The Commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor

that opinion being arranged between sense and diangia, should know the essences fon) > ’

* These reasons in a divine soul, subsist both gnostically and fabricatively, and inthe human soul also, taey thus subsist, when it revolves on high in conjunction with the Gods; but during tue union of the soul with this outward body, they subsist in it gnostically onls.

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of sensibles, through the reasons which it contains, but should be ignorant of the causes of them. For thus right opinion will differ from science in this, that it alone knows that a thing is, science being able to survey likewise the cause of it. But sense adheres to opinion, being also itself a medium between the instrument of sense and opinion. For the instrument of sense apprehends sensibles accompanied with passion, TTence also it is corrupted through the excess of sensibles. But opinion possesses knowledge undefiled with passion, Sense however participates in a certain respect of passion, but has also something gnostic, so far as it is established in the doxastic part, is laminated by it, and) partakes of the form of reason, since it isin itself irrational. In this, therefore, the series of gnostic powers is terminated, of which indecd intelligence is the leader, which is above reason, and is without transition. But reason has the second order which is the intelligence of our soul, transitively coming into contact with real beings. Opinion has the third order, being a knowledge of sensibles conformable to reason. And sense has the fourth order, being an irrational knowledge of sensibles. For dianoia, being a medium between intelligence and opinion, is gnostic of middle forms, which require a more obscure apprehension than that of intelligence, but a clearer pereeption than that of opinion; as Socrates said on the preceding day, when he defined the ditferent kinds of knowledge by the objects of knowledge.

It must be said, therefore, that opinion is according to reason, because it possesses gnostic reasons of the essences of things, but that it is otherwise irrational, as being ignorant of causes. For Socrates in the Banquet, speaking of it says, “since it is an irrational thing, how can it be science?” But it must be admitted that sense is entirely irrational. For in short, since each of the senses knows the passion produced about the animal by the object of sense, hence intelligence is an intransitive, but dianoia and reason a transitive knowledge ; opinion a knowledge in conjunction with reason but without the assignation of cause; sense an irrational Knowledge of passions; and the instrument of sense passion enly. Thus, for instance, when an apple is presented to us, the sight indeed knows that it is red from the passion about the eye, the smell that it is fragrant from the passion about the nostrils, the taste that it is sweet, and the touch that it is smooth. What then is it which says that the thing presented to us is an apple? For it is not any one of the partial senses; since each of these knows one certain thing only about the apple, and not the whole of it; nor does even the common sense know this. For this alone distinguishes the differences of the passions; but it does not know that the thing which possesses an essence of such a kind is the Tim. Piat, Vou. I. 2Dp. 210 whole thing. Hence, it is evident that there is a certain power superior to the senses, which knowing the whole prior to the things which are as it were parts, and surveying the form of it, is impartibly connective of these many powers. This power, therefore, Plato calls opinion, and on this account, he denominates that which is sensible doxastic. ‘

This power, therefore, Plato calls opinion, and on this account, he denominates that which is sensible doxastic. ‘

Farther still, since the senses frequently announce various passions, and not such as things of this kind are in themselves, what is it in us which judges and says, that the sight is deceived when it asserts that the sun is but a foot in diameter, and that the taste which pronounces honey to be bitter, is the taste of those that are diseased?) For it is entirely evident that in these, and all such-lke particulars, the senses announce indeed their own passions, and are not perfectly deceived. For they say what the passion is ubout the instruments of sense, and itis athing of such a kind as they assert it to be; but that which says what the cause is of the passion, and forms a judgment of it, is something different from sense, Hence, there is acertain power of the soul superior to sense, which no longer knows sensibles through an instrument but through itself, and corrects the wrossness of sensible information, And this) power indeed which is reason as with reference to sense, is irrational as with reference to the knowledge of trily existing beings. But sense is simply irrational, On this account, Plato in’ the Republic calling this power opinion, shows that it is a medium between hnowledge and ignorance: for it is indeed a rational knowledge, but it is mingled with irrationality, knowing sensibles in’ conjunction with sense, But sense is alone irrational, as ‘Timwus also denominates it; i the first place, because it is also inherent in irrational animals, and is characteristic of every irrational life; for by these things, what is said in the Theatetus distinguishes it from science. In the second place, because in contradistinction to all the parts of the irrational soul, it is disobedient to reason. For the irascible and epithymetic parts, are obedient to reason and its mandates, and receive from it erudition. But sense though it should hear reason ten thousand times asserting that the sun is greater than the earth, yet would) still see it to be a foot in diameter, and would not otherwise announce itto us. In the third place, because neither does it [accurately] know that which it knows. For it is not naturally adapted to see the essence of it. For it does not know what a white thing is, butit knows through passion that it is white. It likewise is not separated from the instrument of sense,’ and is therefore on this account irrational. For thus in the Georgias,

* Instead of διακέκριται δε ro acaOnrnpior in this place, it is necessary to read ov &caxexpiraa δὲ τὸν αισθητηριον.

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