The Commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor

p. 169

difference. For intellectual knowledge is imparlililc and eternal, because the reasons in it of things ;u* of this kind. Hut. psychical knowledge is evolved, and subsists in discursive energies ; because the reasons of the soul, through which it knows things, have an « volved nature.

Farther still, intellectual knowledge is uniform, lweaiise the reasons in it sub¬ sist inonadicallv, for they are prinionlial. Hut the psychical knowledge is biforined ; because the reasons also have a twofold subsistence, the dianoetic sul»- sisling in one way but the doxastic in another. Knowledge therefore is both one and twofold, according to the essential division of reasons. For if one of the circles knows the intelligible, but the other the sensible essence, what is it which say s that these are dillerent from each other, and that the former is a paradigm, but the latter an image? For it is not possible for that which has not a know h dgo of both, to speak concerning the difference of them, as we may learn in the Thea-fetus, Hence, as it iv there said, that the nature which knows visibles anil audibh-s, the former through the sight, and the latter through the hearing, and says that these are different from each other, ought to know both ; so this reason which is different from the two circles, speaking through all the soul, some filings concerning inlelligibh-s, but others concerning sensible?, and being common to both the circles, i«., as I should say, the energy of the essential part of the soul. For so far as the soul is one essence, according to this, it has this one gnostic energy, w hich Plato rails reason. Hence also, we simply call the whole soul rational. This reason therefore is the one knowledge of the soul, which through the circle o! the same knows the impartible, but through the circle of the tiilh rent the dissipated essence. For though both the circles have a sub¬ sistence between the impartible and the partible essence, yet the circle of t he same participates in a greater degree of the impartible, but tin-circle of the different of the partible essence. And this is the one essential reason, as the essence is one, prior to the same and the different. The life of it likewise, is the self-motion, which exists m the two circles; hut the knowledge of it is transitive, this also being common to both the circles. And on this account, the soul is not only Informed, but also uniform. 'Finis much therefore, has been said, for the sake of the eompn Ik iision of the whole dogma.

And on this account, the soul is not only Informed, but also uniform. 'Finis much therefore, has been said, for the sake of the eompn Ik iision of the whole dogma.

Descending lmwevcr to particulars, it must be observed, that Plato says the soul consists of three parts, and that it is mingled from these; through the mix¬ ture indeed, indicating the union of the congregated parts ; but through the num¬ ber, their timningled purity. For they would not remain three , unless they pre¬ served tiieir proper essence unconfused. It must also be observed, that shaking of partible natures, lie says, “ j vhen the soul touches on a certain thing having a dis¬ sipated essence .” For the word to have (to t* yap r^ov) jvertams to tilings vv Inch

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PROCLUS ON THE

[BOOK III.

possess the essential anil l>eing, adventitiously, ami the subject of which is unes¬ sential anil non-l>eiiig. And the word (to tivos) a certain thing, is most adapted to things which in some way or other are partible, and endued with interval. Farther still, to touch is appropriately asserted, because the soul proximately pre¬ sides over sensibles, and is suspended from intrlligibles \ the contact manifesting a knowledge which is clear , immediate, and established according to a dtjinite Jn ijcctivn towards the object of Inunt ledge. “ -•!.* a contact, says some one ot the Gods. Put concerning impartible essences, l'iato was satisfied with alone saying, ‘ and rchen on that which is impartible .” For the simple and the uniform are the pectiliauties of the impartible essence alone. .Moreover, tv speak, appropriately sig¬ nifies the psvehical inti llig< nee. F'ur the soul is reason, but tv speak is the euergy (f vEftT'Ua)' of reason, in the same manner as to perceive intellectually, is the enemy of intellect, and to germinate, of nature. For the energies ol essences, are parunvinoiisly deiiominateil will the essences themselves.

F'ur the soul is reason, but tv speak is the euergy (f vEftT'Ua)' of reason, in the same manner as to perceive intellectually, is the enemy of intellect, and to germinate, of nature. For the energies ol essences, are parunvinoiisly deiiominateil will the essences themselves.

Me uni'll! not however to be ignorant of vvliat Porphyry relates concerning the words tt speak*, and it ends (jizi too ?.£ysi, nai hryei); and that he met with one interpreter, Amelins,* who instead ot “ it speaks bung moved, reads, “ it ends being mored;" though it is difficult to adapt this reading to the soul, which is moved incessantly, as vve have before observed. Porphyry adds, lh.it he said to Ame¬ lins, it speaks should be adopted, and not it ends, and that Ann bus w as very much hurt at this emendation], hut that he afterwards found one Socrates who reads \r t yu as well as Amelins. It must the.i fore, be written by us, “ it speaks being moved through the whole if itself, and not *• ,t ends being moved,' as that Socrates and Amelins wrote, according to the narration of Porphyry. For to speak, is the essential 1 enemy of reason. I he soul then fere, being reason, and a rational intellect, speaks and sees intellectually through the whole of itself, (vv hen it comes into contact with a partible, or an impartible essence,) what that is whit h i> the object of its perception, because it is itself both impartible and partible. And if indeed, the genera in it, were alone divided from e.u h other, tin* whole soul would not from essence possessing knowledge, have a know ledge of essence. Hut it the genera, were entirely corrupted, there would not be a definite knowledge of beings,

1 As mij/io, »s we learn from Simplicius, is the boundary of motion, just a* to mr tfir now is the boundary of lime, so rn/>yi)/ia is the boumlary of energy. Thus loo totjfta is the boundary of or intellectual perception, and utoUiifju of uiadijnti, or sensible perception. \.id as ataO>)^a bi lug the terinination of sensible perception, is an impression of il in the se: »» am, that winch is analogous to this must lie conceivid In lake place litmiq/ju, rifpyijpu, and mijua.

* \fit\wi is umilted in the original.

* Tor oi/fTifciJou here, it is necessary to read oejiw^ijr.

BOOK III.]

TIM/EUS or PLATO.

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