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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1— in the complementary passage, ' That became existent' — referred to by the word 'that/ and qualified as ' Existent.' The word 'was' would, moreover, not apply to the (absolutely) Non-existing, which cannot be conceived as connected with prior or posterior time. — Hence with refer- ence to the other passage also, ' Non-existing indeed/ &c, the complementary part, 'That made itself its Self/ shows, by the qualification which it contains, that absolute Non-existence is not meant. — It follows from all this that the designation of ' Non-existence ' applied to the effect before its production has reference to a different state of being merely. And as those things which are distinguished 1 For simplicity's sake, asat will be translated henceforth by non- existing. 334 VEDANTA-stjTRAS. by name and form are in ordinary language called ' existent,' the term 'non-existent' is figuratively applied to them to denote the state in which they were previously to their differentiation. 1 8. From reasoning and from another Vedic passage. That the effect exists before its origination and is non- different from the cause, follows from reasoning as well as from a further scriptural passage. We at first set forth the argumentation. — Ordinary expe- rience teaches us that those who wish to produce certain effects, such as curds, or earthen jars, or golden ornaments, employ for their purpose certain determined causal sub- stances such as milk, clay, and gold; those who wish to produce sour milk do not employ clay, nor do those who intend to make jars employ milk and so on. But, according to that doctrine which teaches that the effect is non-existent (before its actual production), all this should be possible. For if before their actual origination all effects are equally non-existent in any causal substance, why then should curds be produced from milk only and not from clay also, and jars from clay only and not from milk as well? — Let us then main- tain, the asatkaryavadin rejoins, that there is indeed an equal non-existence of any effect in any cause, but that at the same time each causal substance has a certain capacity reaching beyond itself (atLraya) for some particular effect only and not for other effects ; that, for instance, milk only, and not clay, has a certain capacity for curds ; and clay only, and not milk, an analogous capacity for jars.
2ce has a certain capacity reaching beyond itself (atLraya) for some particular effect only and not for other effects ; that, for instance, milk only, and not clay, has a certain capacity for curds ; and clay only, and not milk, an analogous capacity for jars. — What, we ask in return, do you understand by that ' atu-aya ? ' If you understand by it the antecedent condition of the effect (before its actual origi- nation), you abandon your doctrine that the effect does not exist in the cause, and prove our doctrine according to which it does so exist. If, on the other hand, you understand by the atuaya a certain power of the cause assumed to the end of accounting for the fact that only one determined effect springs from the cause, you must admit that the power can II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 8. 335 determine the particular effect only if it neither is other (than cause and effect) nor non-existent ; for if it were either, it would not be different from anything else which is either non-existent or other than cause and effect, (and how then should it alone be able to produce the particular effect?) Hence it follows that that power is identical with the Self of the cause, and that the effect is identical with the Self of that power. — Moreover, as the ideas of cause and effect on the one hand and of substance and qualities on the other hand are not separate ones, as, for instance, the ideas of a horse and a buffalo, it follows that the identity of the cause and the effect as well as of the substance and its qualities has to be admitted. (Let it then be assumed, the opponent rejoins, that the cause and the effect, although really different, are not apprehended as such, because they are connected by the so-called samavaya connexion 1.) — If, we reply, you assume the samavaya connexion between cause and effect, you have either to admit that the samavaya itself is joined by a certain connexion to the two terms which are connected by samavaya, and then that connexion will again require a new connexion (joining it to the two terms which it binds together), and you will thus be compelled to postulate an infinite series of connexions ; or else you will have to main- tain that the samavaya is not joined by any connexion to the terms which it binds together, and from that will result the dissolution of the bond which connects the two terms of the samavaya relation 2. — Well then, the opponent rejoins, let us assume that the samavaya connexion as itself being a connexion may be connected with the terms which it joins without the help of any further connexion.
