The Commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor

* lor Xfiyuor litre, it is necessary to read \cynmmy.

* Instead of nrrftiprcr 10 tbit place, read aereOijser.

Tim. Plat. Vol. II.

Y

p. 170

PROCLUS ON THE

[book 11).

frequently observed, ant! in intelligible* always subsists in energy. Ami it seems that he thus denominates the rational the logistic, just as lie afterwards calls the sensible the sensitive. Tor tin sensible is motive of sense, ami the intelligible of the reasoning of the soul. Hence the logistic’ will lie that which is compre¬ hended by the reasoning of the soul; and this antecedently comprehending cause, is liomonyniously to reasoning called logistic. But he cal w the intellectual voluble, as having the unimpeded in transition, and also the circular, and the flourishing, likewise perfection in intellections, the energizing about divinity, the boniform, ami the revolving about tin* intelligible as a centre, “ hastening to conjoin yourself to the centre of resounding light,' says some one of the Hods. Hie word being likewise signifies that wlm h is tilled with truly existing Wings and is united to them. But the word indicates signifies, to untold as it were into light, to teach, and to product* from that which is arcane, hart her still, by intellect here, niu.-t be understood the intellect which is ai cording to habit. For intellect has a threefold subsistence ; the Jirst indeed, being divine, such as is tin demiurgic intellect; but the second, being that which is participated by soul, and is essential and se-U'-perfect; and the Hind, that which subsists according to habit, and on account of which tin* soul is intellectual. And science is tin* tir>t knowledge which is filla.-d from inlclligibh ■>, ami exists with an unincliiiing, non-verging, and immu¬ table energy. But it differs from intellect, * so lar as the latter i* surveyed in the simple projections alone of the soul. For through it the soul at once intellec¬ tually jierceivcs the whole of each object of intellection; since the at-oncecullected in energit s, is the peculiarity ot intellect. But science is surveyed in the knowledge from cause. For this is the peculiarity of science as is also the composition and division of forms. For it is evident, that having a knowledge of beings, it also know*, which among them have the order of causes, and which of effects. But all know ledge of this kind is called science, just as the simple appre¬ hension oj each object of intellection is called intelligence. And such is our expla¬ nation.

But all know ledge of this kind is called science, just as the simple appre¬ hension oj each object of intellection is called intelligence. And such is our expla¬ nation.

landilichus however, conceives this intellect to lie more ancient than soul, supernally containing, and giving perfection to it. He also contends against those, who either immediately conjoin the soul to all-pcrfrcl intellect, (tor it is necessary that the transition should not 1 h* immediate from exempt natures to participants, but that there should he middle essences co-arraiiged with the things that participate) or who suppose intellect to he a habit of the soul, lor it is ne-

* litre also fur X. -/<». », read XoytaTtKuy.

1 Non is omitted here iu the original.

ROOK 111.]

TIM.LUS or PLATO.

p. 171

-/<». », read XoytaTtKuy.

1 Non is omitted here iu the original.

ROOK 111.]

TIM.LUS or PLATO.

p. 171

cessary that prior to lliat which is in another, that should exist which i-< in itscit. Ami this indeed, is rightly asserted with refen lire to things; hut it is more con¬ sonant to the words of Plato, to survey this intellect as a habit in the soul itself. For TnnuMis s.ivs it is produced from the energy of the circle of the same. But that intellect which the 1)< miur^us constituted, must Ik; said to he above soul, when he placed analogously soul in body, and intellect in soul. For it is evident that this 1 ut* llect is more ancient than soul, just as soul, according to Timauis, is more ancient than body. The intellect however, which is now mentioned, being the elfect of the motion of reason about the inti iligible, through the circle of the same; for he says it is produced, in ronsiTjurncc of that circle revolving with faci¬ lity about that which is apprehended by the reasoning power; will not be more ancient than the soul, but a certain habit of it, in the same manner as science. II* nee also, he says, that it is in genera ted in the soul, in the same manner as science, opinion, and faith. From all that has been said therefore, this one thing may be summarily collected, that xihcn reason is conversant with the intelligible, and the circle of the same unfolds through its intellectual energy, the nature of beings to reason, then intellect and science are produced in the soul. And this indeed, must necessarily be the case. For a perfection adapted to such energies, is consubsistent w ith them. \\ hat then, some one may sav, is reason at one time conversant w ith intelligibles, but at another with sensibles ? By no means is this the case with the total soul [or soul of the universe], hut it is always on high, ami is always directed to intelligibles. it likewise abides and is established there, and provi¬ dentially attends to sensibles, with an untamed energy; and through the facility of the motion of the circle of th• same, the rectitude of the circle of the different is permanent. But the words when, is generated, and the like, manifest differences of power. For the energy is not every where similarly according to all the powers: for this is the peculiarity of d vine intelligibles, on account of the simplicity of their essence. But according to the energy of the circle of the same, reason is more conversant with intelligibles than with sensibles; anti from the energy of the circle of the different, is more conversant with sensibles than with intelligibles. It is requisite also not to overlook this, that Timncus says, u the circle <f the different proceeding xcith rectitude looking in so saying to the circles of a partial soul, of which, when in a fallen condition he asserts, that the circle of the same is fettered, and the circle of the different distorted. For in saying this he opposes rectitude to distortion, and to the being fettered facility of motion,' which signifies the unincumbered; just as rectitude there, indicates a lation undistorted by inferior