The Commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor

And thus much concerning these particulars,

It is here, however, usual to enumerate all the causes, and the differences of causes according to Aristotle ; nor is this done immethodically. For it is requisite to say that every cause is either essential or accidental, fand this proximately or remotely,] and that these subsist in a two-fold respect, either simple or complex. All these, likewise, have a two-fold subsistence ; as they are either in capacity, or in energy. For thus the multitude of them may be surveyed. For on account of the essential and accidental, there are two modes of the explication of causes. But on account of these being attributed in a two-fold respect, either proximately or remotely, there are four modes, And again, on account of all these subsisting ina two-fold respect, either as simple or complicated with each other, there are eight modes, Through these also being two-fold, either in energy, or in capacity, there are sixteen modes, But on account of causes being predicated in a four-fold respect according to Aristotle, but according to Plato, causes subsisting in a threefold,’ and con-causes also, though in a different way, in a three-fold respect,—hence according to the former, there will be sixty-four modes of causes ; [but according to the latter there will be forty-eight modes of causes,] and the same number of con-causes. For thus the assumption will become perfectly methodical ; though that of Plato is usually omitted by the interpreters, who having enumerated causes

* These causes are, the producing, the paradigmatic, and the final ; and the con-causes are, maller, matcrial causes, and form.

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according to Aristotle, enquire how it is said that every thing which is generated, is generated by acertain cause. We, however, omitting all this superfluous discussion, say that Timeus is here speaking about the eflective cause. Hence he uses the words, by a certain cause. For the term by which, is adapted to that which is effective. But he adds a@ certain cause. For the intellect of the universe, soul and nature, are said to be producing causes, and prior to these, other causes have this dignity, yet as many things are generated, and there are many causes, thoueh not of each particular, the word certain is very properly added. | For each particular is generated by a certain cause, and not by all causes. These things therefore are manifest.

| For each particular is generated by a certain cause, and not by all causes. These things therefore are manifest.

This axiom, however, is entirely derided by the Epicureans, who make the whole world, and the most divine of visible natures to be the work of chance. Bat by the Aristotelians, for the name alone itis thought worthy of reverence, For they say indeed, that what is generated, is) entirely generated by a certain cause, but they undesignedly make the cause to be causeless, when they enumerate chance with causes. Por chance is this very thing, (he causeless. But Plato alone, following the Pythagoreans, rightly says that every thing which ts generated, ix generated by a cause, and places over generated natures, Fate and God. For though generated natures are many, and separated from cach other, and which also on this account are generated from many causes, producing in ἃ different manner, yet there is one cause collective and connective of the makers, in order that there may be nothing in vain, or adventitious in the universe. Jor it is not proper that beings should be governed badly. Let there, however, be one ruler, one cause ofall things, one providence, and one chain of beings ; let there be also together with the monad an appropriate multitude, many Kings, various causes, a multiform providence, and a different order; yet every where multitude has a co-arrangement about the monad, things various about that which is simple, things multiform about that which js uniform, and things different about that which is common, in order that a traly golden chain may have dominion over all things, and that all things may be constituted ina becoming manner, For if, as Aristotle says, all things are co-arranged with a view to form, itis necessary that there should be a cause of the co-ordination, and that nothing which is in vain should have a place in the universe, but that what appears to be in’ vain to a part, should be advantageous to che whole, These observations, however, have been made elsewhere.

* These are the words of Anstotle, in the 12th book of his Metaphysics.

HOOK ti] TIM.UEUS OF PLATO. ba |

* These are the words of Anstotle, in the 12th book of his Metaphysics.

HOOK ti] TIM.UEUS OF PLATO. ba |

But what is said in the Philecbus appears to be more universal than this axiom, viz. that every thing which is mixed, subsists froma certain cause of the mixture. ‘For if things which are mingled, are not to be mingled casually, it is necessary there should be one cause collective of the separated natures, and imparting union to the mingled form. . This cause, however, is in one mixture God, in another intellect, in another soul, in another nature, and in another a certain art, imitating nature, Indeed, every thing which is generated, is mingled, but not every thing which is mingled is generated. For the first of beings, bound and infinity, subsist mingled with each other. From these, therefore, Plato says other things, and also bodies derive their subsistence, All that is said here therefore, is analogous to all that is said in the Philebus, viz. the Demiurgus to the one, form to bound, matter / to the infinite, and that which is generated to that which is mixed. But the latter: are more universal than the former; because the latter [viz. the one, bound, the infinite, and that whichis mixed,] are beheld in all things, but the former (viz. the Demiurgus, form, matter, and that which is generated} are seen in mundane natures only, For intellect is mixed, as being knowledge, and as possessing infinite power, and also soul, as being at one and the same time impartible and partible. Hlenee, a certain cause, is the cause of that which is generated, just as that which is generated is a cer¢ain mixture, and not every mixture; by which also it is evident that the Demiurgus is subordinate to the one, since he produces indeed a mixture, but a mixture which is generated. For since the causes of the world are these, the final, the paradigmatic, the effective, the organic,’ the formal, and the material, Timzus indeed points out to us afterwards, from reason and demonstration, the final cause, but delivers the organic, the formal, and the material eause, from the former before-mentioned axioms. For if the universe is not [real] being, but that which is generated, itis a form participated by matter, and by | the orzanie, formal, and material causes is proximately moved, But Timeus unfolds to us the effective cause from what is now said. For if the universe is ~ generated, there is an effective cause of it. And he unfolds the paradigmatic cause in what will be said afterwards. For if the world is beautiful it was generated according to an eternal paradigm. So that through these axioms investigating for us the causes of the universe, he delivers all things in order. And the hypotheses afford him this utility,

“When therefore, an artificer looking to that which possesses an invariable sameness of subsistence, and always employing’ a certain paradigm