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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1lity of the) conjunction of the Self with the body is itself not established, the circumstance of merit and demerit being due to the action of the Self is likewise not established ; for (if we should try to get over this difficulty by representing the Self's embodiedness as caused by merit and demerit) we should commit the logical fault of making embodiedness dependent on merit and de- 42 VEDANTA-S^TRAS. merit, and again merit and demerit on embodiedness. And the assumption of an endless retrogressive chain (of em- bodied states and merit and demerit) would be no better than a chain of blind men (who are unable to lead one another). Moreover, the Self can impossibly become an agent, as it cannot enter into intimate relation to actions. If it should be said that the Self may be considered as an agent in the same way as kings and other great people are (who without acting themselves make others act) by their mere presence, we deny the appositeness of this instance ; for kings may become agents through their relation to servants whom they procure by giving them wages, &c, while it is impossible to imagine anything, analogous to money, which could be the cause of a connexion between the Self as lord and the body, and so on (as servants). Wrong imagination, on the other hand, (of the individual Self, considering itself to be joined to the body,) is a manifest reason of the connexion of the two (which is not based on any assumption). This ex- plains also in how far the Self can be considered as the agent in sacrifices and similar acts1. Here it is objected that the Self's imagination as to the body, and so on, belonging to itself is not false, but is to be understood in a derived (figurative) sense. This objection we invalidate by the remark that the distinction of derived and primary senses of words is known to be applicable only where an actual difference of things is known to exist. We are, for instance, acquainted with a certain species of animals having a mane, and so on, which is the exclusive primary object of the idea and word ' lion,' and we are likewise acquainted with per- sons possessing in an eminent degree certain leonine quali- ties, such as fierceness, courage, &c. ; here, a well settled difference of objects existing, the idea and the name ' lion ' are applied to those persons in a derived or figurative sense. In those cases, however, where the difference of the objects is not well established, the transfer of the conception and 1 The Self is the agent in a sacrifice, &c.
2e idea and the name ' lion ' are applied to those persons in a derived or figurative sense. In those cases, however, where the difference of the objects is not well established, the transfer of the conception and 1 The Self is the agent in a sacrifice, &c. only in so far as it imagines itself to be joined to a body ; which imagination is finally removed by the cognition of Brahman. I ADHYAYA, I PAD A, 4. 43 name of the one to the other is not figurative, but simply founded on error. Such is, for instance, the case of a man who at the time of twilight does not discern that the object before him is a post, and applies to it the conception and designation of a man ; such is likewise the case of the con- ception and designation of silver being applied to a shell of mother-of-pearl somehow mistaken for silver. How then can it be maintained that the application of the word and the conception of the Ego to the body, &c, which application is due to the non-discrimination of the Self and the Not- Self, is figurative (rather than simply false) ? considering that even learned men who know the difference of the Self and the Not-Self confound the words and ideas just as common shepherds and goatherds do. As therefore the application of the conception of the Ego to the body on the part of those who affirm the existence of a Self different from the body is simply false, not figurative, it follows that the embodiedness of the Self is (not real but) caused by wrong conception, and hence that the person who has reached true knowledge is free from his body even while still alive. The same is declared in the *Sruti passages concerning him who knows Brahman : s And as the slough of a snake lies on an ant-hill, dead and cast away, thus lies this body; but that disembodied immortal spirit is Brahman only, is only light ' (Bn. Up. IV, 4, 7) ; and ' With eyes he is without eyes as it were, with ears without ears as it were, with speech without speech as it were, with a mind without mind as it were, with vital airs without vital airs as it were.' Smrzti also, in the passage where the characteristic marks are enume- rated of one whose mind is steady (Bha. Gita II, 54), declares that he who knows is no longer connected with action of any kind. Therefore the man who has once com- prehended Brahman to be the Self, does not belong to this transmigratory world as he did before. He, on the other hand, who still belongs to this transmigratory world as before, has not comprehended Brahman to be the Self. Thus there remain no unsolved contradictions.
