The Commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor

Open to allProclus; trans. Thomas Taylor1234 segments · 412 pp

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" Instead of cura ro ny here, it is uecessary to read cara ro εν.

* For εξησταται here, it is necessary to read εξετασται.

> Instead of ἀφιστησιν in this place, it is requisite to read ἀφίησιν. 4 For ra aw avrov bere, read ra ax’ avrwy.

“20 PROCLUS ON THE [βοοκ "1.

its being invested with forms; for every form is a measure ; and of its participation of order. For order is the reason of things that are arranged, ‘Lhe paradigm, /however, is not the cause of matter, but ofthe production of form, and of the order vin forms. But the Demiurgus is the cause of order, Hence also Plato says, that ‘the Demiurgus received matter now advancing to the participation of forms. — Since all causes therefore, subsist always and at once, but of their effects, some "proceeding as far as to things that are last [1. e. to bodies], but others as far as to things which are beyond both, through the extension of superior causes ;—this being the case, the paradigm indeed, receives matter from ¢he good, and invests it with form; for forms, so far as they are forms, are the progeny of the paradigm ; but the Demiurgus receiving forms from the paradigm adorns them with numbers, and inserts in themorder. After this manner therefore, you must conceive, if you disjoincauses. Ifalso you say, that the Demiurgus 15 the one cause of all things, [ he produces indeed in one way according to his goodness [or the good which he | derives from the ineffable], but in another way according to his own paradigmatic, “andas we may say, artificial peculiarity. Ashe produces likewise collectively, atonce, and eternally,diflerent things proceed from a different peculiarity contained in him, | For according to the good, he produces matter, form and order; but according to the ‘paradigm in him, form; and according to his artificial peculiarity, order. Hence this thing which is invested with form prior to order, has these representations of forms from the paradigm which is in its own nature intelligible | From this order hkewise, the Oracles produce abundantly-various matter. For they say, “ From thence entirely leaps forth the generation of abundantly-various matter.” For the first matter does not possess a great variety ; nor ts there a generation of this, but of that matter which has vestiges the forerunners of forms ; from which it is evident that the paradigm and the Demiurgus differ from each other, since matter indeed participates of the former prior to the fabrication of the world, when according to the hypothesis, the Demiurgus was absent; but it especially receives something from the latter when it is arranged and adorned, and then the Demiurgus is present with it. The word therefore recetving, may be said to indicate the paradigmatic cause which is exempt from the demiurgic providence, from which the Demiurgus receives the subject of things, now variegated with certain vestiges of forms. It may also be said, that a different work participates of a diflerent power, ) though we may survey all powers in the Demiurgus. For he will be the same divinity who receives and who delivers, essentializing, or adorning things by different powers.

For he will be the same divinity who receives and who delivers, essentializing, or adorning things by different powers.

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But the words, ‘“cehich was not in a state of rest but moved,” show that the 7 hypothesis alone imparts to the subject a nature from which motion is derived. For the nature of it being irrational and not governed by divinity, what kind of) order can it be able to preserve? This however is evident, from the Politicus,! where, separating the Demiurgus from the world, Plato says, that it was moved by a certain fate, and an essentially connascent desire. Hence supposing here in conjunction with fabrication, what he there supposed after it, he introduces the privation of order to the motion of the visible nature, this motion being produced without intellect. And thus much for this particular. Again, the words, “ he led it’ from disorder into order,” signify the participation of intellect, and an intellectual life. But the word conceiving indicates the demiurgic intelligence, which is analogous to his will and power. Previously assuming therefore, will in the ἡ expression “ being willing,” and power in the expression “ as much as possible,” in the third place, he adds intellectual knowledge in the term, “ conceiving.” For in the Laws, he characterizes divine providence by these three things, vis. by goodness, power, and knowledge. And goodness indeed is paternal, and pertains to the first natures; but power is maternal, and ranks in the second place; and intellect, which is gnostic, is the third. Goodness therefore is the first, but power is with him, viz. with the first of the triad, and intellect, which is from him, is the third. Again, the words, “ that was in every respect better than this,” signify that order is better than disorder. For it was thus said, viz. “ that he led ' it from disorder into order.” "The word this also has an indication of the disorder then present which the Demiurgus received ; buat the word that represents to us the order pre-existent in the Demiurgus, according to which also he is about to arrange disorderly natures. Aristotle therefore, did not know the order which is in the Demiurgus, but that which is in effects. Tle places however, the excellent in both; in order that according to him, intellect may abide in itself, but may in no respect be effective of secondary natures. But Plato following Orpheus, says, that order is firstin the Demiurgus, and the whole prior to parts. For the Demiurgus being ali things intellectually, made all things to exist sensibly. For if he produces by his very being or existence; and it is necessary that he should, in order that we may not ascribe to him deliberate choice, which is an ambiguous tendency ; he either produces by a separation of parts from himself, and by a diminution of his own powers, in the same manner as fire, or abiding such as he is [without any

" For nxev here, itis requisite to read ηγεν.

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alteration], he produces successive natures by his very being. It is however, alwurd to say, that he produces by a separation of parts from himself: for neither js nature diminished in producing the hair or teeth, or any other of the parts of the body. Much more therefore, is it fit to preserve an exempt essence, and which gives subsistence to itself, undiminished. But if remaining that which he is, he produces by his very being, through this indeed, he produces that which is similar to himself; but through a separation of parts, he does not ' make that which he produces wholly similar to himself. For that which is diminished, does not make according to the whole of itself. All things therefore, subsist in him primanly. But external natures are the images of his allness, (ravroryros) and order exists in one way in effects, and in another in paradigms. Tor the former is complicated with disorderly natures, but the latter is order itself, subsisting in, and being of itself; that it may be able to arrange things disorderly, and may be exempt from them, and prescrye its Own essence in undefiled purity. And thus much concerning the meaning of the words.

It deserves however not to be omitted, that Plato here imitates the theologists, in supposing the existence of a confused and disorderly nature prior to. the fabrication of the world. For as they introduce the wars and seditions of the Titans against the Olympian Gods. So likewise Plato presupposes these two things, the unadorned and that which is effective of ornament, that the former of these may be adorned, and participate of order, They however speak theologically. For they arrange in opposition to the Olympian Gods, the patrons of bodies. But Plato philosophically transfers order from the Gods to the subjects of their government.

In the next place, therefore, let us concisely narrate the sacred conceptions which the philosopher Porphyry here delivers. In the first place, then, he opposes Atticus and his followers, who admit that there are many principles, conjoining to each other the Demiurgus and ideas. These also say, that matter is moved by an unbegotten, but irrational and malevolent: soul, and is borne along in a confused and disorderly manner. That according to time likewise, matter exists prior to that which is sensible, irrationality to reason, and disorder to order, ‘Let there however be, as they say, matter and God, both being without generation from acause. Hence, the unbegotten is common to them. At the same time, they differ from each other. They differ therefore, by something eise, and not by the unbegotten. Hence, that by which they differ from each other, will

| * Instead of καθολον here, it is necessary to read ov καθ᾽ ολον. { wt ervgeut 2 a AWA A,

͵ - t } ! " vberwnct

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