The Commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor

* For roury here, read τοῦτον

Zim. Plat. Vor. J. Ye ὦ

p. 554

animal by vitality. If therefore, the intelligible paradigm lives, as being eternal ; for eternity, as Plotinus says, is the life of all things, so that the eternal lives κα and if every thing that lives is an animal, hence the intelligible paradigm is an animal. And you may from hence assume that this paradigm is in the third trad of intelligibles. For it ig not in the first triad; for this is prior to life. Nor is it in the second ; for this is life. Hence it isin the third. For it does not exist out of intelligibles; since Plato on this' account alone calls the paradigm intelligible, though he knew the super-mundane demiurgic intellect. But neither does he call the latter intellizible, nor the former intellectual. Before therefore, he assumed every thing which perpetually exists as the paradigm of all generation ; among which eternally existing beings, animal itself and the Demiurgus are included ; for each of these always is. Eternity likewise, which is the first thing that always is, and the one being itself, which is eternal being according to cause, are in the number of eternally existing beings. Now, however, he calls animal itself the paradigin of the world considered as living. Fur perpetual being was the paradigm of disorderly generation ; since from thence, forms without distinction, were present with the disorderly nature, prior to the generation of the universe. But though we should assume animal itself, which has the forms of the elements, this also is te paradigm of the vestizes of the elements. So far, however, as it 1s animal, it is the paradigm of this universe now possessing life. So that simply considered, animal itself, and the intelligible paradigm are not the same. For eternity likewise, which always exists, is the paradigm of time, but is not an intelligible animal 5 since not every paradigin is an animal belonging to the intelligible order. But if animal itself is eternal, eternity is prior to it, whichis not an animal, For prior to animal itself, there is no other animal ; since neither prior to any other of those things to which we apply the term itself, is there a certain -form prior to it. As therefore, eternity is prior to animal itself, not being yet an animal, so hkewise, being itself is prior to eternity. Hence also eternity is that which is being, and is a certain being, Animal itself therefore, is the third intelligible triad, concerning which the (Chaldean] Oracles say, “ It is the operator, and the giver of life- bearing fire. It fills the vivific bosom of Hecate,? and pours on the Synoches the fertile strength (in fireendned with mighty power.” For all these assertions in no respect differ frorn saying that all-perfect intelligible animal is the fountain of all intellectual

’ For δια re here, it is necessary to read δια rovro.

? For exaorns here, read Exarns.

? For exaorns here, read Exarns.

p. 335lite, and the cause of every paradigmatic hyparxis, And thus much concerning this particular.

With respect to the words of the text, “fo constitute in the similitude,” manitests that the universe is in the highest degree assimilated to its paradigm. For not every image is constituted in similitude, but that alone which is perfectly similar ; since this is not the case, where dissimilitude predominates. Vor then similitude is not the end. But the words, “the constituting artificer constituted,” clearly demonstrate to us, that the Demiurgus of the universe makes by his very being, and. possesses energy essentially, For Plato does not call him in one way, and the effective energy proceeding from him in another, but he calls both by one name. Farther still, the words likewise appear to signify, that the Demiurgus always produces, and that he always produces perfectly. Tor the word constituting, Manifests an ever-present making; but the word constituted, an all-perfect making, and which is suspended from its cause. But by the conjunction of both these expressions, itis very manifest that the maker of the universe generates eternally all things, his productive energy neither commencing, nor ending at a certain time,

“ We must not therefore assert, that he thought it would be adequate to its dignity, to assimilate it to any one of the animals which naturally exist in the form of apart. For that which is similar to an impertect thing, can never at any time become beautiful.”

As there are many intelligible animals, some of which are more total, but others more partial,’ some of which are united, but others disided, and some are detined according to bound, but others according to infinity; Plato inquiring what the all-perfect paradigm of the universe is, and from what intelligible animal the world is suspended, thinks that no partial animal ought to be placed in this order. For each of these is imperfect as with reference to the whole. For it is possible for the imperfect to be so called in a twofold respect, either with reference to its own nature, or with reference to that which is better and more causal, And the former indeed, it is not even lawful to conceive of divine natures. For each has the measure of itself eternally, and its own proper good always exerted. For, as Socrates says in the Republic, each of them is most excellent in its own

‘It is obviously necessary in this place, to supply the words, των δὲ μερικωτερων.

p. 356

For each has the measure of itself eternally, and its own proper good always exerted. For, as Socrates says in the Republic, each of them is most excellent in its own

‘It is obviously necessary in this place, to supply the words, των δὲ μερικωτερων.

p. 356

order. But the latter ranks, as it is said, among the things that are usual. For as in the Banquet, Plato calls that which is not primarily beautiful, but participates of beauty, indigent of beauty, thus also he calls that an imperfect animal which is not the first animal, nor animal itself, but is such by participation, and subsists according to a progression from that which is first. If therefore, every partial animal is imperfect, but the paradigm of the world is all-perfect, the paradizm of the world will not be a partial amimal. Por whether does the Demiurgus intelleetually perceive this all-perfect and first animal, or not? It is impossible indeed, that he should not intellectually perceive those things which we perceive when our soul energizes intellectually. But if he thus sees it, and all intellectual perception of the Demiurgus is production or making, it is necessary that he should make:

δ; by intellectual perception itself. What therefore can he make more divine than the universe? For he will not make any thing of a less excellent nature, when looking to that which is more excellent. Very properly therefore, does Plato when investizating the paradigmatic principle of the world, recur to all-perfect animal,