The Commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor

And on a survey of the conception of Plato, we shall find that it is truly admira¬ ble ami arcane,* since lie does not represent the Demiurgns as fashioning these vehicles from wholenesses which previously had an existence, as neither does he rnoeiAJs on tiif.

* For ni<t« lirrc, read arm Ft*.

* i. c. Vulcan.

1 For awop ijrnr also in (hiv place, read a*opp7r*r.

[nooi v.

.103 the vehicles of the planets and the fixed ' stars ; hut he says that the J)einiurt;tis p ulueed these, the junior Gods lending parts, ami from these causing the bodies to coalesce. This therefore, is an evident argument that each of these \ehicles is in a cerium respect self-constituted, mid ru»t fahrieated hy an ahlation of other things, lest it shouUl lie requisite that they should In- a^am refunded into anothi r tiling. For every tiling which subsists hy an abscission ol other things, since the aliscission is accompanied with a diminution of tin* whole, must necessarily he entirely restored to the whole, l or it is necessary that each of the wholes of the universe should always remain a whole; on which account also every vehicle of the soul ot this kind is p.-rpetiinl, and alway s the same vehicle is suspended front the same soul. I or each is thus naturally adapt¬ ed to subsist, as It was generated by the Ihmiur^us. For how «au we any lonjri r preservo the soul mundane, if we corrupt the \< !ii« lc ? .And how can that beany longer said to be mundane, ot which there is nothing in the univeise ! For it parti d souls were superior to a life in conjuiu lion with veliii les, tin v would also he sii|m nor to divine souls themselves. And if they were interior to such a life, how does the IJciniurttus immediately on tlu ir bcim; venerated, introduce them into these vehicles, as lie is now said to do * How likewise, do souls use vehicles, both in Hades, ami in the heavens, it these bodies are not jmi petually PusjM-nderl from them ? Hi it it is evident that they do list* them, both from what is asserted by Socrates in the IMi.rdo, and in tin l’ha drus. I’or in the former, he says, that .wills ascending into vehicles, prut eed to Acheron; and in the latter, (hut the x i hides of the dints In i //•' i truly managed, prin ted in n/nilihi mm, hut the ve¬ hicles of other souls that follow the Cods, primed uith ihj/u uln/, and seurcehf [.obtain the vision if the stipercelestiul place]. This therefore*, may also b«* demonstrated through other arguments ; and these things have Is en lieforo ideally asserted by us, and are now recalled to our recollection.

This therefore*, may also b«* demonstrated through other arguments ; and these things have Is en lieforo ideally asserted by us, and are now recalled to our recollection.

From this likewise, we may survey the dilletvnre of partial and divine souls. For in the latter, tlie I)emiur^us placed the bodies in the souls, as heinir on all sides compri heiuh it in them; the souls not beitiij converted to tin; subjects of their government, but employing one immutable intellection, lhit in tlie former, he causes the souls to ascend into vehu h-s ; Itecausc they ar»* adapted to be frivqueutly Vatupushed by bodies, and to In* converted to the natures over which they preside, 1 when they become parts ol the universe; in tin* same manner as their vehicles arc subservient to tin* laws of Fate; and no longer purely live under tin divim lijjht of l*rovideiiee. And thus much concerning the vehicle of the soul.

I liolr.iil of rXiiiwf lierr, it i> no,to rend iirVuw*.

* Tor ^itu^Ktu lure, it is ikii mry to rrad hutkuvfom.

BOOK V.]

TLMJEL’S OF PLATO.

3.93

And thus much concerning the vehicle of the soul.

I liolr.iil of rXiiiwf lierr, it i> no,to rend iirVuw*.

* Tor ^itu^Ktu lure, it is ikii mry to rrad hutkuvfom.

BOOK V.]

TLMJEL’S OF PLATO.

3.93

It is worth while however, again to recall to our remembrance, hut with a cer¬ tain accurate consideration of what has been frequently said, that since the whole of our soul is a medium between an impartible essence, and that essence which is divisible about bodies, we clearly obtain this latter essence from its vehicle. Fora connascent vehicle is suspended from our soul, having an appropriate life, in the same manner as the v chicles of divine and da moniacal souls. And this life is the partial essence, of which the soul antecedently comprehends the paradigm; so that opinion is established in the soul as the paradigm of sense ; but the power of deliberate choice, as the paradigm of the orexis in its proper vehicle, according to which it is moved to this, or to that place, and is impelled to do this thing or that. For these arc proximately the partial natures in the soul, and prior to these, the dillcrence in the soul of the all-various divisions of its essence, according to which ii is distributed into parts, and possesses something which is impartible, and a whole. Since therefore, we assert these things concerning the separation into parts in the soul, it is worth while to inquire, what we should admit the imparti¬ ble essence above our soul to be, since each of the souls superior to ours has an intellect 1 prior to it. For each of these partial souls has not an essential intellect above it. For if it had, it would alvvavs abide on high, in the same manner as the souls superior to it, in consequence of intellect always detaining it in the intelligi¬ ble, through always imparting to it its light. We have therefore already said some¬ thing court ruing this, and more than oner, and vve shall now assert more elearly what we conreive to be the truth on this subject, and vvliat divinity imparts to our intellect. Ib nee, vve have frequently spoken concerning vvliat the impartible is in each partial soul, it being a thing truly dubious, by extending our intellect to deity. For to leave an intellect to car h, and this partial, is a thing by no means to be admitted. May we not s.iv therefore, that each of these partial souls is essentially suspended from a certain d.emon, every d.rmon having a certain demo¬ niacal intellect above its* If ? A partial soul therefore, has the same intellect as the d.emon from which it is suspended, arranged as an impartible essence prior to it. Hence, the da-moniacal soul primarily participates of this intellect, but the partial souls that are under it, secondarily, which also makes them to l»e partial. For each lias a peculiar partible nature, but possesses the impartible, in common with the dannons that are above these souls, and to whom the impartible is pecu¬ liar. Hence diemons abide on high, but partial souls sometimes descend, divid¬ ing themselves about bodies, as l»eing more adapted to these. I*or if in partial souls, the genus of ditlerence is redundant, which makes them unable always to