Fetching
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Fetching
One moment.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1is pronounced, it is eternal ; while the apprehension of difference referred to above has for its object the letters merely. From this eternal word, which is of the nature of the spho/a and possesses denotative power, there is produced the object denoted, i. e. this world which consists of actions, agents, and results of action. Against this doctrine the reverend Upavarsha maintains that the letters only are the word. — But — an objection is raised — it has been said above that the letters no sooner produced pass away! — That assertion is not true, we reply; for they are recognised as the same letters (each time they are produced anew). — Nor can it be maintained that the recognition is due to similarity only, as in the case of hairs, for instance ; for the fact of the recognition being a re- cognition in the strict sense of the word is not contradicted by any other means of proof. — Nor, again, can it be said infer the existence of fire only if we are actually conscious of the smoke. But that actual consciousness does not take place because the impressions are not objects of perceptive consciousness. i adhyAya, 3 pAda, 28. 207 that the recognition has its cause in the species (so that not the same individual letter would be recognised, but only a letter belonging to the same species as other letters heard before) ; for, as a matter of fact, the same individual letters are recognised. That the recognition of the letters rests on the species could be maintained only if whenever the letters are pronounced different individual letters were apprehended, just as several cows are apprehended as different individuals belonging to the same species. But this is actually not the case ; for the (same) individual letters are recognised as often as they are pronounced. If, for instance, the word cow is pronounced twice, we think not that two different words have been pronounced, but that the same individual word has been repeated. — But, our opponent reminds us, it has been shown above, that the letters are apprehended as different owing to differences of pronunciation, as appears from the fact that we apprehend a difference when merely hearing the sound of Devadatta or Ya^vzadatta reading. — Although, we reply, it is a settled matter that the letters are recognised as the same, yet we admit that there are differences in the apprehension of the letters ; but as the letters are articulated by means of the conjunction and disjunction (of the breath with the palate, the teeth, &c), those differences are rightly ascribed to the various character of the articulating agents and not
2in the apprehension of the letters ; but as the letters are articulated by means of the conjunction and disjunction (of the breath with the palate, the teeth, &c), those differences are rightly ascribed to the various character of the articulating agents and not to the intrinsic nature of the letters themselves. Those, moreover, who maintain that the individual letters are different have, in order to account for the fact of recogni- tion, to assume species of letters, and further to admit that the apprehension of difference is conditioned by ex- ternal factors. Is it then not much simpler to assume, as we do, that the apprehension of difference is conditioned by external factors while the recognition is due to the intrinsic nature of the letters? And this very fact of recognition is that mental process which prevents us from looking on the apprehension of difference as having the letters for its object (so that the opponent was wrong in denying the existence of such a process). For how should, for instance, the one syllable ga, when it is pronounced in 2o8 vedAnta-s6tras. the same moment by several persons, be at the same time of different nature, viz. accented with the udatta, the anudatta, and the Svarita and nasal as well as non-nasal * ? Or else2 — and this is the preferable explanation — we assume that the difference of apprehension is caused not by the letters but by the tone (dhvani). By this tone we have to understand that which enters the ear of a person who is listening from a distance and not able to distinguish the separate letters, and which, for a person standing near, affects the letters with its own distinctions, such as high or low pitch and so on. It is on this tone that all the distinctions of udatta, anudatta, and so on depend, and not on the intrinsic nature of the letters ; for they are recognised as the same whenever they are pronounced. On this theory only we gain a basis for the distinctive apprehension of the udatta, the anudatta, and the like. For on the theory first propounded (but now rejected), we should have to assume that the distinctions of udatta and so on are due to the processes of conjunction and disjunction described above, since the letters themselves, which are ever re- cognised as the same, are not different. But as those processes of conjunction and disjunction are not matter of perception, we cannot definitely ascertain in the letters any differences based on those processes, and hence the apprehension of the udatta and so on remains without a basis.
3not different. But as those processes of conjunction and disjunction are not matter of perception, we cannot definitely ascertain in the letters any differences based on those processes, and hence the apprehension of the udatta and so on remains without a basis. — Nor should it be urged that from the dif- ference of the udatta and so on there results also a difference of the letters recognised. For a difference in one matter does not involve a difference in some other matter which in itself is free from difference. Nobody, for instance, thinks that because the individuals 1 'How should it be so?' i.e. it cannot be so; and on that account the differences apprehended do not belong to the letters themselves, but to the external conditions mentioned above. 2 With ' or else ' begins the exposition of the finally accepted theory as to the cause why the same letters are apprehended as different. Hitherto the cause had been found in the variety of the upadhis of the letters. Now a new distinction is made between articulated letters and non-articulated tone. I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 28. 2O9 are different from each other the species also contains a difference in itself. The assumption of the spho/a is further gratuitous, be- cause the sense of the word may be apprehended from the letters. — But— our opponent here objects — I do not assume the existence of the spho/a. I, on the contrary, actually perceive it ; for after the buddhi has been impressed by the successive apprehension of the letters of the word, the spho/a all at once presents itself as the object of cognition. — You are mistaken, we reply. The object of the cognitional act of which you speak is simply the letters of the word. That one comprehensive cognition which follows upon the apprehension of the successive letters of the word has for its object the entire aggregate of the letters constituting the word, and not anything else. We conclude this from the circumstance that in that final comprehensive cognition there are included those letters only of which a definite given word consists, and not any other letters. If that cognitional act had for its object the spho/a — i.e. something different from the letters of the given word — then those letters would be excluded from it just as much as the letters of any other word. But as this is not the case, it follows that that final comprehensive act of cognition is nothing but an act of remembrance which has the letters of the word for its object. — Our opponent has asserted above that the letters of a word being several cannot form the object of one mental act.