3ed Brahman to be the Self, does not belong to this transmigratory world as he did before. He, on the other hand, who still belongs to this transmigratory world as before, has not comprehended Brahman to be the Self. Thus there remain no unsolved contradictions. With reference again to the assertion that Brahman is not 44 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. fully determined in its own nature, but stands in a comple- mentary relation to injunctions, because the hearing about Brahman is to be followed by consideration and reflection, we remark that consideration and reflection are themselves merely subservient to the comprehension of Brahman. If Brahman, after having been comprehended, stood in a subordinate relation to some injunctions, it might be said to be merely supplementary. But this is not the case, since consideration and reflection no less than hearing are subservient to comprehension. It follows that the 5astra cannot be the means of knowing Brahman only in so far as it is connected with injunctions, and the doctrine that on account of the uniform meaning of the Vedanta- texts, an independent Brahman is to be admitted, is thereby fully established. Hence there is room for beginning the new *Sastra indicated in the first Sutra, 'Then therefore the enquiry into Brahman.' If, on the other hand, the Ved&nta- texts were connected with injunctions, a new 5astra would either not be begun at all, since the vSastra concerned with injunctions has already been introduced by means of the first Sutra of the Purva Mima^sa, ' Then therefore the enquiry into duty ;' or if it were begun it would be intro- duced as follows : ' Then therefore the enquiry into the remaining duties ;' just as a new portion of the Purva Mima/^sa Sutras is introduced with the words, 'Then therefore the enquiry into what subserves the purpose of the sacrifice, and what subserves the purpose of man ' (Pu. Mt. Su. IV, i, i). But as the comprehension of the unity of Brahman and the Self has not been propounded (in the previous S&stra), it is quite appropriate that a new vSastra, whose subject is Brahman, should be entered upon. Hence all injunctions and all other means of knowledge end with the cognition expressed in the words, ' I am Brah- man ;' for as soon as there supervenes the comprehension of the non-dual Self, which is not either something to be eschewed or something to be appropriated, all objects and knowing agents vanish, and hence there can no longer be means of proof. In accordance with this, they (i. e. men knowing Brahman) have made the following declaration : — I ADHYAYA, I PAD A, 4.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1lity of the) conjunction of the Self with the body is itself not established, the circumstance of merit and demerit being due to the action of the Self is likewise not established ; for (if we should try to get over this difficulty by representing the Self's embodiedness as caused by merit and demerit) we should commit the logical fault of making embodiedness dependent on merit and de- 42 VEDANTA-S^TRAS. merit, and again merit and demerit on embodiedness. And the assumption of an endless retrogressive chain (of em- bodied states and merit and demerit) would be no better than a chain of blind men (who are unable to lead one another). Moreover, the Self can impossibly become an agent, as it cannot enter into intimate relation to actions. If it should be said that the Self may be considered as an agent in the same way as kings and other great people are (who without acting themselves make others act) by their mere presence, we deny the appositeness of this instance ; for kings may become agents through their relation to servants whom they procure by giving them wages, &c, while it is impossible to imagine anything, analogous to money, which could be the cause of a connexion between the Self as lord and the body, and so on (as servants). Wrong imagination, on the other hand, (of the individual Self, considering itself to be joined to the body,) is a manifest reason of the connexion of the two (which is not based on any assumption). This ex- plains also in how far the Self can be considered as the agent in sacrifices and similar acts1. Here it is objected that the Self's imagination as to the body, and so on, belonging to itself is not false, but is to be understood in a derived (figurative) sense. This objection we invalidate by the remark that the distinction of derived and primary senses of words is known to be applicable only where an actual difference of things is known to exist. We are, for instance, acquainted with a certain species of animals having a mane, and so on, which is the exclusive primary object of the idea and word ' lion,' and we are likewise acquainted with per- sons possessing in an eminent degree certain leonine quali- ties, such as fierceness, courage, &c. ; here, a well settled difference of objects existing, the idea and the name ' lion ' are applied to those persons in a derived or figurative sense. In those cases, however, where the difference of the objects is not well established, the transfer of the conception and 1 The Self is the agent in a sacrifice, &c.
