The Commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor

But since tin re is likewise a participation from more divine natures, Plato adds the word much, in order thid he may indicate the imh finiteness and confusion of a participation of this kind. For the participation of div itter natures, introduces to the participants, union, bound and order.

“ Hut the artificer of the world constituted soul both in generation and virtue prior to and more ancient than body, as the despot [or lord] and ruler of its servile nature; and that from certain things in the follow¬ ing manner.”

Porphyry subdividing, conceives the words to signify, that soul is more ancient than body in generation, but prior to it in virtue. Botli however, or cither, max be signified, and prior to and more ancient than , may be conjoined to the words in geftr rifiuv pvvXofii fia Toy rout ; but it appears lo me llial tlie wools ui wpririivTtpw ought to be expunged, unless »<• rrail instead of them ot«n orrpvr, (as more familiar to us), aud that for/icvXefuOa, wt sluMild read ov fiovXofiifla.

1 I'or KapawmovfirOa here, it appears to be requisite lo read *aptf wmovfjtba.

* In the original, veXXa it itn' firm, -u r< appXvyvvo i fupifjyai. But for ra r« il is obviously ►ary to read ron rf.

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PROCl.L'S ON THK

[hook III.

1 I'or KapawmovfirOa here, it appears to be requisite lo read *aptf wmovfjtba.

* In the original, veXXa it itn' firm, -u r< appXvyvvo i fupifjyai. But for ra r« il is obviously ►ary to read ron rf.

p. 14

PROCl.L'S ON THK

[hook III.

ncration ; anil apain, either may be conjoined to the words w virtue. But "( lieration when ascrilwd to the soul, is not that which is accord ins to time ; for I Mato in the Pint elms demonstrates that the soul is nnh.-otten and ind.Mrii.Mil.le; hut is an essential progression from inlelliuihk* causes. I*or of beings, some are in¬ telligible and nnhe^otteii, hut others are sensible and generated. And thetm dia Ik*, ween these, are intelligible and general.-.!, l or some things are entirely incomposite and impartible, and on this account are unbt-otten ; but others which .subsist between these, are intelligible and generated, belief naturally impartible and partible, and after another manner simple and composite. Genera¬ tion therefore, in the soul is one lliiii” but that in the body another. And tin* one, indeed, is prior and more aneieiit ; tor it is more proximate to the l)eiuiur*4iis of all things; but the other is secondary and more recent ; for it is more remote from the one [tabrirative cause nt all. ImiIIht sti! , \irtueis present with the soul, and it is also pr. sent with the body, and the whole animal; but the \ ntue of the soul is more divine, and that of the body, abject. And tin-former is of a more niliuir nature, and is nearer to the mm a! causes of intelliuibh Grtiie; hut the latter is of an attendant nature, and is more remote from iiilelh-ibles. Can ration, kuar, muni ft its progression, hut virtue, perfectivnundimivusiun ; of whit !», the former is from the fot ntam ot the soul . 1 but the latter is inherent in souls from i'onlal \irtue, (i. e from Vesta j. 'Hie prior list It also, and the more ancient, have a certain tlitli n nee w itli respect to each other. J-'or prior inthed, is si'jiiifieant if order alone ; but the more am nut, of the hanscemlcney of cause u ith nfireme to tin thing caused. Not eveiy thina therefore whieh is prior, can al>o be c died more atiei. nt, but that whit h is the leader <>l essence to seenmlary natures. Both however are true of the soul. F«.r sin* is allotted a prior order, beim; the sist, r of body, aeeordin- to the progression ot both from one fabriealion ; and >he ^viierates and adorns body in coiijnm lion with the father. IW the first pro-eny of raiiss, produce as they proceed the s* corn! progeny, in conjunction with tin* eau-es ot tin uist ns.

IW the first pro-eny of raiiss, produce as they proceed the s* corn! progeny, in conjunction with tin* eau-es ot tin uist ns.

What, however, shall vve say of the words , the lord and ruler 9 Do not both indicate, that the soul supplies all things with^ood, that it provides in every respee, for the hotly, ami that it pn-serves its own proper good in a thuinshincondition.* And how is it possible, that Plato should not manifest these things throiuih these wolds? For a despot or lord, alw ay s refers lh»r good ' ut those that

• Ii i, nct-Cssarv In 11 1 <» »u|i|ilv riji yi'X’O t hv louiltaiu ot I lie v»ul i~ Juno,

1 I'or ui/if»iii"t' in tin* |»I.u.e, read m/iuioi.

I l„,icud of ru TU,V uvuO-. n. a^.,... ill this |il.iee, U is m|iiisilf to re.ul ru ruie uyuOu uvayfpet.

mink m.J

TIMAiL'S Ol- PLATO.

p. 16

lie govt rn<. to Ins own good. Hut a ruler looks to the good of those who are obedient to him, ami eo-arranges all things with r« ferenre to it. 'Y\\c despotic jti cMiliarily, howncr, is present with tin: soul, in eonsefpieneo of her performing all tilings (of the sake of herself; hut the ruling peculiarity, through tilling all things with good. I’or her providential energy is not diminished, through referring all things to her own proper good. And her good remains unchanged, while she gives eomph lion to her providential energies. In another wav also she is a ruler and a despot: tor she proceeds both from the ruling, and the tout d soul.' Uerause likewise, the universe is her dwelling, she is railed it despot. And U-cause she lr ids all things by her motions, she has a ruling power. In rouseipn nee too, of h.mug dominion o\er wholes, she is a despot ; hut because she assimilates all things to the intelligible, she rules over the universe. If however, she was thus constituted at fust, as a despot and a ruler, these things arc essential to her, I mean the despotic and the ruling peculiarity, lint it they are essential, i!i-v are always present with her. And if indeed they were present with her in capacity alone, she would be impi rlei t, which it is not I ivvful to assert ; but it m energv, th it which is governed by In r alvvavs was, and was adorned by her. The uni¬ verse itself therefore, if it was so generated, as to be governed by soul, is consiihsistent with soul. Tor that wInch is governed is simultaneously conjoined with that w Inch governs. Ilenee through both, we mav discover the perpcliniv of the uiiiM ise, and that to govern is not aecuh ntal to soul, nor to In governed, to body, but that I he soul is, by its very essence, tbe despot of tin- body, and body the vassal of the soul. On this account also, they are spontaneously conjoined to e ii h other; and the body is excited to the participation ol the soul, and the soul to the ear* of the liody .