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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1e, viz. the quality of being of an earthy nature ; we reply that in the case of Brahman and the world also one characteristic feature, viz. that of existence (satta), is found in ether, &c. (which are the effects) as well as in Brahman (which is the cause). — He, moreover, who on the ground of the difference of the attributes tries to invalidate the doctrine of Brahman being the cause of the world, must assert that he under- stands by difference of attributes either the non-occurrence (in the world) of the entire complex of the characteristics of Brahman, or the non-occurrence of any (some or other) characteristic, or the non-occurrence of the characteristic of intelligence. The first assertion would lead to the negation of the relation of cause and effect in general, which relation is based on the fact of there being in the effect something over and above the cause (for if the two were absolutely identical they could not be distinguished). The second assertion is open to the charge of running counter to what is well known ; for, as we have already remarked, the characteristic quality of existence which belongs to Brahman is found likewise in ether and so on. For the third assertion the requisite proving instances are wanting ; for what instances could be brought forward against the upholder of Brahman, in order to prove the general assertion that whatever is devoid of intelligence is seen not to be an effect of Brahman ? (The upholder of Brahman would simply not admit any such instances) because he maintains that this entire complex of things has Brahman for its material cause. And that all such assertions are contrary to Scripture, is clear, as we have already shown it to be the purport of Scripture that Brahman is the cause and substance of the world. It has indeed been maintained by the purvapakshin that the other means of proof also (and not merely sacred tradition) apply to Brahman, on account of its being an accomplished entity (not something to be accomplished as religious duties are) ; but such an assertion is entirely gratuitous. For Brahman, as being devoid of form and so on, cannot become an object of II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 6. 307 perception ; and as there are in its case no characteristic marks (on which conclusions, &c. might be based), inference also and the other means of proof do not apply to it ; but, like religious duty, it is to be known solely on the ground of holy tradition.
2perception ; and as there are in its case no characteristic marks (on which conclusions, &c. might be based), inference also and the other means of proof do not apply to it ; but, like religious duty, it is to be known solely on the ground of holy tradition. Thus Scripture also declares, ' That doctrine is not to be obtained by argument, but when it is declared by another then, O dearest ! it is easy to under- stand ' (Ka. Up. I, 3, 9). And again, f Who in truth knows it? Who could here proclaim it, whence this creation sprang ?' (Rzg-v. Sa/^h. X, 1 29, 6.) These two mantras show that the cause of this world is not to be known even by divine beings (fovara) 1 of extraordinary power and wisdom. There are also the following Smrtti passages to the same effect : ( Do not apply reasoning to those things which are uncognisable 2 ; ' * Unevolved he is called, uneognisable, unchangeable;' 'Not the legions of the gods know my origin, not the great rz'shis. For I myself am in every way the origin of the gods and great r/shis ' (Bha. Gi. X, 2). — And if it has been maintained above that the scriptural passage enjoining thought (on Brahman) in addition to mere hearing (of the sacred texts treating of Brahman) shows that reasoning also is to be allowed its place, we reply that the passage must not deceitfully be taken as enjoining bare independent ratiocination, but must be understood to represent reasoning as a subordinate auxiliary of intuitional knowledge. By reasoning of the latter type we may, for instance, arrive at the following conclusions; that because the state of dream and the waking state exclude each other the Self is not connected with those states ; that, as the soul in the state of deep sleep leaves the phenomenal world behind and becomes one with that whose Self is pure Being, it has for its Self pure Being apart from the phenomenal world; that as the world springs from Brahman it cannot be separate from Brahman, 1 On uvara in the above meaning, compare Deussen, p. 69, note 41. 2 The line ' prakr/tibhya^ param,' &c. is wanting in all MSS. I have consulted. X 2 308 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. according to the principle of the non-difference of cause and effect, &C.1 The fallaciousness of mere reasoning will moreover be demonstrated later on (II, I, n).
