Fetching
One moment.
Fetching
One moment.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1their meaning enables us to use them as steps in our investiga- tion. The sixth Sutra of the p&da mentioned replies to the Sankhya objection that the non-intelligent world cannot spring from an intelligent principle, by the remark that c it is thus seen/ i. e. it is a matter of common observation that non-intelligent things are produced from beings endowed with intelligence ; hair and nails, for instance, springing from animals, and certain insects from dung. — Now, an argu- mentation of this kind is altogether out of place from the point of view of the true vSankara. According to the latter the non-intelligent world does not spring from Brahman in so far as the latter is intelligence, but in so far as it is associated with Maya. Maya is the upadana of the material world, and Maya itself is of a non-intelligent nature, owing to which it is by so many Vedantic writers identified with the prakr/ti of the Sankhyas. Similarly the illustrative instances, adduced under Sutra 9 for the purpose of showing that effects when being reabsorbed into their causal sub- XC1V VEDANTA-SUTRAS. stances do not impart to the latter their own qualities, and that hence the material world also, when being refunded into Brahman, does not impart to it its own imperfections, are singularly inappropriate if viewed in connexion with the doctrine of Maya, according to which the material world is no more in Brahman at the time of a pralaya than during the period of its subsistence. According to 5ankara the world is not merged in Brahman, but the special forms into which the upadana of the world, i.e. Maya, had modified itself are merged in non-distinct Maya, whose relation to Brahman is not changed thereby.— The illus- tration, again, given in Sutra 24 of the mode in which Brah- man, by means of its inherent power, transforms itself into the world without employing any extraneous instruments of action, ' kshiravad dhi,' ' as milk (of its own accord turns into curds)/ would be strangely chosen indeed if meant to bring nearer to our understanding the mode in which Brahman projects the illusive appearance of the world ; and also the analogous instance given in the Sutra next following, ' as Gods and the like (create palaces, chariots, &c. by the mere power of their will) ' — which refers to the real creation of real things — would hardly be in its place if meant to illustrate a theory which considers unreality to be the true character of the world.
2ds and the like (create palaces, chariots, &c. by the mere power of their will) ' — which refers to the real creation of real things — would hardly be in its place if meant to illustrate a theory which considers unreality to be the true character of the world. The mere cumulation of the two essentially heterogeneous illustrative instances (kshiravad dhi ; devadivat), moreover, seems to show that the writer who had recourse to them held no very definite theory as to the particular mode in which the world springs from Brahman, but was merely concerned to render plausible in some way or other that an intelligent being can give rise to what is non-intelligent without having recourse to any extraneous means1. That the Maya doctrine was not present to the mind of the Sutrakara, further appears from the latter part of the fourth pada of the first adhyaya, where it is shown that Brahman is not only the operative but also the material cause of the world. If anywhere, there would have been 1 Ankara's favourite illustrative instance of the magician producing illusive sights is — significantly enough — not known to the Sutras. INTRODUCTION. XCV the place to indicate, had such been the author's view, that Brahman is the material cause of the world through Maya only, and that the world is unreal ; but the Sutras do not contain a single word to that effect. Sutra 26, on the other hand, exhibits the significant term 'parkamat ;' Brahman produces the world by means of a modification of itself. It is well known that later on, when the terminology of the Vedanta became definitely settled, the term 'pari/zamavada' was used to denote that very theory to which the followers of vSankara are most violently opposed, viz. the doctrine according to which the world is not a mere vivarta, i.e. an illusory manifestation of Brahman, but the effect of Brah- man undergoing a real change, may that change be con- ceived to take place in the way taught by Ramanu^a or in some other manner. — With regard to the last-quoted Sutra, as well as to those touched upon above, the commentators indeed maintain that whatever terms and modes of ex- pression are apparently opposed to the vivartavada are in reality reconcilable with it ; to Sutra 26, for instance, Govindananda remarks that the term ' pari^ama ' only denotes an effect in general (karyamatra), without implying that the effect is real.
