The Commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor

It is necessary however for that which primarily parti-

* Tor Tuiy €V nubia'll yfiwr here, It It requisite to n ail TVv rr ovfinoi titvr.

* In dead of t) a/i/wua ill tins plarc, il is iit-cosarj to rcait airrrj rj append.

1 I'or aevrOrrvt iirrr, il is uc« cssary In read trvrlkrwt.

* instead of to wrVtTvr avrvr trj\er 10 tbo place, it o requisite to read to «r(kr«r «u tw tf

p. 30

PROCLUS ON THIS

[book III.

cipates of then! to be a tiling of this kind. Plato, therefore, from these genera con¬ stitutes the psychical essence, producing in the first place the subject 1 of this essence from the ini<h!le genera. l'or as we have said of the elements, that all of them are in the heavens, in the sulilunary region, anil under the earth, and that all things consist indeed of the four, yet not of the same elements, but hea\en of the summits of them, generation ot the second, and the subterranean regions of the last procession of the elements; thus all things consist indeed of these genera ; but intelligible* of such of them as are first, impartible, immmcahle anil entire ; self-inutile natures, of such as are’ both impartible and partible; and eorporealformcd natures, of such as are partible. l'or such as are the genera, such also are the essences, Impartihh natures, hmicicr, precede those that are impartible, and at the same time partible ; and the lath r precedi partible natures, l or the im¬ partible is nearer to tlu mu ; since it is impartible on account of union. Since therefore the p»\ i local issi nee has been shown to be the inedmm of beings, it ierv propel I v consists ol the nmldli* genera of being, \ i/. ot essence, same, and ditlerent [of a middle charai teristic 1 . l'or I’l ito in the Pha*drus complicating: the powers denied from these, denominates them a charioteer and horses; because the existence of the soul is defined bv these. lint we may survey permanency and motion m the energies of the soul. l'or permanency and motion are in tlx* essence of it. l’or it constitutes itself, abides ami proceeds, and is eternal ; motion and |h*rmanericv being superior to sameness and difference. For it abides m eternal natures according to permanency, and proceeds, In ing inured. Hut through progression it is separated into united multitude. The genera of being however, are more c learly seen m tin energies of tin* soul.

For it abides m eternal natures according to permanency, and proceeds, In ing inured. Hut through progression it is separated into united multitude. The genera of being however, are more c learly seen m tin energies of tin* soul.

You may also say that Tima us ill constituting the essence of the soul, after ano¬ ther manner assumes motion and permanency prior to sameness anil difference. For the soul is not only the medium between the impartible and the partible essence, but also between the essence which always subsists with invariable sameness, and that which is in generation, or becoming to In*. Hence, through subsisting with invariable sameness, if participates of permanency according to its essentiality, but through lieing generated, of motion. Unless it should Insaid, that because same and different appropriately belong to the Demiurgus, Tiina-u* delivers a precedaneous generation of these. \\ hat then is the charac¬ teristic of each of the middle genera 1 .May w< not say, that since essence con¬ sists of hound and infinity, when the former vanquishes the lath r, it produces the c k rwr ufitpiOTW tui fupiOTwr •

* l'or virtp** mu' lirrr, riMil vroktiji* toy.

1 lor ru avTvkinim, uvTutv ufufnrrw vat furptGr** here, it is ilfCCSMiry to read ra it avTGkirrjru

LOOK 111.]

TIM l'US OF PLATO.

p. 31

1 lor ru avTvkinim, uvTutv ufufnrrw vat furptGr** here, it is ilfCCSMiry to read ra it avTGkirrjru c k rwr ufitpiOTW tui fupiOTwr •

LOOK 111.]

TIM l'US OF PLATO.

p. 31

impartible essence; but that when infinity vanquishes bound, it produces the partible essence ; and that when the power of these two is equal, they produce the middle essence? And a^ain, wlo-n sameness vanquishes dill* fence, it makes an impartible; but when dillerence vanquishes sameness, a partible saim ness and dillerence: and win u the power of each is equal, they produce a sameness and dillerence of a middle nature. When likewise permancuev vanquishes motion, an impartible, but when motion subdues permanency, a partible; and when the power of each is equal, a middle motion and permanency is produced. Since however, sameness and dillerence eousis) o| both these [i. e. oi hound and infinity] it is necessary that m these also, either bound should have dominion or infinity, or that tin power ol’earh should Is* equal ; ami thus that eithei an imparti¬ ble, or a partible, or a middle sameness and dillereuee should 1 m* elli •< t< d And the like must also necessarily taki place m motion and permanency. For every hyparxis, power, and energy, are from both these; ami are either characterized by bound, or by infinity, or not by one of these more than the other. Hence the whole of the intelligible and intellectual breadth, 1 is said to be hound, and to be in siieb a manner the Mime, as to render it necessarv to inquire whether there is dif/i rent e in it; and also to be in siieb a wav permanent, as to render it dubious whether it lias any iutelleetual motion, lint every coiporeal-lbrmed nature is allied to infinity, to dilierenee, and to motion. And souls exhibit alone and the same tilin', multitude and union, that wbieli is stable, and that which is moved* For there i i. e. m intelligible and iutelleetual natures] the essence is one in each intellect; but in soul, then* i> one and not one essence in each. For tin re are many cs.u nets in tier// soul, and ns mum/ us the parts into uhie/i etich may In divided. And as body bane; partible may In divided into infinites, souls [on the contrary] are divisible into jinit < v, m the same manner as number is divisible into monads, /fan e also, soim have thought propel to rail tin soul numbt r, as divisible indeed, bat into im¬ partible*, and not into things ninth may always In lUriduf. Hence too, the impar¬ tible oi the soul is twofold, vi/. according to that which is as it were a whole, and according to the last oi tin 1 parts. ]*or every number likewise, according to its proper form, is one and impartible, but according to that w hich is as it were the matter o| it, it is partible ;‘ yet not the whole of this, hut in this also the last in which the division t< miniates, is impartible.