2e idea and the name ' lion ' are applied to those persons in a derived or figurative sense. In those cases, however, where the difference of the objects is not well established, the transfer of the conception and 1 The Self is the agent in a sacrifice, &c. only in so far as it imagines itself to be joined to a body ; which imagination is finally removed by the cognition of Brahman. I ADHYAYA, I PAD A, 4. 43 name of the one to the other is not figurative, but simply founded on error. Such is, for instance, the case of a man who at the time of twilight does not discern that the object before him is a post, and applies to it the conception and designation of a man ; such is likewise the case of the con- ception and designation of silver being applied to a shell of mother-of-pearl somehow mistaken for silver. How then can it be maintained that the application of the word and the conception of the Ego to the body, &c, which application is due to the non-discrimination of the Self and the Not- Self, is figurative (rather than simply false) ? considering that even learned men who know the difference of the Self and the Not-Self confound the words and ideas just as common shepherds and goatherds do. As therefore the application of the conception of the Ego to the body on the part of those who affirm the existence of a Self different from the body is simply false, not figurative, it follows that the embodiedness of the Self is (not real but) caused by wrong conception, and hence that the person who has reached true knowledge is free from his body even while still alive. The same is declared in the *Sruti passages concerning him who knows Brahman : s And as the slough of a snake lies on an ant-hill, dead and cast away, thus lies this body; but that disembodied immortal spirit is Brahman only, is only light ' (Bn. Up. IV, 4, 7) ; and ' With eyes he is without eyes as it were, with ears without ears as it were, with speech without speech as it were, with a mind without mind as it were, with vital airs without vital airs as it were.' Smrzti also, in the passage where the characteristic marks are enume- rated of one whose mind is steady (Bha. Gita II, 54), declares that he who knows is no longer connected with action of any kind. Therefore the man who has once com- prehended Brahman to be the Self, does not belong to this transmigratory world as he did before. He, on the other hand, who still belongs to this transmigratory world as before, has not comprehended Brahman to be the Self. Thus there remain no unsolved contradictions.
3ed Brahman to be the Self, does not belong to this transmigratory world as he did before. He, on the other hand, who still belongs to this transmigratory world as before, has not comprehended Brahman to be the Self. Thus there remain no unsolved contradictions. With reference again to the assertion that Brahman is not 44 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. fully determined in its own nature, but stands in a comple- mentary relation to injunctions, because the hearing about Brahman is to be followed by consideration and reflection, we remark that consideration and reflection are themselves merely subservient to the comprehension of Brahman. If Brahman, after having been comprehended, stood in a subordinate relation to some injunctions, it might be said to be merely supplementary. But this is not the case, since consideration and reflection no less than hearing are subservient to comprehension. It follows that the 5astra cannot be the means of knowing Brahman only in so far as it is connected with injunctions, and the doctrine that on account of the uniform meaning of the Vedanta- texts, an independent Brahman is to be admitted, is thereby fully established. Hence there is room for beginning the new *Sastra indicated in the first Sutra, 'Then therefore the enquiry into Brahman.' If, on the other hand, the Ved&nta- texts were connected with injunctions, a new 5astra would either not be begun at all, since the vSastra concerned with injunctions has already been introduced by means of the first Sutra of the Purva Mima^sa, ' Then therefore the enquiry into duty ;' or if it were begun it would be intro- duced as follows : ' Then therefore the enquiry into the remaining duties ;' just as a new portion of the Purva Mima/^sa Sutras is introduced with the words, 'Then therefore the enquiry into what subserves the purpose of the sacrifice, and what subserves the purpose of man ' (Pu. Mt. Su. IV, i, i). But as the comprehension of the unity of Brahman and the Self has not been propounded (in the previous S&stra), it is quite appropriate that a new vSastra, whose subject is Brahman, should be entered upon. Hence all injunctions and all other means of knowledge end with the cognition expressed in the words, ' I am Brah- man ;' for as soon as there supervenes the comprehension of the non-dual Self, which is not either something to be eschewed or something to be appropriated, all objects and knowing agents vanish, and hence there can no longer be means of proof. In accordance with this, they (i. e. men knowing Brahman) have made the following declaration : — I ADHYAYA, I PAD A, 4.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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