3ine ' prakr/tibhya^ param,' &c. is wanting in all MSS. I have consulted. X 2 308 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. according to the principle of the non-difference of cause and effect, &C.1 The fallaciousness of mere reasoning will moreover be demonstrated later on (II, I, n). — He2, more- over, who merely on the ground of the sacred tradition about an intelligent cause of the world would assume this entire world to be of an intellectual nature would find room for the other scriptural passage quoted above (' He became knowledge and what is devoid of knowledge') which teaches a distinction of intellect and non- intellect ; for he could avail himself of the doctrine of intellect being sometimes manifested and sometimes non-manifested. His antagonist, on the other hand (i. e. the Sankhya), would not be able to make anything of the passage, for it distinctly teaches that the highest cause constitutes the Self of the entire world. If, then, on account of difference of character that which is intelligent cannot pass over into what is non-intelligent, that also which is non-intelligent (i.e. in our case, the non-intelligent pradhana of the Sankhyas) cannot pass over into what is intelligent. — (So much for argument's sake,) but apart from that, as the argument resting on difference of character has already been refuted, we must assume an intelligent cause of the world in agreement with Scripture. 1 Ananda Giri on the above passage : mityakarikshita/ra tarkam eva mananavidhivishayam udaharati svapnanteti. Svapnag-agaritayor mithovyabhi^arad atmana^ svabhavatas tadvattvabhavad avastha- dvayena tasya svato * sa#zprz'ktatvam ato ^ivasyavasthavatvena nabrahmatvam ity artha^. Tathapi dehaditadatmyen&tmano bhavan na ni^prapan^abrahmatety a\yankyaha sa^prasade ketl Sata somya tada sawpanno bhavatiti smtek sushupte ni/^prapa^asadatmatvava- gamad atmanas tathavidhabrahmatvasiddhir ity artha/L Dvaita- grahipratyakshadivirodhat katham atmano*dvitiyabrahmatvam ity a\rankya ta^atvadihetuna brahmatiriktavastvabhavasiddher adhya- kshadinam atatvavedakapramawyad avirodhad yuktam atmano idvitiyabrahmatvam ity aha prapaw^asyeti. 2 Let us finally assume, merely for argument's sake, that a vailakshawya of cause and effect is not admissible, and enquire whether that assumption can be reconciled more easily with an intelligent or a non-intelligent cause of the world. II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 8. 309 7. If (it is said that the effect is) non-existent (before its origination) ; we do not allow that because it is a mere negation (without an object).
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1e, viz. the quality of being of an earthy nature ; we reply that in the case of Brahman and the world also one characteristic feature, viz. that of existence (satta), is found in ether, &c. (which are the effects) as well as in Brahman (which is the cause). — He, moreover, who on the ground of the difference of the attributes tries to invalidate the doctrine of Brahman being the cause of the world, must assert that he under- stands by difference of attributes either the non-occurrence (in the world) of the entire complex of the characteristics of Brahman, or the non-occurrence of any (some or other) characteristic, or the non-occurrence of the characteristic of intelligence. The first assertion would lead to the negation of the relation of cause and effect in general, which relation is based on the fact of there being in the effect something over and above the cause (for if the two were absolutely identical they could not be distinguished). The second assertion is open to the charge of running counter to what is well known ; for, as we have already remarked, the characteristic quality of existence which belongs to Brahman is found likewise in ether and so on. For the third assertion the requisite proving instances are wanting ; for what instances could be brought forward against the upholder of Brahman, in order to prove the general assertion that whatever is devoid of intelligence is seen not to be an effect of Brahman ? (The upholder of Brahman would simply not admit any such instances) because he maintains that this entire complex of things has Brahman for its material cause. And that all such assertions are contrary to Scripture, is clear, as we have already shown it to be the purport of Scripture that Brahman is the cause and substance of the world. It has indeed been maintained by the purvapakshin that the other means of proof also (and not merely sacred tradition) apply to Brahman, on account of its being an accomplished entity (not something to be accomplished as religious duties are) ; but such an assertion is entirely gratuitous. For Brahman, as being devoid of form and so on, cannot become an object of II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 6. 307 perception ; and as there are in its case no characteristic marks (on which conclusions, &c. might be based), inference also and the other means of proof do not apply to it ; but, like religious duty, it is to be known solely on the ground of holy tradition.