3the bond which connects the two terms of the samavaya relation 2. — Well then, the opponent rejoins, let us assume that the samavaya connexion as itself being a connexion may be connected with the terms which it joins without the help of any further connexion. — Then, we reply, conjunction (sa//zyoga) also must be connected with the two terms which it joins without the help of the samavaya 1 Samavaya, commonly translated by inherence or intimate rela- tion, is, according to the Nyaya, the relation connecting a whole and its parts, substances, and qualities, &c. 2 Samavayasya svatantryapakshazrc dushayati anabhyupagamya- mane^eti. Samavayasya samavayibhi^ sambandho neshyate kim tu svatantryam evety atravayavavayavinor dravyaguwadina/ft ka. viprakarsha^ syat sa/flnidhayakabhavad ity artha^. An. Gi. 336 VEDANTA-stlTRAS. connexion ; for conjunction also is a kind of connexion 1. — Moreover, as substances, qualities, and so on are apprehended as standing in the relation of identity, the assumption of the samavaya relation has really no purport. In what manner again do you — who maintain that the cause and the effect are joined by the samavaya relation — assume a substance consisting of parts which is an effect to abide in its causes, i. e. in the material parts of which it consists ? Does it abide in all the parts taken together or in each particular part? — If you say that it abides in all parts together, it follows that the whole as such cannot be perceived, as it is impossible that all the parts should be in contact with the organs of perception. (And let it not be objected that the whole may be apprehended through some of the parts only), for manyness which abides in all its substrates together (i.e. in all the many things), is not apprehended so long as only some of those substrates are apprehended. — Let it then be assumed that the whole abides in all the parts by the mediation of intervening aggregates of parts 2. — In that case, we reply, we should have to assume other parts in addition to the primary originative parts of the whole, in order that by means of those other parts the whole could abide in the primary parts in the manner indicated by you. For we see (that one thing which abides in another abides there by means of parts different from those of that other thing), that the sword, for instance, pervades the sheath by means of parts different from the parts of the sheath.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1— in the complementary passage, ' That became existent' — referred to by the word 'that/ and qualified as ' Existent.' The word 'was' would, moreover, not apply to the (absolutely) Non-existing, which cannot be conceived as connected with prior or posterior time. — Hence with refer- ence to the other passage also, ' Non-existing indeed/ &c, the complementary part, 'That made itself its Self/ shows, by the qualification which it contains, that absolute Non-existence is not meant. — It follows from all this that the designation of ' Non-existence ' applied to the effect before its production has reference to a different state of being merely. And as those things which are distinguished 1 For simplicity's sake, asat will be translated henceforth by non- existing. 334 VEDANTA-stjTRAS. by name and form are in ordinary language called ' existent,' the term 'non-existent' is figuratively applied to them to denote the state in which they were previously to their differentiation. 1 8. From reasoning and from another Vedic passage. That the effect exists before its origination and is non- different from the cause, follows from reasoning as well as from a further scriptural passage. We at first set forth the argumentation. — Ordinary expe- rience teaches us that those who wish to produce certain effects, such as curds, or earthen jars, or golden ornaments, employ for their purpose certain determined causal sub- stances such as milk, clay, and gold; those who wish to produce sour milk do not employ clay, nor do those who intend to make jars employ milk and so on. But, according to that doctrine which teaches that the effect is non-existent (before its actual production), all this should be possible. For if before their actual origination all effects are equally non-existent in any causal substance, why then should curds be produced from milk only and not from clay also, and jars from clay only and not from milk as well? — Let us then main- tain, the asatkaryavadin rejoins, that there is indeed an equal non-existence of any effect in any cause, but that at the same time each causal substance has a certain capacity reaching beyond itself (atLraya) for some particular effect only and not for other effects ; that, for instance, milk only, and not clay, has a certain capacity for curds ; and clay only, and not milk, an analogous capacity for jars.
