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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1e glorification of the syllable Om considered as a means to obtain Brahman. — Therefore we take akshara to mean either ' the Imperishable' or 'that which pervades ; ' on the ground of either of which explana- tions it must be identified with the highest Brahman. But — our opponent resumes— while we must admit that the above reasoning holds good so far that the circum- stance of the akshara supporting all things up to ether is to be accepted as a proof of all effects depending on a cause, we point out that it may be employed by those also who declare the pradhana to be the general cause. How then does the previous argumentation specially establish Brah- man (to the exclusion of the pradhana) ? — The reply to this is given in the next Sutra. 11. This (supporting can), on account of the command (attributed to the Imperishable, be the work of the highest Lord only). The supporting of all things up to ether is the work of the highest Lord only. — Why? — On account of the command. — For the sacred text speaks of a command (; By the command of that akshara, O Gargi,sunand moon stand apart!' 111,8,9), and command can be the work of the highest Lord only, not of the non-intelligent pradhana. For non-intelligent causes such as clay and the like are not capable of command, with reference to their effects, such as jars and the like. 12. And on account of (Scripture) separating (the akshara) from that whose nature is different (from Brahman). Also on account of the reason stated in this Sutra Brahman only is to be considered as the Imperishable, and the supporting of all things up to ether is to be looked upon as the work of Brahman only, not of anything else. The meaning of the Sutra is as follows. Whatever things other than Brahman might possibly be thought to be denoted by the term ' akshara,5 from the nature of all those things Scripture separates the akshara spoken of as the I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 3. 171 support of all things up to ether. The scriptural passage alluded to is III, 8, 11, 'That akshara, 0 Gargi, is unseen but seeing, unheard but hearing, unperceived but perceiving, unknown but knowing.' Here the designation of being unseen, &c. agrees indeed with the pradhana also, but not so the designation of seeing, &c, as the pradhana is non- intelligent.
2a, 0 Gargi, is unseen but seeing, unheard but hearing, unperceived but perceiving, unknown but knowing.' Here the designation of being unseen, &c. agrees indeed with the pradhana also, but not so the designation of seeing, &c, as the pradhana is non- intelligent. — Nor can the word akshara denote the embodied soul with its limiting conditions, for the passage following on the one quoted declares that there is nothing different from the Self ('there is nothing that sees but it, nothing that hears but it, nothing that perceives but it, nothing that knows but it ') ; and, moreover, limiting conditions are expressly denied (of the akshara) in the passage, ' It is without eyes, without ears, without speech, without mind,' &c. (Ill, 8, 8). An embodied soul without limiting con- ditions does not exist1. — It is therefore certain beyond doubt that the Imperishable is nothing else but the highest Brahman. 13. On account of his being designated as the object of sight (the highest Self is meant, and) the same (is meant in the passage speaking of the medi- tation on the highest person by means of the syllable Om). (In Pra. Up. V, 2) the general topic of discussion is set forth in the words, ' O Satyak&ma, the syllable Om is the highest and also the other Brahman ; therefore he who knows it arrives by the same means at one of the two.' The text then goes on, c Again, he who meditates with this syllable Om of three matras on the highest Person,' &c. — Here the doubt presents itself, whether the object of medi- tation referred to in the latter passage is the highest Brahman or the other Brahman ; a doubt based on the former pas- sage, according to which both are under discussion. The purvapakshin maintains that the other, i. e. the lower 1 A remark directed against the possible attempt to explain the passage last quoted as referring to the embodied soul. 172 vedanta-s6tras. Brahman, is referred to, because the text promises only a reward limited by a certain locality for him who knows it. For, as the highest Brahman is omnipresent, it would be inappropriate to assume that he who knows it obtains a fruit limited by a certain locality. The objection that, if the lower Brahman were understood, there would be no room for the qualification, ' the highest person,' is not valid, because the vital principle (pra^a) may be called ' higher ' with reference to the body \ To this we make the following reply : What is here taught as the object of meditation is the highest Brahman only. — Why? — On account of its being spoken of as the object of sight.
