The Commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor

p. 247

is corraptible, as atts said to be in the Republie, that which is incorruptible is unbezetten, But ie work! is destructiile, as net bein abl to connect its fo For ws that whieh ts corporeal so faras pertains τὸ itselfis alteramotive, or maved hy another, thus also so faras pertains to itself itis destructible, in consequence of hong connected by something else. Por no body is either generative or connec. live of itself; since every thing which generates, makes; but every thing which mahes is ineorporeal. For though it should be a body, yet it makes by incorporeal powers. Every thing, therefore, which generates is incorporeal ; and every. thing which connects, is efective of a certain thing, viz. it is efleetive of union, and the undissipated. Bat every thing which is effective is impartible. Every thing therefore connective is impartible. Henee itis impossible for that which connects itself to bea body. Poritis not the province of body to connects; since so. far as itis body, tis partible, as itis said in the Sophista against those who assert that all things are bodies, Bat that which connects is inpartible, Tf however, that whieh is connected is body, but that which couneets is imeerporeal, body is not itself connective of itself Hence that whieh is connected by itse:f is necessarily impartble. As therefore body has in its own nature a tinite power, so likewise iis inits own nature destructible, not as being adapted to corruption, but as not naturally capable of preserving itself, nor as corruptible in’ capacity, that vou may also investigate the corruptible in energy, but as incapable of impartiig Incorruptibility to itself.

Whence, therefore, has it the perpetual, and whenee does it receive intinite power? We reply, from its producing cause. For as it is moved from thence, so likewise it is generated from thence, and is always generated, Por every thing which is generated fren an immoveable cause, is allotted a never-failing nature, as also the damontacal Aristotle says 5 so that according to this reasoning likewise, the world will have the perpetual proceeding from the immoveable (i. e. from the intellectual) fabrication, Since, however, according to its own proper nature it is senerated, it is always generated from the father, But since the world being all anda whele, is not imperfect, in addition to being generated, or beconune to be, it always Was generaied, since, likewise, the motion of itis always in the end, as Aristotle says. Much more, therefore, is the essential gener. Gon of italways in the end, imitating the perfection of its maker. So Mat it is always generated, and always was generated ; not receiving’ at once the whole infinity of the generative

ΛῊ is pecessary here to supply μη δέχομένοι.

p. 248

Gon of italways in the end, imitating the perfection of its maker. So Mat it is always generated, and always was generated ; not receiving’ at once the whole infinity of the generative

ΛῊ is pecessary here to supply μη δέχομένοι.

p. 248

power of its Maker, but always according to the now possessing the ability of existing from this power, and receiving something from it, according to the instantaneous participation of infinity. And it receives the same infinity, indeed, on account of that which is imparted, but on its own account is not able to receive the same at ence. After this manner, therefore, the perpetuity of the world remains, and the weneration of it takes place ; and in this respect the before mentioned men {i. ὁ. Plato and Aristotle} are not at variance. At the same tine, however, they differ, because Plato says, that the essence of the universe is co-extended with all time, but Aristotle supposes that it simply always exists, infers this to be necessary through many arguments, and ascribes to it temporal infinity, asserting at the same time that eternity is stable infinite power. He likewise demonstrates that no infinite power whatever can be present with a finite body, Hence it follows, that the world being corporeal always receives infinite power, but never tras the whole of it, because it is finite, [tis therefore alone trae to say, that from intimnite power itis generated, but ay not, infinitely, But if itis eenerated, It receives infinity on account of infinite time. ΕῸΓ fo be infinite pertains alone to that which is eternal; but a gene raced infinite belongs to that w hichis temporal; for generation is conjoined with time. Hence Aristotle himself is compelled to acknowledge that the world is in a certain respect generated,

Both likewise assert that itis the same in number, but) Plato conformably to principles, says that it is venerated. Por he established: prior to the universe a producing cause, from which he gives subsistence to the universe. But Aristotle does not admit that any eternal nature is an effective cause. And the former, indeed, generates time together with the essence of the universe, but the latter together with motion: for time according to him is that which is numbered. Aristotle, however, is accustomed to do this in his other Preatises. Lor such things as Plato asserts of the ove, Aristotle ascribes to intellect,’ viz. the non-possession of multitude, the desirable, the having no intellectual perception of secondary natures. But such things as Plato attributes to the demiurgic intellect, Aristotle ascribes to the heavens, and the celestial Gods: for according to hin, falrication and providence are from these. Such things also as Plato ascribes to the essence of the heavens, Aristotle attributes to their circular motiun; departing indeed from theological principles, but dwelling more than is fit on physical

Such things also as Plato ascribes to the essence of the heavens, Aristotle attributes to their circular motiun; departing indeed from theological principles, but dwelling more than is fit on physical

* Aristotle in his metaphysical discussions ascends no higher than intelligible intellect, which is with him the first cause. And perhaps this was in consequence of knowing that all beyond this intellect is truly ineffable.

p. 249

productive powers.’ Since, however, the demoniacal Aristotle is very copious in discussing the reciprocations of the generated with reference to the corruptible, and of the unbegotten with reference to the incorruptible, he must be reminded, that Plato much prior to him assents to these axioms; in the Republic indeed asserting that corruption follows every thing which is generated; but in the Phadrus, that the unbegotten is also incorruptible. How is it possible, therefore, since Plato gives generation to the universe, that he should not also introduce corruption to it; or that corrupting that which is moved in a confused and disorderly manner, he should not give generation to it prior to corruption? The generation of the universe, therefore, was devised by him after a manner different [from its apparent meaning].

* But we say that whatever is generated, is necessarily generated bv a eS ᾽ ~ 5 - certain cause.”

The discussion accords with the hypotheses, or rather with the order of the things from which the hypotheses are assumed. Tor as every where form is suspended from the effective cause, so likewise, the first hypotheses are in continuity with the second, and afford a principle to the demonstrations which are consequent to them. For since it was demonstrated according to the first hypothesis, that the world was generated, through the object of opinion as a medium, afterwards that which is consequent to this is demonstrated according to the second hypothesis, viz. that it was generated by a cause. For it the world is a thing generated, or becoming to be, but every thing generated is generated by a certain cause, hence the world was necessarily generated by a certain cause. What therefore is the producing cause of the universe? That from which the being generated is present to the world, For it is necessary to investigate this immediately after the present demonstration. And we shall see as we proceed, what kind of arguments Plato uses on this subject.

Now, however, let us briefly recall to our memory, [the reasoning by which it is shown] that every thing which is generated, is necessarily generated by a cer- (ain cause. Every thing gencrated, therefore, is in its own nature imperfect. But being imperfect, it is not naturally adapted to perfect itself; since neither is any other imperfect thing. For every thing which is perfected, is perfected from that