intelleet; but through the concise solution of the doubt, energizing according to intellect. For to comprehend the whole of a sentence in one word, is animage of intellectual projection, And through the demonstration descending from intellect to dianoia, For every one who demonstrates, receives the principles of lis demonstration from intellect. Butitis intellect, says Aristotle, by which we know terms 3 for through this we apprehend (true) beimes by simple projections, Such therefore throughout is the form of the words.

Let us, however, if you think fit, in the first place, svilogistieally survey the trath of the words themselves. The whole sentence, therefore, is of the following kind, If the world was generated according to a paradigm, and the paradigm is one, then the world is one." Bat the antecedent is true, and) therefore the consequent also is true, That the world, however, was generated according to a paradigm, was asserted before, and was mentioned both by Plato and ous. But that the paradigm is one and monadic, Plato asserts as he proceeds, ‘The assumption therefore being true, it remains to see how that which follows from it is true. He says then that if the world imitates especially and accurately the paradizm, it ought to imitate it ino all thines, and ought to resemble the essence of it. For if it imitates the paradigin in some things, and not in’ others,

* Instead of ro ἀγαθὸς ἣν in this place, it is requisite to read rw az ules ny.

* The words ὁ κόσμον apa ἐν ἐστιν, are omitted in the original, but evidently ought to be inserted.

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For if it imitates the paradigin in some things, and not in’ others,

* Instead of ro ἀγαθὸς ἣν in this place, it is requisite to read rw az ules ny.

* The words ὁ κόσμον apa ἐν ἐστιν, are omitted in the original, but evidently ought to be inserted.

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it will not be the imare of ἃ certain whole. For the paradigm making by its very being, it makes a certain image of the whole of itself. But this being the case that which is generated with reference or according to. the whole paradigm itself, is monadic, is perpetual, and is an animal. For as he who imitates the whole of Socrates expresses the whole of his life, after the same manner, the world being fashioned in the resemblance of animal itself, imitates all things mit, so far as itis naturally adapted to such an imitation ; possessing all things sensibly which animal itself possesses intelligibly,

Some however oppose what is here said, by adducing the multitude of men and of horses, Por man itself is the cause of many men, horse itself of inany horses, and this is the ease with every other form or idea of the like hind. But if some one should say, that these beeause they are parts of other things, are on this account monadic, the oljector will not cease adducing tous the sun and the moon, and all the parts of the world which are monadic. Tence more profound solutions of the objection are requisite. The philosopher Porphyry therefore striving to solve the didiculty, says, that forms as they proceed, always descend into mulutude and division, and pass into balk, and an all-various distribution into parts. Tfenee an intelligible essence, procceding into the world, terminates ina divided, gross, and material multitade, though on high itis united, impartible, and monadic., To every thing, therefore, which is intelligible, nothing else imparts the whole, for the intelligible itself gives subsistence to it. Hence it constitutes it as great as it is able to become. But this universe supplies man itself with matter. And on this account the matter of one form receives many Impressions of that form. "The world, therefore, is one from one (paradigm), and a Whole froma whole. But man is numerous trom one torm, the world supplying the matter of it. Why, therefore, says he, are there not many suns and moons? For the matter of these is from the universe. To this he replies, that to incorruptible natures in the world, though they may be parts, the monadic is appropriate; but to corraptible natures, multitude. For if there were not many participants of the same reason (or form) but only one corraptible participant, the form would perish, this being corrupted. It is necessary, however, that all [materialj forms perishing, the full perfection of the world should still remain. Such therefore is the solution of Porphyry. |