The Commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor

The neat to these are intellects, Those in the third rank, are souls, ‘Those in the fourth, the natures that are divided about bodies, And those in the fifth and last rank are bodies.

Jim. Plat, ἘΠ fe α ᾿ 22kp. 314 others; those in the fourth rank are generated from things characterized by the term another ; and those in the fifth rank being others only ; and on each side of these those natures subsisting which are dissimilarly similar!’ Such, therefore, being the continuity in things, what can be deficient? Immoveable natures being first established, selfmotive natures having the second, and alter-motive natures, the third rank, all of which are the last of things. Por all beings derive their completion from the above-mentioned orders. In short, the production of things may be shown to be continued in many ways; and if you are willing so to speak, analogy subsisting from on high as far as to the last of things, according to the well-ordered progression of all beings from (he one.

Let, therefore, all these things be acknowledged, and let the generation of beings be extended as faras to nothing ; bat whether is there nothing evil in these, or shall we admit that there is in a certain respect, and that there is what is called depravity in bodies, and in souls?) For some have been led by this doubt to take away evil entirely 3 but others have been induced to deny a providence, im consequence of believing, that if providence has a subsistence, all things are “σους, Lor if, indeed, divinity was willing there should be evil, how can he be good? For it is the province of that which is essentially good to benetit every thing, Just as itis of that which is essentially hot, to give heat. Butit is not lawful for (he good to effect any thing else than what is good. And if divinity was not willing there should be evil, how can it have a subsistence? For something will exist contrary to the will of the father of all things. Such therefore is the doubt.

We must say, however, conformably to the doctrine of Plato, according to our preceptor, that the habitude of divinity with respeet to things subsists ina different manner from that of ours. And again that the habitude of things with reference to deity is different from their habitude with reference to us. Por wholes have a relation to parts different from that of parts to cach other. To divinity therefore nothing is evil, not even of the things which are called evil. Por he uses these also toa good purpose. But again, to partial natures there is a certain evil, these being naturally adapted to suffer by it. And the same thing is to a part indeed evil, but to the universe and to wholes is not evil but good. Forso far as itis a being, and so far as it participates of a certain order, itis good. Por this thing which is said to be evil, if you apprehend it to be destitute ofall good, you will

"viz. The one, and matter.

~My 1» wanting iw the original,

Forso far as itis a being, and so far as it participates of a certain order, itis good. Por this thing which is said to be evil, if you apprehend it to be destitute ofall good, you will

"viz. The one, and matter.

~My 1» wanting iw the original,p. 315 make it to be beyond even that which in no respect whatever is. For as the good itself is prior to being, so evil itself is posterior to the nothingness of non-entity. Por that which is most distant from the good 15. evil, and not that which has no kind of subsistence.' If, therefore, that which in’ no respect whatever is, has more of subsistence than evil itself, but this is impossible, it is much more impossible that there should be such a thing as evil itself.

If, however, that which is entirely evil has no subsistence, but evil is complicated with good, you give ita place among beings, and you make it good to other things, And, indeed, how is it possible it should not, if it ranks among beings ? For that which participates of being, participates also of unity, and that which participates of unity, participates likewise of good. Hence evil, if it is, participates of good ; because evil has not an unmingled subsistence, and is not entirely deprived of order, and indetinite. Who therefore made it to be such? Who imparted to it measure, and order, and bound? It is evident that it is the Demiurgus who rendered all things similar to himself. For he filled both wholes and parts with good. But if he benefits all things, and colours evil itself with good, there is nothing evil according to the power of divinity and of recipients. For power is twofold, one being that of divinity which benefits the depravity that is so abundantly seen ;* but the other being that of recipients, which participate of the goodness of the Demiurgus according to the measure of their order [in the scale of beings}. In consequence therefore of the Demiurgus being willing that there should be nothing evil, nothing is evil. But if certain persons accuse him as the cause of evil, because he gave subsistence to partial natures, they take away the fabrication of the worid, subvert the prolific power of wholes, and confound the nature of things first and last,

‘That we assert these things, however, conformably to the opinion of Plato, may be easily seen from his writings. For in the Politicus, he clearly says, “ that the world obtained from? its maker all beautiful things, but from its former habit, all such injustice, and evil, as are produced within the heavens.” For because there is generation, and also corruption, that which is preternatural has a subsistence.

" The good itself is prior to being. Nothing or non-being is not that which is most distant from the good; for it is that in which the procession of being ends, but that which is most distant from thr good is evil itself. Hence eril itself is posterior to nonentity.

" The good itself is prior to being. Nothing or non-being is not that which is most distant from the good; for it is that in which the procession of being ends, but that which is most distant from thr good is evil itself. Hence eril itself is posterior to nonentity.

τ * For wodvaparoy, it is necessary to read πολυόρατον,

? For rept here, it is requisite to read παρα,

p. 316

And because the deformity of matter fills partial souls with inelegance, through an association with it, on this account that which is not conformable to reason is allotted a certain resemblance of subsistence. Atthe same time, however, all these particulars become beautiful through the goodness of the maker of the universe. But inthe Republic, Plato assigns no other cause of good than God, and says that certain other causes of evils are to be investigated 5 through which he manifests that evils do not derive their subsistence from divinity, For it is not, says he, the province of fire to refrigerate, nor of snow to heat, nor of that which is all-good to produce evil, And he asserts that certain partial causes of these are to be admitted, and such as are indefinite, For itis not in evils as im things that are wood, viz. that the one and what is primarily good, precede multltude; and this on account of the indefinite diffusion of evil The words others, therefore, and certain, evince that the Causes of evil are partial and indefinite. But in the Thewtetus he says, thatit is neither possible for evils to be abolished, nor for them to be in the Gods, but that they revolve from necessity about the mortal nature, and this place of our abode.” If, therefore, evil revolyes necessarily in the mortal place, it will not be according to Plato, that which in no respect whatever has a subsistence, and which is exempt from all beings. So that according to him evil exists, is from partial causes, and is benefited through the boniform providence of the Demiurgus, because there Is nothing which is entirely evil, but every thing is in a certain: respect: accomplished contormably to justice and divinity.