The Commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor

But why the one is one cannot be unfolded, for it is more ancient than every cause. And if we are not to inves¬ tigate the causes of all tilings, why should we investigate the cause of soul, and the generation of it from a cause, but should hy no means do this in other tilings?

Since however, we have separately interrogated each of them, we shall doubt with ourselves for both of them, through what cause Plato indeed devises the generation of the soul, and the progression of it from a cause, but Theophrastus condemns ail doctrine of this kind. And having doubted we say, that to Theo¬ phrastus, and all of the Peripatetic sect, the ascent of their speculation, is [only] as far as to the motive forms of the universe ; whether it be proper to call these souls, or intellects.' But by Plato, these as falling short of the lir>t dignity among l>eings, in consequence of I icing participate, are considered as having an order very remote from principles. For prior to these, are the intelligible ami intellec¬ tual orders of beings, from which these derive their progression. And prior to tin 'se orders, is the number of the Gods, causing beings to become one, and con¬ nected, and illuminating them with div ine light. And again, prior to this number, is the imparticipable one, from which this numlier unfolds itself into light through the natures by which it is received. For it is necessary that imparticipable forms

Tim. Plat.

' i. e. The souls of the celestial and sublunary spheres.
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PItOCLUS ON THE

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KhouUl fwUsitft prior to those that art* participated, and prior to imparticipables, the unities of them. For the united is one thin" and unity another, and prior to the multitude of unities, the one fountain of them exists.

VOL. II.

c

p. 18

PItOCLUS ON THE

[book 111.

KhouUl fwUsitft prior to those that art* participated, and prior to imparticipables, the unities of them. For the united is one thin" and unity another, and prior to the multitude of unities, the one fountain of them exists.

Such therefore I icing the opinions of both these philosophers, Theophrastus indeed, since he asserts that the soul is the principle of motion, and does not admit that there is any thin" else prior to this principle, very projierly thinks that principle on 'lit not to Im investigated. For he "rants that the universe is ani¬ mated, and on this account divine. Fur if it is divine, says he, and has the most excellent life, it is animated; since nothin- is honourable u it It out soul, as he writes in his treatise On the Heaven, lint Plato admits that there are mundane intellects, prior to the celestial souls, and plior to these, iut< Meets without habitmleLto souls], and prior to these, the divine order. Hence, he very properly delivers the soul produced and Generated from another principle; though he also knew that generatioii of another kind has not only a place in bodu but also in souls, so lar as they participate of time. For in divine soi.ls likewise there is time, since, as Plato says ill the Phadrus, they survey through time real being itself. lor all transitive in ition has tune conjoined with it. And thus much tor the tiist ot the before-mentioned problems. For at the same tune, it is sullieiently demon¬ strated, tl at Plato rightly delivers the generation ot the soul, though it is essen¬ tially unbe_M*tt< n, and tli it the argument whii h is urged against it, is partly right and partly not. l or to him who admits that the soul is the first thing, it is coiiseijueiit to subvert 11 it* gem ration of it. For troiu w hat is the generation ot it, vv hell there is nothing prior to it f This very thing however, is not true, th.it soul is the first of all things. For that which Vristotle says concerning body, that being finite, it alvvavs receives the power ot being always moved, but does not levttVi the infinite at once, the same, thing also must necessarily be said concerning the soul, that it does not at once » uergi/.e aci ordmg to all things, so that it dues not at once possess ail the infinite power, from which it always i.*nergi/es, nor does it energize at once according to every power, so as always to possess one energy. For ot all power, there is one energy ot one power. Home it always receives the power of energizing alvvavs, and on this account does not always energize with invariable sameness, but dillercnlly at dillen nl times. So that m short it is true, that every thing which energizes according ta tune, always reaives the power of energizing, yet does not at once receive the u hole power, and on this account is generated.

That the soul however, is not the first of beings' is evident. I* or th.it which is

So that m short it is true, that every thing which energizes according ta tune, always reaives the power of energizing, yet does not at once receive the u hole power, and on this account is generated.

That the soul however, is not the first of beings' is evident. I* or th.it which is first is pn sent with all things, and it is necessary that all things should p irti* ipate

1 lion .at ufori i v f uv irpo tovtuv i/ yi’X'O hi this place, «t is necessary to real ■* -< ou w P u,ro> '

rvr u» Tur il)\oi.

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TI M/EUS OF PLATO.

p. 19