The Commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor

But after what manner the heaven is unbegotten and perpetual, will be manifest to us

* Instead of ove apa οντων γενητὸς ἐστιν in this place, it is obviously necessary to read ove apa orrws ayernros ἐστιν.

p. 213

shortly after. Now, however, this alone is evident from what has been sald, that every thing corporeal, is of itself, or in its own nature generated and corrupted, but never truly is, as Plato also says in the Politicus. For he there observes “ that to subsist always invariably the same, alone pertains tothe most divine of all things. But the nature of body ts not of this order. That, however, which we denominate heaven or the world, possesses indeed many and blessed prerogatives from its generator ; but, as it partakes of body, it is impossible that it should be entirely free from mutation.” We have shown, therefore, how the heaven falls under the above-mentioned distinctions,

Ifhowever, the damoniacal Aristotle, should again doubt respecting what is said of eternal being, not enduring to say that every thing which always is, is comprehended by intelligence in conjunction with reason; since the most divine of visible objects always * exist; we think it fit, that he should not confound the eternal, and that which subsists through the whole of time. For he also distin. cuishes eternity from time ; and attributes the former indeed to intellect, but the latter to heaven, and the motion of heaven. That always-existing being, therefore, the eternal, is a thing of such a kind as Timiwus defines it to be. The most divine, however, of visible objects, are afier another manner perpetual, and not according to an eternal permanency. But they are produced in the whole of time from their causes, and the whole of their existence is in becoming to be. This also is said by Aristotle, that eternity is connascent with intelligibles, possessing and comprehending in itself infinite time ; and therefore the eternal is truly intelligible.” Jf, however, that which akcays is, signifies the eternal, why is it necessary to refer the nature of heaven to this perpetual being, and why should we not say that it is always generated, or becoming to be, as being co-extended with the perpetuity of time? So that we shall thus dissolve the objections from his arguments, which he urges against these definitions. Since, however, we have replied to this inquiry, we shall dismiss it; for it will be spoken of hereafter.

But, in short, the opinion of Plato concerning criteria, may from these things be assumed. Vor diflerent persons admitting a different criterion, some asserting that it is sense, as the Protagoreans, others opinion, as he who said,

Opinion is in all things fram'd; * Itis necessary here, to supply the word ae.

* Instead of ro awytov vonroy ovros ἐστιν in this place, it appears to me that we should read cae

TO αἰωγίον apa vonToy οὕτως €or.

p. 214

* Instead of ro awytov vonroy ovros ἐστιν in this place, it appears to me that we should read cae

TO αἰωγίον apa vonToy οὕτως €or.

p. 214

others that it,is reason, and others that it is intellect; Plato divides the essence of the criteria conformably to things themselves, attributing intellect to intelligibles, dianoia to dianoetic objects, opinion to doxastic objects, and sense to sencibles. You must not however fancy that the criteria are on this account divulsed according to him from each other. — For the soul is both one and amultitude. If, therefore, the soul which judgesis both one ἡ anda multitude, the judicial power will also be both uniform and multiform. Some one therefore may say, what is this one power? We reply, reason. For this, when it proceeds to the survey of intelligibles, uses both itself and intelligence ; not that intelhgence indeed is the instrument, and reason that which uses it, as the Platonic Severus thought, considering intelligence as inferior to reason, but that intelligence is the licht of reason, perfecting and elecating it, and Uluminating its gnostic power.

But when it forms a judgment of middle reasons, it alone uses dianoia and itself, and through this is converted to itself. When also it decides on objects of opinion, it moves opinion ; but in judging of objects of imagination, it excites the phantasy, and in judging of sensibles, sense. For when it considers the sensible essence of forms, such as is every sensible object, it uses opinion as the co-adjutor of its speculation, Vor in this the reasons of sensibles subsist. But when it directs its attention to the position or figure of a certain thing, as for instance, to the manner in which the earth 15 posited, which has in its summit a habitude to the heavens, it then excites the phantasy, in order that it may survey the object of its inquiry accompanied with interval and morphe, as it Is. And when it considers an eclipse, it employs sense as an adjutor in its observations. At one time also, it admits the judgments of the second powers ; but at another, it blames the errors which they frequently happen to commit on account of the instruments. Concerning the criteria therefore, thus much may sutlice for the present; for we have discussed these things more copiously in our Commentaries on the Thewtetus. From what has been said, however, the great accuracy of the before-mentioned definitions is evident.

But if you are willing, we will also survey the same thing according to another method. I say, therefore, that the mature which is primarily perpetual being, is that which is eternal according to all things, viz. according to essence, power, and energy. And that the nature which is simply generated, 1s that which receives }} " its essence, power and energy in time, For itis necessary that the

‘ It is requisite here to supply the word ἐν.

> For ragwy here, read πάσαν.

according to essence, power, and energy. And that the nature which is simply generated, 1s that which receives }} " its essence, power and energy in time, For itis necessary that the

‘ It is requisite here to supply the word ἐν.

> For ragwy here, read πάσαν.

ROOK τι TIM.EUS OF PLATO, 215

former should) be wholly eternal, but the latter wholly temporal. And that the former should be at once every thing in a self-subsistent manner, but that the latter should have its hypostasis suspended elsewhere than from itself, and consisting Inan extension’ of existence. Since these, however, are the extremes, the media are, things which in a certain respect participate of a portion of being, and ina certain respect communicate with generation. But again, there are two natures which participate of neither of these, one in consequence of being superior, but the other through being inferior to them. For matter is neither being, nor that which is generated. For it is neither comprehended by intelligence, nor is sensible. And this also is true of the one, as Parmenides demonstrates of both these, of the latter in the first, and of the former in the fifth hypothesis, Perpetual being, therefore, is the whole of the intelligible, and the whole of the intellectual genus, every supermundane intellect, every intellect participated hy divine souls, and every intellect which is called partial, and is participated by angels, and diemons ; and by partial souls, through angels and daemons as media. And as far as to this, perpetual being extends. For every intellect enerzizes eternally, and is measured in the whole of itself by eternity. But that which is generated, is every thing which is moved in a confused and disorderly manner, and which in conception is surveyed prior to the production of the world ; likewise every thing which is) properly generated and corrupted, heaven, and all these sensible and visible natures. “Timius also detines that which is simply generated, and that which is simply perpetual being, to be these. But the intermediate natures are those which communicate with both these; and on each side of them are the natures which participate of neither of these. Hence Timeus proposes hoth of them affirmatively and negatively, as for instance, perpetual being, and without generation, and again, that which is generated, and is necer real being, in order that through the affirmations he may separate them from things which are the recipients of neither, but that through the negations they may be distinguished from things which ina certain respect participate of both.