3ital principle (pra^a) may be called ' higher ' with reference to the body \ To this we make the following reply : What is here taught as the object of meditation is the highest Brahman only. — Why? — On account of its being spoken of as the object of sight. For the person to be meditated upon is, in a com- plementary passage, spoken of as the object of the act of seeing, e He sees the person dwelling in the castle (of the body ; purusham pumayam), higher than that one who is of the shape of the individual soul, and who is himself higher (than the senses and their objects).' Now, of an act of meditation an unreal thing also can be the object, as, for instance, the merely imaginary object of a wish. But of the act of seeing, real things only are the objects, as we know from experience ; we therefore conclude, that in the passage last quoted, the highest (only real) Self which corresponds to the mental act of complete intuition 2 is spoken of as the object of sight. This same highest Self we recognise in the passage under discussion as the object of meditation, in conse- quence of the term, ' the highest person.' — But — an objection will be raised — as the object of meditation we have the highest person, and as the object of sight the person higher than that one who is himself higher, &c. ; how, then, are we to know that those two are identical ? — The two passages, we 1 YindaJi sthulo deha^, pra/za^ sutratma. Ananda Giri. — The lower Brahman (hirarayagarbha on sutratman) is the vital principle (pra^a) in all creatures. 2 Saflzyagdawana, i.e. complete seeing or intuition; the same term which in other places — where it is not requisite to insist on the idea of ' seeing ' in contradistinction from ' reflecting ' or ' medi- tating'— is rendered by perfect knowledge. I ADHYAYA, 3 PAD A, 1 3. I 73 reply, have in common the terms ' highest ' (or ' higher,' para) and ' person.' And it must not by any means be supposed that the term ^ivaghana1 refers to that highest person which, considered as the object of meditation, had previously been introduced as the general topic. For the consequence of that supposition would be that that highest person which is the object of sight would be different from that highest person which is represented as the object of meditation. We rather have to explain the word ^ivaghana as ' He whose shape2 is characterised by the^ivas ;' so that what is really meant by that term is that limited condition of the highest Self which is owing to its adjuncts, and manifests itself in the form of ^ivas, i. e.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1e glorification of the syllable Om considered as a means to obtain Brahman. — Therefore we take akshara to mean either ' the Imperishable' or 'that which pervades ; ' on the ground of either of which explana- tions it must be identified with the highest Brahman. But — our opponent resumes— while we must admit that the above reasoning holds good so far that the circum- stance of the akshara supporting all things up to ether is to be accepted as a proof of all effects depending on a cause, we point out that it may be employed by those also who declare the pradhana to be the general cause. How then does the previous argumentation specially establish Brah- man (to the exclusion of the pradhana) ? — The reply to this is given in the next Sutra. 11. This (supporting can), on account of the command (attributed to the Imperishable, be the work of the highest Lord only). The supporting of all things up to ether is the work of the highest Lord only. — Why? — On account of the command. — For the sacred text speaks of a command (; By the command of that akshara, O Gargi,sunand moon stand apart!' 111,8,9), and command can be the work of the highest Lord only, not of the non-intelligent pradhana. For non-intelligent causes such as clay and the like are not capable of command, with reference to their effects, such as jars and the like. 12. And on account of (Scripture) separating (the akshara) from that whose nature is different (from Brahman). Also on account of the reason stated in this Sutra Brahman only is to be considered as the Imperishable, and the supporting of all things up to ether is to be looked upon as the work of Brahman only, not of anything else. The meaning of the Sutra is as follows. Whatever things other than Brahman might possibly be thought to be denoted by the term ' akshara,5 from the nature of all those things Scripture separates the akshara spoken of as the I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 3. 171 support of all things up to ether. The scriptural passage alluded to is III, 8, 11, 'That akshara, 0 Gargi, is unseen but seeing, unheard but hearing, unperceived but perceiving, unknown but knowing.' Here the designation of being unseen, &c. agrees indeed with the pradhana also, but not so the designation of seeing, &c, as the pradhana is non- intelligent.
