The Commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor

For it was constituted by him who composed it, from ald fire, water, airand earth; and he did not leave externally any part or power of any one of the clements.”

* Instead of euros here, it s requisite to read ovrws.

p. 133

Plato knew, as we have before observed, that there are many differences of fire, of water, and of each ofthe other elements; from all which, he says, the worid derives its completion; and he confers this as the thira demiurgic gift on the world. So that we must not wonderif he leaves the summits of the four elements in the heavens, but the middle progressions of them in the sublunary regions, and the last dregs of them in the subterranean realms, distributing the elements analogous to the three demiurgi Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto. For each whole of them is assumed, and the universe consists of all of each; whether you speak of that which is primarily fire, and is celestial, or of that which has a middle rank, or of that which is the last, which is disorderly and confused, and is coloured over with certain fiery qualities. Kor such as we suppose the confused and inordinate to be, such especially appears to be each of the subterranean elements ; because fabrication in proceeding, ends gradually in that which is unadorned, and which participates in the smallest degree of order. These things, therefore, are manifest.

We say, however, that part and power differ; so far as a part of each of the elements, Is of a similar essence with the whole of which it is a part, but power gives completion to each of the elements, For a part of fire is fire; Sut power is one of the many peculiarities in fire, such as motion, acuteness, and tenuity. Itis evident, therefore, that all tire, and all the powers of fire, and of the other elements, are comprehended in the world. What then, some one may say who is impelled by the divine wisdom which is beyond the confines of common philosophy ;' who divides all things, into the empyrean, the etherial, and the material;* and who calls the visible alone the material world, what shall we assert of the firmaments that are above the world, whether it be requisite to call them Olympus, or empyrean, or ethers? May we not say, that though those firmaments should not consist of the four elements, again it is true, that no part of the four, is external to the universe, or rather, as Plato says, is erternally. For the term ectlernally, is more emphatical, because it manifests, that the violence which these clements bring with them, is not within the universe, but externally invades it. For those lirmaments are fiery, and are comprehended in the whole world. And again it

* Proclus means by this, the wisdom of the Chaldeans, as delivered in their Oracles.

For those lirmaments are fiery, and are comprehended in the whole world. And again it

* Proclus means by this, the wisdom of the Chaldeans, as delivered in their Oracles.

> According to the Chaldeans there are seven corporeal worlds, one empyrean and the first; after Wis, three ethereal; and then three material worlds, which consist of the inerratic sphere, the seven planetary spheres, and the sublunary region.

Tim. Plat, Vou. i. 41

p. 434

is true, that there is no fire out of the universe, but the universe comprehends the whole of it, such as the universe is, and such as is the amplitude of its bulk. So that the assertion of Tiinwus 15. perfectly true. But why then, some one may say, does he give subsistence to the universe, beginning from the inerratic sphere? Is it net because it belongs to a natural philosopher to discourse about visible, and in short, sensible natures? Perhaps, too, he very properly alone makes mention of these, as pertaining to the fabrication of Jupiter. For of those [10 e. the empyrean, etherial, and material worlds] the etherial is most vivific, but the empyrean is paternal, and the material is demiurgic. For the fire which is the first beyond, did not englose its’ power in works, but in intellect : for the artificer of the fiery (i.e. the empyrean) world ts an intellect * of intellect, says the Oracle. Unless it be requisite to say this, that Plato produces soul analogous to the etheral worlds, but intellect, to the empyrean world. Ifence also he says, that soul was mingled from three parts, but that intellect is impartible. For the etherial is triple, and the Psychocrator, or mingler of soul, who ascends into the cetherial worlds, is a Teletarch. " We Jearn, alsu, that the empyrean world is one, and is essentially intellectual. These things therefore must hereafter be considered : for itis very dubious how they accord with the dogmas of Plato. Now, however, let us pass on to the words that follow.

“ For by a dianoetic or reasoning process he concluded, that it would thus be a whole animal in the highest degree perfect from perfect parts. And besides this, that it would be one, as nothing would be left from which any other such nature might be produced. And further still, that it would neither be obnoxious to old age, nor disease. For he intellectually perceived, that the heat and cold which meet in body, and all such things as have strong and vigorous powers, when they surround bodies externally, and fall on them unseasonably, dissolve their union, and introducing diseases and old age, cause them to perish through decay.”

’ For ex buvapuy here, read env δνναμιν.

* Instead of γον yap ws, it is necessary to read νὸν yap vous.

Ὁ The Teletarchs subsist at the extremity of that order of Gods which is called intelligible and at the same time intellectual. See the 4th Book of wy translation of Proclus on the Theology of Plato.

Ὁ The Teletarchs subsist at the extremity of that order of Gods which is called intelligible and at the same time intellectual. See the 4th Book of wy translation of Proclus on the Theology of Plato.

Book 111} TIMJEUS OF PLATO. 430

Plato assigns three causes, that I may speak summarily, through which no element is left externally to the universe, viz. perfection, unity, and perpetuity. But all these reciprocate in the subject of them. For if the universe is perfect, there is nothing external to it. For another world might be generated from that which is external; since why should one thing be generated from these elements (which are within the worldJ, but nothing from those (which are external to it}? And if there is nothing external to the world, the world is one. Again, if the world is perpetual, there is no body external to the universe, homogeneous to the elements which are init. For if any thing should invade it, it would injure, and dissolve the universe. For being external, it would be foreign to the world, and being foreign it would molest the universe. And if nothing is external to the world, the world is perpetual. For it will not have that which is corruptive of it. If also the admonition respecting the onlyness, perpetuity, and perfection of the universe, is true, it was before assumed from the paradigm. For that was all-perfect, uniform {or having the form of one], and eternal ; the second of these, on account of the one being, from which the only-begotten is derived; but the third, through eternity, from which perpetuity is derived ; and the first, through comprehending all the forms of intelligible animals. For this is the peculiarity of all-perfect animal. But the all-perfect, indeed, is the cause of pertect natures ; the uniform, of monadic; and the eternal, of perpetual natures 3 since every producing cause, produces that which is second similar to itself, and especially when it produces according to essence, and has an essence inenergy. At the same time, also, each of these is demonstrated from these as material causes. For if there is nothing external to the universe, and if it comprehends all appropriate parts, it is one, perfect, and perpetual, Some one however may doubt, how Plato arguing from perpetuity, says that nothing is left external to the universe, For there are other perpetual natures, such as the celestial bodies, and yet something is external to them. But may you not say of these, that other things are external to them, and yet not external? For as naturally separated from other things, there is something external to them ; but as being co-passive with them, and comprehended together with them as most principal parts of the universe by one nature, there is notany thing external to them. But if any thing was external to the universe, it would be external alone, having no sympathy with the world. It would also be a thing of a foreign nature, would be destitute of the life which is in the world, and would be cut off from it, by the intervening vacuum.