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1is pronounced, it is eternal ; while the apprehension of difference referred to above has for its object the letters merely. From this eternal word, which is of the nature of the spho/a and possesses denotative power, there is produced the object denoted, i. e. this world which consists of actions, agents, and results of action. Against this doctrine the reverend Upavarsha maintains that the letters only are the word. — But — an objection is raised — it has been said above that the letters no sooner produced pass away! — That assertion is not true, we reply; for they are recognised as the same letters (each time they are produced anew). — Nor can it be maintained that the recognition is due to similarity only, as in the case of hairs, for instance ; for the fact of the recognition being a re- cognition in the strict sense of the word is not contradicted by any other means of proof. — Nor, again, can it be said infer the existence of fire only if we are actually conscious of the smoke. But that actual consciousness does not take place because the impressions are not objects of perceptive consciousness. i adhyAya, 3 pAda, 28. 207 that the recognition has its cause in the species (so that not the same individual letter would be recognised, but only a letter belonging to the same species as other letters heard before) ; for, as a matter of fact, the same individual letters are recognised. That the recognition of the letters rests on the species could be maintained only if whenever the letters are pronounced different individual letters were apprehended, just as several cows are apprehended as different individuals belonging to the same species. But this is actually not the case ; for the (same) individual letters are recognised as often as they are pronounced. If, for instance, the word cow is pronounced twice, we think not that two different words have been pronounced, but that the same individual word has been repeated. — But, our opponent reminds us, it has been shown above, that the letters are apprehended as different owing to differences of pronunciation, as appears from the fact that we apprehend a difference when merely hearing the sound of Devadatta or Ya^vzadatta reading. — Although, we reply, it is a settled matter that the letters are recognised as the same, yet we admit that there are differences in the apprehension of the letters ; but as the letters are articulated by means of the conjunction and disjunction (of the breath with the palate, the teeth, &c), those differences are rightly ascribed to the various character of the articulating agents and not
2in the apprehension of the letters ; but as the letters are articulated by means of the conjunction and disjunction (of the breath with the palate, the teeth, &c), those differences are rightly ascribed to the various character of the articulating agents and not to the intrinsic nature of the letters themselves. Those, moreover, who maintain that the individual letters are different have, in order to account for the fact of recogni- tion, to assume species of letters, and further to admit that the apprehension of difference is conditioned by ex- ternal factors. Is it then not much simpler to assume, as we do, that the apprehension of difference is conditioned by external factors while the recognition is due to the intrinsic nature of the letters? And this very fact of recognition is that mental process which prevents us from looking on the apprehension of difference as having the letters for its object (so that the opponent was wrong in denying the existence of such a process). For how should, for instance, the one syllable ga, when it is pronounced in 2o8 vedAnta-s6tras. the same moment by several persons, be at the same time of different nature, viz. accented with the udatta, the anudatta, and the Svarita and nasal as well as non-nasal * ? Or else2 — and this is the preferable explanation — we assume that the difference of apprehension is caused not by the letters but by the tone (dhvani). By this tone we have to understand that which enters the ear of a person who is listening from a distance and not able to distinguish the separate letters, and which, for a person standing near, affects the letters with its own distinctions, such as high or low pitch and so on. It is on this tone that all the distinctions of udatta, anudatta, and so on depend, and not on the intrinsic nature of the letters ; for they are recognised as the same whenever they are pronounced. On this theory only we gain a basis for the distinctive apprehension of the udatta, the anudatta, and the like. For on the theory first propounded (but now rejected), we should have to assume that the distinctions of udatta and so on are due to the processes of conjunction and disjunction described above, since the letters themselves, which are ever re- cognised as the same, are not different. But as those processes of conjunction and disjunction are not matter of perception, we cannot definitely ascertain in the letters any differences based on those processes, and hence the apprehension of the udatta and so on remains without a basis.
3not different. But as those processes of conjunction and disjunction are not matter of perception, we cannot definitely ascertain in the letters any differences based on those processes, and hence the apprehension of the udatta and so on remains without a basis. — Nor should it be urged that from the dif- ference of the udatta and so on there results also a difference of the letters recognised. For a difference in one matter does not involve a difference in some other matter which in itself is free from difference. Nobody, for instance, thinks that because the individuals 1 'How should it be so?' i.e. it cannot be so; and on that account the differences apprehended do not belong to the letters themselves, but to the external conditions mentioned above. 2 With ' or else ' begins the exposition of the finally accepted theory as to the cause why the same letters are apprehended as different. Hitherto the cause had been found in the variety of the upadhis of the letters. Now a new distinction is made between articulated letters and non-articulated tone. I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 28. 2O9 are different from each other the species also contains a difference in itself. The assumption of the spho/a is further gratuitous, be- cause the sense of the word may be apprehended from the letters. — But— our opponent here objects — I do not assume the existence of the spho/a. I, on the contrary, actually perceive it ; for after the buddhi has been impressed by the successive apprehension of the letters of the word, the spho/a all at once presents itself as the object of cognition. — You are mistaken, we reply. The object of the cognitional act of which you speak is simply the letters of the word. That one comprehensive cognition which follows upon the apprehension of the successive letters of the word has for its object the entire aggregate of the letters constituting the word, and not anything else. We conclude this from the circumstance that in that final comprehensive cognition there are included those letters only of which a definite given word consists, and not any other letters. If that cognitional act had for its object the spho/a — i.e. something different from the letters of the given word — then those letters would be excluded from it just as much as the letters of any other word. But as this is not the case, it follows that that final comprehensive act of cognition is nothing but an act of remembrance which has the letters of the word for its object. — Our opponent has asserted above that the letters of a word being several cannot form the object of one mental act.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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