The Commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor

For what kind of indigence can there be in such transcendent abundance? What imbecility is there in almighty deity?) What participation in the

"i.e. Ovders φθόνοι, no envy. > Evéesay is omitted in the original.

lim. Plat, Tot. ki 2Qp. 408 fountain of good? The Demiurgus therefore, being good by his very being, transcends al! indigence, and all participation which ‘acecdes from another thing, For he is united to the one itself, and does not proceed out of it. Por intellectual union is of one kind, but the union prior to intellect of another, according to which the generative deity of the Demiurgus, and the goodness which connects allthings, ave united to the one itself. Vor this goodness is not a certain power, as some say, but the measure of all power, Nor is it will, but will proceeds from it. Nor is it a habit; for habit pertains to another! thing different from habit ; but goodness is itself of itself [1 ¢. pertains to itself alone}. Nor, in short, is it an essential hypostasis ; but itis that which unites essence, and is ineffable, connects powers, and is prolific of demiurgic energies. As therefore, every intellect 15 essentialized in existing as intellect, but that which is above intellect is participated by it; and as every soul is essentialized in existing as soul, but intellect 1s participated by it; thus also every God Is essentialized ino being a God, or rather is superessentialized, but there is not any ung Which is participated by him 15 because the Gods are the most ancient and venerable of all things. | Phe demiurvic intellect therefore, so far as it is a God, in-existing as a God iN primarily se, and not according to participation, This however ts the same with good. As therefore, if some one should say that envy is the want of intellect, and a partial intellect is superior to envy, but soul is not superior to it, for itis indigent of intellect, because it is adapted to become intellectual by the participation of intellect;—thus also in goodness, envy > is the indigence of good ; but every thing indigent is not primarily good, Soul indeed and intellect are indigent of good, because they are not primarily good. But a God, so far as a God, being good, is exempt from all envy, and transcends all indigence of whatever kind it may be, whether it subsists according to diminution, or according to deviation. Vor indigence is twofold, one kind as we have said being evil, but the other not.

“ Being therefore entirely void of this, he was willing that all things should become as much as possible similar to himself.”

This is consequent to the before-mentioned axioms. For the first colon [or

" Por ἀλλο here, itis necessary to read ἀλλον,

Male. Every God, so faras he isa God, is a participant of uothing superior to himself, For the procession of the Gods frum the principle of all things, ix nota participation, but an ἀρρήτοις exparou, an ineflable unfolding into light.

Every God, so faras he isa God, is a participant of uothing superior to himself, For the procession of the Gods frum the principle of all things, ix nota participation, but an ἀρρήτοις exparou, an ineflable unfolding into light.

> Yor agOosos here, read g6ores,p. 307 part of the sentence] manifested the order, and the hyparxis of the Demiurgus, that he is ἃ αὐ. And since with respect to deity, one God is imparticipable, but another participable, ' he manifests that the Demiurgus is participable. For he does not say that he was goodness, but that he was good. But he who is cood participates of goodness. And goodness itself indeed, is primarily good. But intellect and being are good by participation. Again, the second colon shows that the Demiurgus does not rank among deitied natures. For one thing is entirely imparticipable, such, for instance, as the good ; but another is good by* the participation of some other nature, as every thing which is deified.! But that which is primarily good, isgood itself, And that which is participated, and is the medium of both the before-mentioned natures is of such akind as all the intelligible and intellectual orders of the Gods are suid to be. But this third colon comprehends the demiurgie pecuharity. For not only to be good, but on account of the super-plenary, and the extended, to proceed to all things, is indicative of the demiurgic and eflective cause, desiring to fill all things with itself, and to benefit all things; in order that all things may become as much as possible similar to itself, by participating of a certain divine nature, and of arcane and ineflable impressions, which accede to them from the whole fabrication of things. If therefore, the maker of the universe is superior to all indigence, he is exempt from all imbecility, and this eternally. For being signifies the eternal; and because he especially benefits all things, he imparts to all things by illumination, the measure of good, a greater thing than which each of the participants is by no means adapted to receive. And this indicates the extension of providence. If likewise, he wished to supply all things with the participation of good, there is nothing in the universe solely evil, so that neither ois there any thing disorderly, nor without the inspection of providence, nor indefinite; but all things participate of beauty and order, so far as they are naturally adapted to receive them. Tlence he made all things similar to himself, so far as he is a God, benefiting generated natures ; buthe caused them to become other things besides this, according to other paradigmatic reasons. For as Atticus says, as the carpenter makes all that he makes to be artificial, but differ-

' The Demiurgus is a participable deity, because his intellect participates of his goodness, which constitutes his hyparxis.

> Instead of ro μετασχεῖν in this place, it is necessary to read ry μέτασχειν-

> Instead of ro μετασχεῖν in this place, it is necessary to read ry μέτασχειν-

* Thus soul is deified by the participation of intellect as a medium; because deity accedcs to soul through the intervention of intellect; and body 1» deificd by the participation of soul as a medium.

p. 408

ent things according to a different reason [or productive principle], causing one thing to be aladder, but another a bed; thus also the Demiurgus, so far as he is wood, assimilates all things to himself, rendering them good; but according to forms which distribute their essences, he makes them with relation to paradigmatic causes. Porphyry however, admitting these things, thinks fit to ask what itis by the reception of which genera are good, And he says it is by the reception of harmony, symmetry, and order. For these are beautiful. But every thing [truly] be autiful is good. Plato therefore manifests that good is in these, when he says, “ Zhat God led that which was disorderly into order, through his wish to communicate good.”

From all that has been said, therefore, it is easy to infer, that the Demiurgus produces eternally; that the world is perpe tual, according to a perpetuity which is extended through the whole of time; that it is always generated with arrangement ; and that it rs not always incorruptible, but is always ; generated or becoming to be so, im Consequence of always receiving good. But it is not immediately good like its eenerating father. For in him all things are contained unitedly, {but in the world distributedly],! and not with perfect τὸ ‘ality, as in eternal natures. For if the universe was generated in time, was it from the Demiurgus that it did not e vist before, or from its subject nature being without order? For if from the Demiurgus, was it because he also did not subsist eternally?) Oris it not unlawful to assert this, and in other respects in vain? Por concerning him, there is the same mode of interrogation, and whether shall we make all things generated, or will there be something primarily unbegotten, and the Demiurgus still more so? Let it therefore be admitted, that it was in consequence of the Demiurgus not energizing. Whether then, did he not fabricate, because he was not willing, or because he was not able? If indeed we say it) was because he was not willing, we forget that we thus deprive him of goodness. But if he was not able, itis absurd that he should at one time have power, and at another imbecility. Por we shall take away the eternal. But if it was from its subject nature that the universe did ποῖ exist before, whether was it from this nature being unadapted or adapted? If therefore it was adapted, it was not this nature which prevented the universe from existing. But if it was unadapted, how being unadapted for an infinite time, came it to Le now changed [into an adapted condition]? Whether did it move itself? But it is not