3odes of ex- pression are apparently opposed to the vivartavada are in reality reconcilable with it ; to Sutra 26, for instance, Govindananda remarks that the term ' pari^ama ' only denotes an effect in general (karyamatra), without implying that the effect is real. But in cases of this nature we are fully entitled to use our own judgment, even if we were not compelled to do so by the fact that other commentators, such as Ramanu^-a, are satisfied to take ' pari^ama ' and similar terms in their generally received sense. A further section treating of the nature of Brahman is met with in III, 2, 11 ff. It is, according to Sankara's view, of special importance, as it is alleged to set forth that Brah- man is in itself destitute of all qualities, and is affected with qualities only through its limiting adjuncts (upadhis), the offspring of Maya. I have above (in the conspectus of contents) given a somewhat detailed abstract of the whole section as interpreted by 5ankara on the one hand, and Ramanu^ci on the other hand, from which it appears that the latter's opinion as to the purport of the group of Sutras widely diverges from that of 6arikara. The wording of the Sutras is so eminently concise and vague that I find it impossible to decide which of the two commentators — if XCV1 VEDANTA-stiTRAS. indeed either — is to be accepted as a trustworthy guide ; regarding the sense of some Sutras 5ankara's explanation seems to deserve preference, in the case of others Rama- nu£"a seems to keep closer to the text. I decidedly prefer, for instance, Ramanu^a's interpretation of Sutra 22, as far as the sense of the entire Sutra is concerned, and more especially with regard to the term ' prakrztaitavat- tvam,' whose proper force is brought out by Rimanu^-a's explanation only. So much is certain that none of the Sutras decidedly favours the interpretation proposed by >Sankara. Whichever commentator we follow, we greatly miss coherence and strictness of reasoning, and it is thus by no means improbable that the section is one of those — perhaps not few in number — in which both inter- preters had less regard to the literal sense of the words and to tradition than to their desire of forcing Badaraya^a's Sutras to bear testimony to the truth of their own philo- sophic theories. With special reference to the Mayd doctrine one impor- tant Sutra has yet to be considered, the only one in which the term 'maya' itself occurs, viz. Ill, 2, 3. According to vSahkara the Sutra signifies that the environments of the dreaming soul are not real but mere Maya, i. e.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1their meaning enables us to use them as steps in our investiga- tion. The sixth Sutra of the p&da mentioned replies to the Sankhya objection that the non-intelligent world cannot spring from an intelligent principle, by the remark that c it is thus seen/ i. e. it is a matter of common observation that non-intelligent things are produced from beings endowed with intelligence ; hair and nails, for instance, springing from animals, and certain insects from dung. — Now, an argu- mentation of this kind is altogether out of place from the point of view of the true vSankara. According to the latter the non-intelligent world does not spring from Brahman in so far as the latter is intelligence, but in so far as it is associated with Maya. Maya is the upadana of the material world, and Maya itself is of a non-intelligent nature, owing to which it is by so many Vedantic writers identified with the prakr/ti of the Sankhyas. Similarly the illustrative instances, adduced under Sutra 9 for the purpose of showing that effects when being reabsorbed into their causal sub- XC1V VEDANTA-SUTRAS. stances do not impart to the latter their own qualities, and that hence the material world also, when being refunded into Brahman, does not impart to it its own imperfections, are singularly inappropriate if viewed in connexion with the doctrine of Maya, according to which the material world is no more in Brahman at the time of a pralaya than during the period of its subsistence. According to 5ankara the world is not merged in Brahman, but the special forms into which the upadana of the world, i.e. Maya, had modified itself are merged in non-distinct Maya, whose relation to Brahman is not changed thereby.— The illus- tration, again, given in Sutra 24 of the mode in which Brah- man, by means of its inherent power, transforms itself into the world without employing any extraneous instruments of action, ' kshiravad dhi,' ' as milk (of its own accord turns into curds)/ would be strangely chosen indeed if meant to bring nearer to our understanding the mode in which Brahman projects the illusive appearance of the world ; and also the analogous instance given in the Sutra next following, ' as Gods and the like (create palaces, chariots, &c. by the mere power of their will) ' — which refers to the real creation of real things — would hardly be in its place if meant to illustrate a theory which considers unreality to be the true character of the world.
