The Commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor

* \fit\wi is umilted in the original.

* Tor oi/fTifciJou here, it is necessary to read oejiw^ijr.

BOOK III.]

TIM/EUS or PLATO.

p. 101

nor would it l*o possible to say, that essence is one thin", hut sameness another. •Sineo however, the middle genera arc* mingled with each other, vet not so as jo he confounded, the soul understands earli thin" delinilely, and as Plato says, tlir gh the whole of itself. Hut if it sjieaks, lieiug mo\ed through the whole of itself, it is evident that it is one ami not one; that it has a knowledge common to the extremes, and vet dill'ering from them; and that as one, it wholly speaks about all things, and not wholly, as not l»eing [entirely] one. The circle of the same likewise, in the knowledge of iutelligiblcs, knows sensible* as from paradigms; and the circle of the different knows intelligible*, as from images. For each having perfectly the object of its knowledge, necessarily sees that one is the para¬ digm of the other, Imt the other the image ; or not knowing that the one is a para¬ digm, or that the other is an image, it will not know in a self-perfect manner. Knowing however, that the one is a paradigm, it knows that of which it is the paradigm, and knowing that the other is an image, it knows that of which it is the image. Very properly therefore, is it said that the soul speaks of ail things, through the w hole of itself. And thus much concerning the things themselves.

•Since however, some erroneously read it etuis, and not tt sptaks through the whole of itself, we have said Porphyry relates, and that Amelius thus reading, was not aide to unfold the meaning of the words of Plato, thus much must he added, that to read it speaks being moved, is attended with h ss ddliculty, Imt that we may also read it ends; the word signifying one apprehension from many conceptions, of things knowahle, arriving at the peculiar and definite intui¬ tion of each; in order that the meaning of the whole may he, the soul being moved, ends at the knowledge of each thing [with which it conics into contact]. For the end of being moved is to cease to lie moved, the soul never ceasing to be moved, and always arriving at a certain intelligence. Aristotle also, perceiving this to he the case in the heavens, says that they are always moved in the end.

“ It also asserts what that is with which any thing is the same, from what it is different, to what it is especially related, and in what respect, and how it subsists ; and when any thing of this kind happens either to be , or to sujfcr y both in things which are generated, with reference to each, and also with reference to such as possess an eternal sameness of being."

There arc three interpretations of the proposed words, all w hich an' reasonable. And it is requisite to exhibit the jmwer of each. For the first interpretation makes the whole to be one sentence; but the second makes it to be two sentences, dividing the words as we do ; and the third makes tt to be three, fonn- Tim. Plat. Vol. II. X

PROCLUS ON THIS

[BOOK III.

1C2 ins the division according to each of the colon. The first interpretation also, is as"follo\VH: “ When the soul touches on a certain thing which has a dissipated essence, and when on that which is impartible;' lu re the interpretation making a small stop, i. v. a comma] it adduces the rot of the words, viz. “ it saps being moved through the whole of itself , what that is ruth which am/ thing is the same, ^r." l or Plato asserts, that the soul says all these things, heiug moved through the whole of itself, both of the impartible and the partible essence, coming into contact in both, with sameness ami dilli-reiiee, habitudes and qualities, actions and passions. For all these are analogously in intclligibles and seiisibles. lint the second inter¬ pretation makes one sentence to be that which we haw; before uu iitionc-d, \u. “ It hen the soul touches on a certain thing which has a dissipated essence, and when on that which is impartible. And the second sentence to be, It also eissei ts bang mated, what that is with which tun/ thing is the same, from what ills different, to uhat it is related, in u hat respect, and how it subsists, $c.” 1 bis interpretation however, differs from the former. In-cause it separates what is said about essence irom what is said about things pertaining to essence. And the third interpretation makes a rapid division ol the colons, l or it makes one division to lie l lat which we have before mentioned ; the second, “ It also inserts what that is a ith uhiih amj thing is the same, and from what it is dijferent and the third, all that follows. As we have said then fore, the words have a threefold interpretation. \\ e should direct our altt ntion howevt r, especially to the things thenisi Ives.

As we have said then fore, the words have a threefold interpretation. \\ e should direct our altt ntion howevt r, especially to the things thenisi Ives.

That sameness, then, and dilli-reiiee are in intclligibles, is evident. Hut how are relation, situation, quality, vv hen, and passion there 1 1 or these are well known to exist m seiisibles, but iiow do they subsist ill intclligibles ? INlav it not be said, that the genera of being manifestly subsist in intclligibles, because they are pro¬ perly Ijciugs ? \ on mav also assume* that relation, situation, \(.. may be su v< yt il analogously in intclligibles; relation indeed, if you are w illing, according to the paternal and maternal, ami also the similar and dissimilar, the equal and urn qual, only you must not assume unessential habitudes, but such as are adapted to in¬ telligible essences. For the most principal habitude is there, where tlu-re is a more abundant communion, and all things subsist primarily, lienee Plato says, “ and to what it is especially related." Hut the in a cei tain respect (oxr,) subsists in intclligibles, so far as each of them is not wholly the one, but altera certain man¬ ner jrj: for the one is simply one. And again, the same which is there, is also different, but is not simply ditlerent; since if it were, dillcrenee ' would be no other than sameness. The like also takes place in the rest. All things

• For tn/w rrju/i litre, it is obviously neiessaiy to read rrrpcrijf.

BOOk III.]

TlNLT.rs OP PLATO.

therefore, says ho, air* all, anil each is one according to essence, hut all tilings according to participation. And this is what the in a certain respect is in intellii