The Commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor

The soul howevi r, as being nearer to its maker, is the hat; but body, ns being more remote from him, is indeed most beautiful , yet not the best. Tortlie must beautiful, is secondary to the best, in the same manner as beauty to the go ml .

In what is h. re said, however, Plato may seem to call the Duniurgtis the best of intelligible and eternal beings, in the same manner as lie calls the soul the In st of generated natures; ami thus to hear witness to those who make one (iod prior to the world. 1 But if some one should thus understand the words, by inverting them, yet at the same time it is evident from analogy, that we must not [dace in-

1 l'rotlu* ill what he litre alludes to the Chriilians.

BOOK III.]

TIM.T'US OF PLATO.

l.V»

1 But if some one should thus understand the words, by inverting them, yet at the same time it is evident from analogy, that we must not [dace in-

1 l'rotlu* ill what he litre alludes to the Chriilians.

BOOK III.]

TIM.T'US OF PLATO.

l.V»

telligible and eternal beings, as farms' in the Demiurgus, hut other essences pos¬ terior to him, if soul has the same ratio to all generated natures, that the Demiur¬ gus has to eternal beings. And must either make him look to things posterior to him, though in Ins speech to the junior Gods, when he commits to them the fabrication of mortal natures, he orders them to imitate his power about their generation, lie does not, therefore, fabricate immortal animals, b\ imitating things posterior to him. but things entirely prior to him, m the same manner a.s he wishes the junior finds to fabricate mortal natures by imitating him. Or if we avoid this inconvenience, we must admit that there are many intelligible Gods, though they are posterior to the Demiurgus, which those above alluded to. will not grant Will it not therefore be better to assert, either that the soul is said by Plato, to belong to int« lligibles and < ternal beings, as being the best of ge¬ nerate!] natures, and as truly both impartible and partible, in ennsei|uence of its middle subsistence between the two ; or that because he says it participates of rational energy and harmony, it In longs to [or primarily partieipali s of] int« lligi¬ bles and perpetual beings? For the harmony which is in it is generated, not being harmony' itself, but harmonized. And its rational energy is not eternal being, but has generation, as subsisting according to tune, anil being transitive, llow therefore does tin soul participate of the rational energy and harmony ? And how does it happen, that harmony and the rational energy, arc not primarily in the soul, but a< cording to partii ipation 1 I answi r, because these have a prior subsistence ill the Demiurgus. For he produces the .Muses, and A/nusagctcs [or the leader of the Muses, Apolloj, ami also the Mercurial series. lienee the ra¬ tional d< miurgie energy and harmony, subsist in him primarily; the former being Mercurial, but the latter Apolhmiaral. And the soul being filled from these, partieipali - of the rational t nergy, and of harmony. And if it lx* requisite to speak clearly, what appears to me to be tlie case, harmony must be conceived to have a three¬ fold subsistence; so as to be, either harmony itself, or that which is first harmonized; Leing a thing <j this kind according to the whole of itself; or that a hich is secondarily harmonized, and in a certain refect participates of harmony. And the first of these must be assigned to intellect; the second to soul; and the third to body. The rational likewise, or reasoning cm rgy, Inis a three-fold subsistence; the first lieing prim¬ ordial, the second according to participation; and the third according to re¬ presentation or resemblance. For there is aKo a certain vestige of the rational energy, in some irrational animals. Me likewise understand essence, figure, and power, in a three-fold respect. For essence, according to its primary subsistence.

For there is aKo a certain vestige of the rational energy, in some irrational animals. Me likewise understand essence, figure, and power, in a three-fold respect. For essence, according to its primary subsistence.

* For «« v »i hire, it u neccsrary to read «• itj.

p. 156

l’HOCLUS ON TI1K

[dock mi.

ami the first figure, ami the first power, are in intelligibles. But that which partici¬ pates in a certain respect of all these is the corporeal nature, l or there is also something [i. c. matter] which is unfigured, unessential, ami powerless. 1 he soul, however, has each of these according to participation ; but wholly participates of them according to the whole of itself. For it is wholly corroborated, is wholly i.nestcd with figure, ami wholly ’ ess. ntialli/ed. For the unfigurcd in it, does not precede the figured ; nor the powerless, power; nor the unessential, essence : since if tliev did, it would not at all ditler from material bodies. The soul therefore, participates'of the reasoning energy, „f harmony, figure and power, and wholly participates of each of these ; but body participates of them partially. \gain also, from these things, the middle nature of the soul presents its. If to the view, and it is also , \ file lit that IMato very properly says, that it w as generated by the best of causes, the first and he-t of gene rate it natures, and that it is invisible, but the first participant of intelligible harmony.

“ Since therefore the soul was mingled from these three, viz. from the nature of same and ditferent, and from essence, and was distributed into parts, and bound according to analogy, itself at the same time returning bv a circular energy to itself; hence, when it touches on a certain thing possessing a dissipated essence, and when on that which is impartible, it then speaks concerning it, being moved through the whole of itself.”