The Commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor

Hence this reason Ix-ing one, knows according to the same. I pV it does not sometimes know the intelligible, and sometimes the sensible, like our reason, winch is not able to apprehend both according to the same. This reason hook in.] TIM.IX'S OF PLATO. 105 therefore, knows at once both same and different about the intelligible, and about the sensible essence, not being true, like intellect, but becoming true about both, on account of the transitive nature of its knowledge of both. So that the words according lo same, signify the difference between the knowledge of a divine soul, ami our knowledge; but the word becoming signifies the difference between psychical and intellectual knowledge. This reason therefore, knows inlclligibles and sensibles, by coming into contact with intelligible and sensible sameness and difference; but it passes through the whole soul, here indeed, moving the circle of the same, but tin re, the cin le of the different; and by the one surveying in¬ telligible*, but by the other sensible*. In this respect likewise, it adumbrates the whole Demiurgus, concerning whom it is said, [by the Chaldean Oracles] “ by in¬ tellect he possesses intelligible*, but he introduces sense to the worlds.” For thus also the psychical reason, b< ing borne along in the soul so as to move both itself and the w hole soul, about intelligible and sensible sameness and difference, at one time produces opinions and persuasions, but at another, intellect and science, becoming indeed, and not being true, in the same manner as intcllci t itself. For in¬ tellect i* really true, and i* true according to same ; either a* at once know ing both beings and generated natures, or as always being such, and not sometimes, like the reason ofpartinl souls. For tin* i* not always invariably true, h< ing fill* d with error and ignorance through generation. Or this reason is becoming to be true, as being transitive in it* twofold knowledg ■; but is true according to same, as always comprehending the a hole form of each object of knowledge, and not conformably to our reason, evolving t m h of the forms which it beholds, but surveying at once the whole of • very thing which it sees. For we meeting with a different part of the same thing, do not see aeeording to same, but we perceive each thing partially. Or it mav be said, that this reason is according to same, when conversant with sameness and difference. Incoming simply after the same manner true, both about the intelligi¬ ble and the sensible, a* knowing both at once, so far as same, and so fir a* dif¬ ferent, that it may see and tell that the one lias it> progression from the other.

Incoming simply after the same manner true, both about the intelligi¬ ble and the sensible, a* knowing both at once, so far as same, and so fir a* dif¬ ferent, that it may see and tell that the one lias it> progression from the other.

lo be therefore, according to same, manifests that tins reason is gnostic, according to one projecting energy, both of that which is truly different, and that which is truly same. For possessing at once a transitive know ledge of these, tins reason is becoming to be true, anti of wInch the energy is to speak of that which is truly same, and of that w hich is truly different, in the intelligible, 1 and in the sensible nature. For the work of this reason is to see in what intelligible^ differ from sensibles. For it is necessary that there should lie a certain thing

1 There is uu omission here in llie original of row cr ry rotjry.

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I'ROCMIS ON tin:

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which is gnostic of both, in order that it may sav intelligible ■ are one thing, but sensible another. But “ it is borne alum' m that which is moved by it," as proceed¬ ing into the twofold circles, and turning both itself and them. For the bit ion manifests the progression from one knowledge, ditided into a twofold knowledge. This reason itself however, is a uniform knowledge [or a knowledge hating tin: form ot the one], both ot liitelhgibles and seiisibles. dr it may be said, that it speaks in tin* soil!, because the intelligible is one thing and the sensible another' or that it knows 1 both, being prior to both the circles, which know intelligibles and seiisihles m a divided manner. I or since the soul is both a monad ami a duad, according to one knowledge, it unitedly comprehends intelligibles and setisibles ; and again, it comprehends some things according to the circle of the Siime, but others, according to the « ircle ot tin* diffti cut. As therclore, ill essence, the monadic precedes tin Informed, and this is also the case m harmony, in torm, and in powers, thus also in gnostic energii s, the one reason is the primary leader of distributed knowledge. These things howeier, have been frequently repeated hv me, through the ainbiguitv in which the interpreters aie mvulved in explaining them.

These things howeier, have been frequently repeated hv me, through the ainbiguitv in which the interpreters aie mvulved in explaining them.

Plato therefore, indicating these particulars, says that reason itself becoming true is borne along [i. e. re\ol\esj about both the intelligible and the sensible, in that w hich is moved by it, i. e. in each of the circles. But it is borne along with¬ out sjiecch and sound, l'or inward reason is not at all in want of either ot these; but thev are requisite to that reason wl icli proceeds through the mouth. So that it is just as if lie had said, that this reason has a motion more perfect than every 1 energy which proceeds externally , loir sound and yoice are assumed as symbols of sensible motions. Inward reason therefore, as being the charioteer, and moving in its course each of the circles, produces in ih a twofold kuoyy ledge, yvluch Plato delivers in yyhat follows. But if yye read, as \ye find it y\ritten in the most accu¬ rate manuscripts, in that which is nun til by itst/J, and not, in that which is min ed by it, viz. by reason, this will manifest the vvhole soul, signifying it from its definition. For the tiling defined, is in a certain respect the same vuth the definition of it. Jteason therefore, being borne* along in the soul; for it is the soul which is moved by itself; at one time knows the same and different of sensibh s, but at anotlii r, of intelligibles. And it seems that same and different especially characterize know¬ ledge, in the same manner as motion and p< rinanency characterize life*. Hence

* I\>r uno/rci in litis it t> nc< i-ssarv lo read imjru.

1 1 or iila here, read ttbui.

J 1 s»r irnffae in tlio |il.ue, it is olniotiilv neeejsary lo rea l iraoiji.

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TIM Til'S OF lM,\TO.

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also, Plato particularly makes mention of these, because all knowledge has an nlliance to them.

“ When it is conversant with a sensible nature, and the circle of the (afferent proceeding with rectitude, enunciates uhat it perceives to the whole soul; then stable and true opinions and belief arc produced.”