2ce has a certain capacity reaching beyond itself (atLraya) for some particular effect only and not for other effects ; that, for instance, milk only, and not clay, has a certain capacity for curds ; and clay only, and not milk, an analogous capacity for jars. — What, we ask in return, do you understand by that ' atu-aya ? ' If you understand by it the antecedent condition of the effect (before its actual origi- nation), you abandon your doctrine that the effect does not exist in the cause, and prove our doctrine according to which it does so exist. If, on the other hand, you understand by the atuaya a certain power of the cause assumed to the end of accounting for the fact that only one determined effect springs from the cause, you must admit that the power can II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 8. 335 determine the particular effect only if it neither is other (than cause and effect) nor non-existent ; for if it were either, it would not be different from anything else which is either non-existent or other than cause and effect, (and how then should it alone be able to produce the particular effect?) Hence it follows that that power is identical with the Self of the cause, and that the effect is identical with the Self of that power. — Moreover, as the ideas of cause and effect on the one hand and of substance and qualities on the other hand are not separate ones, as, for instance, the ideas of a horse and a buffalo, it follows that the identity of the cause and the effect as well as of the substance and its qualities has to be admitted. (Let it then be assumed, the opponent rejoins, that the cause and the effect, although really different, are not apprehended as such, because they are connected by the so-called samavaya connexion 1.) — If, we reply, you assume the samavaya connexion between cause and effect, you have either to admit that the samavaya itself is joined by a certain connexion to the two terms which are connected by samavaya, and then that connexion will again require a new connexion (joining it to the two terms which it binds together), and you will thus be compelled to postulate an infinite series of connexions ; or else you will have to main- tain that the samavaya is not joined by any connexion to the terms which it binds together, and from that will result the dissolution of the bond which connects the two terms of the samavaya relation 2. — Well then, the opponent rejoins, let us assume that the samavaya connexion as itself being a connexion may be connected with the terms which it joins without the help of any further connexion.
3the bond which connects the two terms of the samavaya relation 2. — Well then, the opponent rejoins, let us assume that the samavaya connexion as itself being a connexion may be connected with the terms which it joins without the help of any further connexion. — Then, we reply, conjunction (sa//zyoga) also must be connected with the two terms which it joins without the help of the samavaya 1 Samavaya, commonly translated by inherence or intimate rela- tion, is, according to the Nyaya, the relation connecting a whole and its parts, substances, and qualities, &c. 2 Samavayasya svatantryapakshazrc dushayati anabhyupagamya- mane^eti. Samavayasya samavayibhi^ sambandho neshyate kim tu svatantryam evety atravayavavayavinor dravyaguwadina/ft ka. viprakarsha^ syat sa/flnidhayakabhavad ity artha^. An. Gi. 336 VEDANTA-stlTRAS. connexion ; for conjunction also is a kind of connexion 1. — Moreover, as substances, qualities, and so on are apprehended as standing in the relation of identity, the assumption of the samavaya relation has really no purport. In what manner again do you — who maintain that the cause and the effect are joined by the samavaya relation — assume a substance consisting of parts which is an effect to abide in its causes, i. e. in the material parts of which it consists ? Does it abide in all the parts taken together or in each particular part? — If you say that it abides in all parts together, it follows that the whole as such cannot be perceived, as it is impossible that all the parts should be in contact with the organs of perception. (And let it not be objected that the whole may be apprehended through some of the parts only), for manyness which abides in all its substrates together (i.e. in all the many things), is not apprehended so long as only some of those substrates are apprehended. — Let it then be assumed that the whole abides in all the parts by the mediation of intervening aggregates of parts 2. — In that case, we reply, we should have to assume other parts in addition to the primary originative parts of the whole, in order that by means of those other parts the whole could abide in the primary parts in the manner indicated by you. For we see (that one thing which abides in another abides there by means of parts different from those of that other thing), that the sword, for instance, pervades the sheath by means of parts different from the parts of the sheath.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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