The Commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor
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And the energy which changes the subject of its energy in the same and about the same, is a stable motion. Every Iveing therefore, participates by its very existence of this triad, viz. of essence, jvovver and energy, on account of these five genera, and also is, possesses capability and
* rii-ru o omitted in the ordinal.
* Instead of irnrrn yap to or hi this place, it is obviously necessary to read rar yap to or.
1 Both the sense and the version of Lconicus Tlioiuacus require the insertion in this place of if *ir>jni» tar i, ^ oraeu, rj »vi. trtpytta yap rev rov.
p. 28
PROCI.US OS TIIK
[book 111.
energizes. In short, since* every tliiiur xxhie-h in any way whatever has existence, consists of ImuiikI ami infinity, it is i sscntializeil irnleed and subsists ae-e-ordin" to a participation c»l both these. lbit it possesses sameness xvith itself thron'di the communion of these two; anil dillcivucc, through the division n f tlu-in- Nince also it is not the first, it proceeds from the principle of things, am | ; ,bidi s m it, so that it is both Mimed and is permaiieiit. TIiim* liie centra therefore are in entry Iwienr, so far as it is In inn, tlmnuli they subsist difl'en utlx in dill'erent lieinirs. I'or iutelli-^ibles hate all these esseutialli ; intelliuibleand at the s,mi,, tune intei lei tu d natures, possess them u cording to sameness ml* lleetuals ai ctirdim' to ilillerein e; psychical natures aecmduu to pelmaiienev ; and corporeal natures uiccordin^ to motion. Hut \u e ieisa, if life is motion, and sluggishness perman¬ ency : tor souls indeed, are essential ||\| S, but bodies aie alter-Uloti\e. Ii how¬ ever, motion am! permanency are prior to sameness and ilitli-reiiee, as we may di nioiistrale from other reasonings, * ailing the progression of each thm^ from its cause,* a motion prior to energy, and its abiding in its , aiise, a pernianeiiey prior to the iiueiieriietic eondition w bit h is oppos, ,| to cncrirx ;—it this be the ease, aft. r intelliiribles, the inti Nimble and at the s one time intellectual natures, will subsist according to permanency, hut inlellei luaU accord iu?> to motion. Souls also will dins subsist according to same ness, but bodies accordin'.; to dilleiem e. Hut if we should sax that lile is niolioii, and immutable inti'lli^i iiee permaneiicv, :i”ain inti IImibh s will bee liarai t. rized according to (lie essential ; but intelligible and at the same time intellectual natures, Inin.; lixes, aeeordiu^ to motion ; ami intellee tu.il naluies, heiii'4 e ssent lal i/ed m intellect, a. cording to p. nil am iicx ; for -mimlaiie nature s ch ine thi ir permaiieiiex from intellec t. M-xrliical natures also cording to p. nil am iicx ; for -mimlaiie nature s ch ine thi ir permaiieiiex from intellec t. M-xrliical natures also xx <!l t ms subsist accord ii il;Io sameness, because thex contain tlu- bond 1 of impartdde s and partibles ; but cerpon tl nature s xxill subsist accordim; to tlilli-reucc i lor m these, as tbc'y an p utihle, strife lias ilomiuioii. The*se lixe- natures lioxxevc r, are silcfcsiw to e aeli othe r, xiz beinm life, inte lle c t, soul, and body ; because; the total m nera whic h are 1 prior to forms, are likewise- Inc. \ml thus much may he said couceriihi£ the live 1 ”e ncra miners.ellx ; only ohserxin;; in adelition, that the* .same* things an; called both ue nera and elements. And the first e»f sec'imd natures iiideeel arecalle'd •jciiera ; hut the.se* remaining imdiiuiiiished and e xempt lrom partial natures, are the eause-s of their e xi-te ru e 1 . Hut e ac h of the- sexeral
Inst, d.l wl r.i .S. I( r,r.i, tm .ora r» uvro her. 1 , it is net vssary In rt .nl rn K , , u „ na< „.ijro turn rv ui'ro.
I his progression is tlitnliiTr ili “aiillj c.ille.t liy Proelus, an intffablr unfolding into light.
tor a bond is union, and sameness is union of essence.
HOOK 111.]
TIM.rX'S or PLATO.
'29 tilings of which the whole consists, an* railed elements. J’or tlie "encra hi the Dcmim" ii-n ^i\e oomph tion to the demiurgic hein*:, and are the elements of it; hut they are th<‘ genera of all the forms contained in the intellects that proeeeil from him. and also of all those tii.it are in souls and bodies. 1
J’or tlie "encra hi the Dcmim" ii-n ^i\e oomph tion to the demiurgic hein*:, and are the elements of it; hut they are th<‘ genera of all the forms contained in the intellects that proeeeil from him. and also of all those tii.it are in souls and bodies. 1
L t us, however, n you are Milling, proceed to the fifth head, and consider how these genera subsist in souls, and why IMato assumes them. Since, therefore, it has been shown that the soul is the medium between beings and non-beings, and that it knows all beings, both mtelli^ihles and sensililes, whether accordin'.: to the same or accord im: to dilli rent reasons, as some say, it is necessary that the cssi nee ot it should proceed from tile genera of beiii'j. For if it did not proceed from these, but from certain others, it would not be able to know all things, nor to S apply itself to all things. Hence as it knows man aceordin^ to the reason [or form] whir h it contains of man, and d.i'iuon according to the form which is in it of (hemon, thus also it knows hem;: itself, aerordim: to the participation in it of helm:, and ditlereneo according to its participation of difference. So that it will contain all the genera, but in a wav adapted to it»< If. l or it appears to me, that on tins account Plato constitutes the soul from the first *^em ra, and from numbers and harmonic ratios ; and likewise, that lie places in it tin* principles of figures and divine motions, in order that hv antecedently (or cansallyj comprehendim: the reasons of all disciplines and of ilialeetie. it mi^ht thus know all things, vi/. the ? essences, the nimiliers, the harmonies, the figures, anrl the motions ot whieh wholes consist. ll seems likewise, that h< constitutes the soul, as beiim allied to iutelli^ihles, from the genera ol beiiu;, whieh primarily subsist in them ; hut that he <:ives tenure to the soul, as Iwiim alheil to sensililes. For thini;s which are t i it I v figured are sensible*. And that as beim; a medium between intelli^ibles and sensililes, he imiils it with hariiionie ratios ; though m intelligible forms also, there are the form of harmony, and the form ol figure. Hut harmony itself, is not harmonized, nor is figure itself figured. For things which have a primary sub¬ sistence do not exist accordim: to participation. In sensible** also, harm>mv and the genera of hein^ subsist but partibly ; but in souls they subsist iucorporeally and at the same time compositely, 1 and participation manifests their composite nature.* For participation pertains to composites, hut incorporality is the pecu¬ liarity of simple natures. It is necessary however for that which primarily parti-
* Tor Tuiy €V nubia'll yfiwr here, It It requisite to n ail TVv rr ovfinoi titvr.
* In dead of t) a/i/wua ill tins plarc, il is iit-cosarj to rcait airrrj rj append.
1 I'or aevrOrrvt iirrr, il is uc« cssary In read trvrlkrwt.
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