Sacred Books of the East, Vol. 34 — The Vedanta-Sutras, Part I (Sankara/Thibaut, page scans)

Not so, on account of the difference of nature of this (effect).' — The Vedantic opinion that the intelligent Brahman is the material cause of this world is untenable because the effect would in that case be of an altogether different character from the cause. For this world, which the Vedantin considers as the effect of Brahman, is perceived to be non-intelligent and impure, consequently different in character from Brahman; and Brahman again is declared by the sacred texts to be of a character different from the world, viz. intelligent and pure. But things of an altogether different character cannot stand to each other in the relation of material cause and effect. Such effects, for instance, as golden ornaments do not have earth for their material cause, nor is

1 The cognition of Brahman terminates in an act of anubhava ; hence as it has been shown that reasoning is more closely connected with anubhava than *Sruti is, we have the right to apply reasoning to 6ruti. — Ananda Giri comments on the passage from anubhavavasanam as follows: brahmasakshatkarasya mokshopayataya pradhanyât tatra sabdad api parokshago^arad aparoksharthasadharmyago^aras tarko*ntarafigam iti tasyaiva balavatvam ity artha^. Aitihyamatrewa pravadaparamparyamatre/za parokshatayeti yavat. Anubhavasya pradhanye tarkasyoktanyayena tasminn antarangatvad agamasya £a bahirangatvad antarangabahirangayor antararigazrc balavad ity nyayad uktaw tarkasya balavattvam. Anubhavapradh any azra tu nadyapi siddham ity a^arikyahanubhaveti. Nanu Brahma^vzanaffz vaidikatvad dharmavad ad/Ysh/aphalam esh/avya/ra tat kuto * syanubhavavasanavidyanivartakatvanz tatraha moksheti. Adhish/Mnasakshatkarasya ^uktyadi^ane tadavidyatatkaryanivartakatvadrzsh/e^, brahma^Tzanasyapi tarkava^ad asambhavanadinirasadvard sakshatkaravasayinas tadavidyadinivartakatvenaiva muktihetuteti nadrzsh/aphalatety artha^.

II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. 3OI

gold the material cause of earthen vessels ; but effects of an earthy nature originate from earth and effects of the nature of gold from gold. In the same manner this world, which is non-intelligent and comprises pleasure, pain, and dulness, can only be the effect of a cause itself non-intelligent and made up of pleasure, pain, and dulness ; but not of Brahman which is of an altogether different character. The difference in character of this world from Brahman must be understood to be due to its impurity and its want of intelligence.

elf non-intelligent and made up of pleasure, pain, and dulness ; but not of Brahman which is of an altogether different character. The difference in character of this world from Brahman must be understood to be due to its impurity and its want of intelligence. It is impure because being itself made up of pleasure, pain, and dulness, it is the cause of delight, grief, despondency, &c, and because it comprises in itself abodes of various character such as heaven, hell, and so on. It is devoid of intelligence because it is observed to stand to the intelligent principle in the relation of subserviency, being the instrument of its activity. For the relation of subserviency of one thing to another is not possible on the basis of equality ; two lamps, for instance, cannot be said to be subservient to each other (both being equally luminous). — But, it will be said, an intelligent instrument also might be subservient to the enjoying soul; just as an intelligent servant is subservient to his master. — This analogy, we reply, does not hold good, because in the case of servant and master also only the non-intelligent element in the former is subservient to the intelligent master. For a being endowed with intelligence subserves another intelligent being only with the non-intelligent part belonging to it, viz. its internal organ, sense organs, &c. ; while in so far as it is intelligent itself it acts neither for nor against any other being. For the Sankhyas are of opinion that the intelligent beings (i. e. the souls) are incapable of either taking in or giving out anything1, and are non-active. Hence that only which is devoid of intelligence can be an instrument. Nor2 is there anythingp. 302 to show that things like pieces of wood and clods of earth are of an intelligent nature ; on the contrary, the dichotomy of all things which exist into such as are intelligent and such as are non-intelligent is well established. This world therefore cannot have its material cause in Brahman from which it is altogether different in character. — Here somebody might argue as follows. Scripture tells us that this world has originated from an intelligent cause; therefore, starting from the observation that the attributes of the cause survive in the effect, I assume this whole world to be intelligent.

1 Niratuaya^, upa^anapayadharma^unyatvaw niratlrayatvam. An. Gi.

2 A sentence replying to the possible objection that the world, as being the effect of the intelligent Brahman, might itself be intelligent.

. — Here somebody might argue as follows. Scripture tells us that this world has originated from an intelligent cause; therefore, starting from the observation that the attributes of the cause survive in the effect, I assume this whole world to be intelligent. The absence of manifestation of intelligence (in this world) is to be ascribed to the particular nature of the modification 1. Just as undoubtedly intelligent beings do not manifest their intelligence in certain states such as sleep, swoon, &c, so the intelligence of wood and earth also is not manifest (although it exists). In consequence of this difference produced by the manifestation and non-manifestation of intelligence (in the case of men, animals, &c, on the one side, and wood, stones, &c. on the other side), and in consequence of form, colour, and the like being present in the one case and absent in the other, nothing prevents the instruments of action (earth, wood, &c) from standing to the souls in the relation of a subordinate to a superior thing, although in reality both are equally of an intelligent nature. And just as such substances as flesh, broth, pap, and the like may, owing to their individual differences, stand in the relation of mutual subserviency, although fundamentally they are all of the same nature, viz. mere modifications of earth, so it will be in the case under discussion also, without there being done any violence to the well-known distinction (of beings intelligent and non-intelligent). — This reasoning — the purvapakshin replies — if valid might remove to a certain extent that difference of character between

1 In the case of things commonly considered non-intelligent, intelligence is not influenced by an internal organ, and on that account remains unperceived; samaste ^agati sato*pi ^aitanyasya tatra tatrdnta^karawapariwamdnuparagad anupalabdhir aviruddha. An. Gi.

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Brahman and the world which is due to the circumstance of the one being intelligent and the other non-intelligent ; there would, however, still remain that other difference which results from the fact that the one is pure and the other impure. But in reality the argumentation of the objector does not even remove the first-named difference ; as is declared in the latter part of the Sutra, ' And its being such we learn from Scripture.' For the assumption of the intellectuality of the entire world — which is supported neither by perception nor by inference, &c.