The Commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor

For Proclus is speaking of the τὸ Ἂν».

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“ Ievery thing however, which is generated, is from necessity generated by a certain cause. [or it is pertectly impossible that it should have generation without a cause.”

Timeus, in a manner truly conformable to the geometric method, after the definitions assumes these axioms. For having said what being and what that which ts gencrated are, he adds these other common conceptions ; that the thing which is gencrated, is entirely generated by a cause; but that the thing which is not generated by a cause, cannot have generation. From these axioms also it is evident that ro διαιρετον, does not signify the dividing method, but that the hypotheses are to be defined. For the assertion that every thing which is generated, is necessarily generated by a certain cause, and that it is impossible for it to have generation without a cause, and also the following axiom, that what is generated according to an eternal paradigm is rendered beautiful, all these being axioms, are to be considered as belonging to the term διοριστέον, and not to be parts of division. Since however one of the present axioms is more clear, but the other is less known and clear, hence Timieus places the one as the middle term, but the other as the conclusion. For the axiom, every thing which is generated, is necessarily generated by a certain cause, is the conclusion. But the axiom, it is entirely impossible that it should have generation without a cause, is the iniddle, in order that the syllogism may be categoric, and may be in the first figure, as follows: It is impossible for that which is generated to be generated without a cause. But this is necessarily generated by a certain cause. Every thing therefore which is generated, is from necessity generated by a certain cause. For it is better to collect: what is said after this manner, as the divine Jamblichus also thinks we ought, than to make, as some other persons do, the syWogism to be hypothetical. But how is the middle more known than the conclusion? For it is evident that a thing must necessarily be, which it is impossible should not be, and that itis impossible a thing should not be, which necessarily is. Or ina certain respect each of these is the same. But frequently it is not known that a thing necessarily is, but that it is impossible for it not to be, is known. Thus for instance, the physician says [to his patient] it is necessary you should be nourished, and he will in a less degree persuade the sick man. But if he says, it is impossible to live without being nourished, this will now compel the paticnt [to take nutriment}. And again, death is necessary through a certain cause: for it is impossible not to die [i 6. to avoid death}, And, it is necessary to give money

Tim. Plat. Vou. I. 2£

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And again, death is necessary through a certain cause: for it is impossible not to die [i 6. to avoid death}, And, it is necessary to give money

Tim. Plat. Vou. I. 2£

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that is owing to a tyrant: for itis impossible not to give it, And in a great variety of other instances, you may in asimilar manner see, that one of these is more ubscure, but the other more known, though both may appear to signify the saine thing.

How, therefore, in the words before us, is the one clearer than the other? For what if in some things this should be true, but in others not? May we not say, that here also it is easy to learn how that which is generated, when it is separated from its cause, is powerless and imbecile? For not being able tu preserve itself, neither is it connected by itself. But as it derives from its cause alone its preseryation and connexion, if it is separated from its cause, itis evident that it becomes of itself powerless, and being dissipated, departs into non-entity, which also demonstrates that what is generated, catnot be venerated without a cause. lor if it is generated, it is generated by a certoin maker. Hence it is rightly said in the Philebus, that whatis generated ts made, but that which makes is the cause to /that which is made! (of its being made]. If, however, this be the case, itis either generated by itself, or by another. Butat’ ly itself, it passes into the same with perpetual being ; and thus that which is generated, and that which always is, will be the same, and a generated nature will rank among things that have an eternal subsistence. But if it is not generated by itself, it is entirely generated by another, For it is necessary that what is generated, should be generated by something, if it is that which is generated, and not [real] being. Por not connecting itself, nor making itself in energy, it will suffer this from something else. And being itself by itself imbecile, it will derive power from another, Farther still, though the same thing should both act and suffer, so far indeed as it is that which suflers, it suflers from another, and so faras itis ctlective it operates on another, That also which is generated, so far as itis generated: sutlers, Bat if it sutlers, it suffers from something else: for itis not naturally adapted to generate itself. For it would be before itis generated, and would bein energy prior to subsisting in capacity. For itis necessary that what operates should operate in energy on that which is in capacity. Plato, therefore, conjoining that which is generated to cause, which he does in the conclusion, very properly uses the term from necessity. Kor firmness and stability accompanied by persuasion accede to that which is venerated, from its cause: just as he says inthe Politicus, that arenovated tmmorality is imparted to the world from its father. But separating that which is

Kor firmness and stability accompanied by persuasion accede to that which is venerated, from its cause: just as he says inthe Politicus, that arenovated tmmorality is imparted to the world from its father. But separating that which is

Por τῷ yeyropery here, it is requisite to read ry ποιουμένῳ.

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renerated from its cause, which he does in the middle, he uses the term impossible. For that which is generated, surveyed by itself, is inefhicacious and imperfect.

Moreover, in employing the word cause, he indicates the uniform power of {πθ΄ demiurgic principle; calling the demiurgic cause, not simply that which gives subsistence to another thing ; for Socrates says that the good is the cause of intellicibles, but it is not the demiurgic cause of them. For the demiurgic is attributed to veneration as Plato says in the Philebus, “ that the demiurgic refers to that which ts gencrated.” Hence, prior to the world, there are different causes of different things, but there are not demiurgic causes of generated natures. If therefore, there are many demiurgic causes, there is also one such cause [prior to the many]. For in short, if that which is generated is one, union must accede to it from its cause, and therefore itis much more necessary that its cause should be uniform and connective of multitude, in order that what is generated may become one conformably to the union pre-existing in its cause. And thus much concerning these particulars,