2a, 0 Gargi, is unseen but seeing, unheard but hearing, unperceived but perceiving, unknown but knowing.' Here the designation of being unseen, &c. agrees indeed with the pradhana also, but not so the designation of seeing, &c, as the pradhana is non- intelligent. — Nor can the word akshara denote the embodied soul with its limiting conditions, for the passage following on the one quoted declares that there is nothing different from the Self ('there is nothing that sees but it, nothing that hears but it, nothing that perceives but it, nothing that knows but it ') ; and, moreover, limiting conditions are expressly denied (of the akshara) in the passage, ' It is without eyes, without ears, without speech, without mind,' &c. (Ill, 8, 8). An embodied soul without limiting con- ditions does not exist1. — It is therefore certain beyond doubt that the Imperishable is nothing else but the highest Brahman. 13. On account of his being designated as the object of sight (the highest Self is meant, and) the same (is meant in the passage speaking of the medi- tation on the highest person by means of the syllable Om). (In Pra. Up. V, 2) the general topic of discussion is set forth in the words, ' O Satyak&ma, the syllable Om is the highest and also the other Brahman ; therefore he who knows it arrives by the same means at one of the two.' The text then goes on, c Again, he who meditates with this syllable Om of three matras on the highest Person,' &c. — Here the doubt presents itself, whether the object of medi- tation referred to in the latter passage is the highest Brahman or the other Brahman ; a doubt based on the former pas- sage, according to which both are under discussion. The purvapakshin maintains that the other, i. e. the lower 1 A remark directed against the possible attempt to explain the passage last quoted as referring to the embodied soul. 172 vedanta-s6tras. Brahman, is referred to, because the text promises only a reward limited by a certain locality for him who knows it. For, as the highest Brahman is omnipresent, it would be inappropriate to assume that he who knows it obtains a fruit limited by a certain locality. The objection that, if the lower Brahman were understood, there would be no room for the qualification, ' the highest person,' is not valid, because the vital principle (pra^a) may be called ' higher ' with reference to the body \ To this we make the following reply : What is here taught as the object of meditation is the highest Brahman only. — Why? — On account of its being spoken of as the object of sight.
3ital principle (pra^a) may be called ' higher ' with reference to the body \ To this we make the following reply : What is here taught as the object of meditation is the highest Brahman only. — Why? — On account of its being spoken of as the object of sight. For the person to be meditated upon is, in a com- plementary passage, spoken of as the object of the act of seeing, e He sees the person dwelling in the castle (of the body ; purusham pumayam), higher than that one who is of the shape of the individual soul, and who is himself higher (than the senses and their objects).' Now, of an act of meditation an unreal thing also can be the object, as, for instance, the merely imaginary object of a wish. But of the act of seeing, real things only are the objects, as we know from experience ; we therefore conclude, that in the passage last quoted, the highest (only real) Self which corresponds to the mental act of complete intuition 2 is spoken of as the object of sight. This same highest Self we recognise in the passage under discussion as the object of meditation, in conse- quence of the term, ' the highest person.' — But — an objection will be raised — as the object of meditation we have the highest person, and as the object of sight the person higher than that one who is himself higher, &c. ; how, then, are we to know that those two are identical ? — The two passages, we 1 YindaJi sthulo deha^, pra/za^ sutratma. Ananda Giri. — The lower Brahman (hirarayagarbha on sutratman) is the vital principle (pra^a) in all creatures. 2 Saflzyagdawana, i.e. complete seeing or intuition; the same term which in other places — where it is not requisite to insist on the idea of ' seeing ' in contradistinction from ' reflecting ' or ' medi- tating'— is rendered by perfect knowledge. I ADHYAYA, 3 PAD A, 1 3. I 73 reply, have in common the terms ' highest ' (or ' higher,' para) and ' person.' And it must not by any means be supposed that the term ^ivaghana1 refers to that highest person which, considered as the object of meditation, had previously been introduced as the general topic. For the consequence of that supposition would be that that highest person which is the object of sight would be different from that highest person which is represented as the object of meditation. We rather have to explain the word ^ivaghana as ' He whose shape2 is characterised by the^ivas ;' so that what is really meant by that term is that limited condition of the highest Self which is owing to its adjuncts, and manifests itself in the form of ^ivas, i. e.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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