2ds and the like (create palaces, chariots, &c. by the mere power of their will) ' — which refers to the real creation of real things — would hardly be in its place if meant to illustrate a theory which considers unreality to be the true character of the world. The mere cumulation of the two essentially heterogeneous illustrative instances (kshiravad dhi ; devadivat), moreover, seems to show that the writer who had recourse to them held no very definite theory as to the particular mode in which the world springs from Brahman, but was merely concerned to render plausible in some way or other that an intelligent being can give rise to what is non-intelligent without having recourse to any extraneous means1. That the Maya doctrine was not present to the mind of the Sutrakara, further appears from the latter part of the fourth pada of the first adhyaya, where it is shown that Brahman is not only the operative but also the material cause of the world. If anywhere, there would have been 1 Ankara's favourite illustrative instance of the magician producing illusive sights is — significantly enough — not known to the Sutras. INTRODUCTION. XCV the place to indicate, had such been the author's view, that Brahman is the material cause of the world through Maya only, and that the world is unreal ; but the Sutras do not contain a single word to that effect. Sutra 26, on the other hand, exhibits the significant term 'parkamat ;' Brahman produces the world by means of a modification of itself. It is well known that later on, when the terminology of the Vedanta became definitely settled, the term 'pari/zamavada' was used to denote that very theory to which the followers of vSankara are most violently opposed, viz. the doctrine according to which the world is not a mere vivarta, i.e. an illusory manifestation of Brahman, but the effect of Brah- man undergoing a real change, may that change be con- ceived to take place in the way taught by Ramanu^a or in some other manner. — With regard to the last-quoted Sutra, as well as to those touched upon above, the commentators indeed maintain that whatever terms and modes of ex- pression are apparently opposed to the vivartavada are in reality reconcilable with it ; to Sutra 26, for instance, Govindananda remarks that the term ' pari^ama ' only denotes an effect in general (karyamatra), without implying that the effect is real.
3odes of ex- pression are apparently opposed to the vivartavada are in reality reconcilable with it ; to Sutra 26, for instance, Govindananda remarks that the term ' pari^ama ' only denotes an effect in general (karyamatra), without implying that the effect is real. But in cases of this nature we are fully entitled to use our own judgment, even if we were not compelled to do so by the fact that other commentators, such as Ramanu^-a, are satisfied to take ' pari^ama ' and similar terms in their generally received sense. A further section treating of the nature of Brahman is met with in III, 2, 11 ff. It is, according to Sankara's view, of special importance, as it is alleged to set forth that Brah- man is in itself destitute of all qualities, and is affected with qualities only through its limiting adjuncts (upadhis), the offspring of Maya. I have above (in the conspectus of contents) given a somewhat detailed abstract of the whole section as interpreted by 5ankara on the one hand, and Ramanu^ci on the other hand, from which it appears that the latter's opinion as to the purport of the group of Sutras widely diverges from that of 6arikara. The wording of the Sutras is so eminently concise and vague that I find it impossible to decide which of the two commentators — if XCV1 VEDANTA-stiTRAS. indeed either — is to be accepted as a trustworthy guide ; regarding the sense of some Sutras 5ankara's explanation seems to deserve preference, in the case of others Rama- nu£"a seems to keep closer to the text. I decidedly prefer, for instance, Ramanu^a's interpretation of Sutra 22, as far as the sense of the entire Sutra is concerned, and more especially with regard to the term ' prakrztaitavat- tvam,' whose proper force is brought out by Rimanu^-a's explanation only. So much is certain that none of the Sutras decidedly favours the interpretation proposed by >Sankara. Whichever commentator we follow, we greatly miss coherence and strictness of reasoning, and it is thus by no means improbable that the section is one of those — perhaps not few in number — in which both inter- preters had less regard to the literal sense of the words and to tradition than to their desire of forcing Badaraya^a's Sutras to bear testimony to the truth of their own philo- sophic theories. With special reference to the Mayd doctrine one impor- tant Sutra has yet to be considered, the only one in which the term 'maya' itself occurs, viz. Ill, 2, 3. According to vSahkara the Sutra signifies that the environments of the dreaming soul are not real but mere Maya, i. e.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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