The Commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor

And the words, “ for that which is similar to an imperfect thing can never be beautiful,” is indeed true, but is attended with a doubt.

358 PROCLUs ON THE [BOOK II,

For if in that whichis a whole one thing 15 more, but another less excellent, must not the whole become inferior to its more excellent part, by the addition of that which is less excellent? But the doubt may be solved by observing, that the co-arrangement of the less with the more excellent makes the whole to be one and perfect, but when they are not conzlomerated with cach otber, then the mixture of the less diminishes the power of the more excellent nature, If however, some one should make a syllogism from opposites, through what is here, and what has been before said, so as to infer that every thing which is generated according to an eternal, is not generated according to an eternal paradigm, we may solve the objection by observing that what 15 employed by the objector as the middle term, isnot so. For in one place, the words “in order that it might be beautiful,” manifest that which is beautiful, whether ina certain respect, or simply ; but in another place, they manifest that which is most beautiful. For a part has indeed the beauty of a part, but simply considered, is not beautiful. But that alone is absolutely beautiful which is a whole, to which also the beauty of the parts contributes 5 this beauty pertaining to certain things, and being itself a cerfain (and not atoiversal) thing. For every part is for the sake of another thing, 1. δὶ the whole, and the beauty which it possesses has the order of matter with reference to the beauty of the whole. Hence itis not so beautiful as to be most beautiful. From what has been said, those assertions Likewise may be confuted, which mnake the good to be a certain intelligible form and not prior to all intelligibles. For if it is a certain form, itis also a part of the whole intelligible profundity in which it subsists. But every part, as it is here said, is imperfect; so that the good likewise is imperfect. How therefore being imperfect is it the most happy of all things? In reality also that which is sinjjlar to it is not beautiful. Nor are all beings similarly with reference to it, either more good, more beautiful. “Uf therefore the good being a part, will suffer things of this 7 it will not be a part of the intelligible. Moreover, neither 15 it the whole of the intelligible. For being the whole of the intelligible, over what will it still reign? = Since neither is the sun which has an arrangement analogous to the good" the whole of that which is visible. It is necessary therefore, that the good should be beyond the intelligible, and be neither a part nor the whole of it. Neither therefore, will either animal itself, or the Demiurgus be the same with ¢he good ; since each of these is a certain whole comprehensive of all forms.

* For τ᾽ ἀγαθὸν bere, read τ᾽ αγαῦφ.

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Neither therefore, will either animal itself, or the Demiurgus be the same with ¢he good ; since each of these is a certain whole comprehensive of all forms.

* For τ᾽ ἀγαθὸν bere, read τ᾽ αγαῦφ.

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“ But we should admit it to be the most similar of all things to that animal of which other animals, both according to one, and according to genera, are parts.”

Some, as Atticus, assert that this “ according to one, andaccording to genera,” gives a division to individual opposite to that of more common forms. But they call individual forms those that are proximate, and the causes of individuals; such for instance as man itself, horse itself, and each of such-like forms. And they denominate genera the more total and comprehensive paradigms of these. Others again, as Amelius, say that Plato by these words, distinguishes that which is particular from things that are more common. For some things are paradigms of parts, but others of forms, Theodorus also, following Amelius, says there are twofold intellects, one of these being divided into wholes, but the other into parts. And that these are the same with, “ according to genera, and according to one.” But others, as Nenarchus, assert, that according to genera inanifests the pre-existent intelligible causes of animals; such for instance as the celestial, aerial, aquatic and terrestrial, which are shortly after mentioned by Timeus. And that by “ according to one,” the formalizing principles in each of these many are indicated. For in celestial natures, the paradigm of the sun is different from the paradigm of the moon. In terrestrial natures, the paradigm of men is different from that of ions. And in a similar manner in the natures which have an intermediate subsistence. The divine Iamblichus however, turns into a path of interpretation contrary to all these. For they indeed make the “ according to one,” subordinate to, and more partial than, “ according to genera ;” but he, on the contrary, makes it to be more venerable, as it is fit that in intelligibles unity should precede multitude. He says therefore, that all other animals are the parts of animal itself, both according to one, and according to genera. For they are comprehended and perfected by animal itself, both according to the multitudes they contain, and according to their unities. Nor is there any one of them which does not proceed from the intelligible. For intelligible animal is comprehensive of all the things posterior to it, not as deriving its completion from them. For itis a whole prior to,’ and does not derive its subsistence from parts. Nor is it a whole, as being predicated of parts; for it is the cause of the many. But it is

* Intelligible animal, or animal itself, isa whole prior to parts, because it comprehends parts in itself causally,

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Nor is it a whole, as being predicated of parts; for it is the cause of the many. But it is

* Intelligible animal, or animal itself, isa whole prior to parts, because it comprehends parts in itself causally,p. 360 a whole, as a primordial principle, and as filling all things posterior to itself with itself. Hence it comprehends what are called parts tinpartibly, many species uniformly, and exists in an all-perfeet manner prior to secondary paradigms. For this principle indeed, is the universe intelligibly ; but of the natures posterior to it, one is all things celestially, another atter a solar, another after a terrestrial manner, and another in some other way, according to the different causes of mundane natures. So that this principle comprehends all things all-perfeetly, but all things are comprehended by each of the natures posterior to it partially, as with reference to the intelligible allness. The world therefore, is also similar to these partial animals ; since itis likewise similar to the Demiurgus ; but it is most similar to animal itself, so far as it is an animal. For animal itself was primary intelligible animal. Henee, that which is most similar is so ina twofold respect; either because it is similar to other things, or because other things are similar to it. But this is especially the case with the universe, and it is espe- Gially similar to animal itself.

* For this indeed, has all intelligible animals comprehended in itself, just as this world contains us, and such other animals as are the objects . μὲ ” of sight.

Plotinus supposes animal itself to exist ina twofold respect. For atone time he considers it to be more excellent than intellect, as in his treatise intitled Different Considerations, but at another, aa inferior to it, as in his treatise Coucerning Numbers, when he says that being ts first, afterwards intellect, and afterwards animal itself. But Theodorus, who says, that each of the demiurgt has a triples hyparxis, thinks fit to call the third in each, animal itself. From both, however, the truth may be assumed. From the admirable Theodorus indeed, that it has the third order in intelligibles; but from the most divine Plotinus, that it is inferior to one intellect, but beyond another. And it must be said, that unfolding itselfanto light at the end of intelligibles, it generates from intelligible life all the number of intellectual, supermundane, and mundane animals, supernally as αν ἀν τὸ the last of things. Tt is likewise comprehensive of all things, being exempt from, and uniformly and antecedently containing ta itsclf{ the causes of them, For Orpheus also indicates things of this kind about it, when theologizing

* For τρίτην here, it is necessary to read rpm Nyy.

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