2perception ; and as there are in its case no characteristic marks (on which conclusions, &c. might be based), inference also and the other means of proof do not apply to it ; but, like religious duty, it is to be known solely on the ground of holy tradition. Thus Scripture also declares, ' That doctrine is not to be obtained by argument, but when it is declared by another then, O dearest ! it is easy to under- stand ' (Ka. Up. I, 3, 9). And again, f Who in truth knows it? Who could here proclaim it, whence this creation sprang ?' (Rzg-v. Sa/^h. X, 1 29, 6.) These two mantras show that the cause of this world is not to be known even by divine beings (fovara) 1 of extraordinary power and wisdom. There are also the following Smrtti passages to the same effect : ( Do not apply reasoning to those things which are uncognisable 2 ; ' * Unevolved he is called, uneognisable, unchangeable;' 'Not the legions of the gods know my origin, not the great rz'shis. For I myself am in every way the origin of the gods and great r/shis ' (Bha. Gi. X, 2). — And if it has been maintained above that the scriptural passage enjoining thought (on Brahman) in addition to mere hearing (of the sacred texts treating of Brahman) shows that reasoning also is to be allowed its place, we reply that the passage must not deceitfully be taken as enjoining bare independent ratiocination, but must be understood to represent reasoning as a subordinate auxiliary of intuitional knowledge. By reasoning of the latter type we may, for instance, arrive at the following conclusions; that because the state of dream and the waking state exclude each other the Self is not connected with those states ; that, as the soul in the state of deep sleep leaves the phenomenal world behind and becomes one with that whose Self is pure Being, it has for its Self pure Being apart from the phenomenal world; that as the world springs from Brahman it cannot be separate from Brahman, 1 On uvara in the above meaning, compare Deussen, p. 69, note 41. 2 The line ' prakr/tibhya^ param,' &c. is wanting in all MSS. I have consulted. X 2 308 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. according to the principle of the non-difference of cause and effect, &C.1 The fallaciousness of mere reasoning will moreover be demonstrated later on (II, I, n).
3ine ' prakr/tibhya^ param,' &c. is wanting in all MSS. I have consulted. X 2 308 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. according to the principle of the non-difference of cause and effect, &C.1 The fallaciousness of mere reasoning will moreover be demonstrated later on (II, I, n). — He2, more- over, who merely on the ground of the sacred tradition about an intelligent cause of the world would assume this entire world to be of an intellectual nature would find room for the other scriptural passage quoted above (' He became knowledge and what is devoid of knowledge') which teaches a distinction of intellect and non- intellect ; for he could avail himself of the doctrine of intellect being sometimes manifested and sometimes non-manifested. His antagonist, on the other hand (i. e. the Sankhya), would not be able to make anything of the passage, for it distinctly teaches that the highest cause constitutes the Self of the entire world. If, then, on account of difference of character that which is intelligent cannot pass over into what is non-intelligent, that also which is non-intelligent (i.e. in our case, the non-intelligent pradhana of the Sankhyas) cannot pass over into what is intelligent. — (So much for argument's sake,) but apart from that, as the argument resting on difference of character has already been refuted, we must assume an intelligent cause of the world in agreement with Scripture. 1 Ananda Giri on the above passage : mityakarikshita/ra tarkam eva mananavidhivishayam udaharati svapnanteti. Svapnag-agaritayor mithovyabhi^arad atmana^ svabhavatas tadvattvabhavad avastha- dvayena tasya svato * sa#zprz'ktatvam ato ^ivasyavasthavatvena nabrahmatvam ity artha^. Tathapi dehaditadatmyen&tmano bhavan na ni^prapan^abrahmatety a\yankyaha sa^prasade ketl Sata somya tada sawpanno bhavatiti smtek sushupte ni/^prapa^asadatmatvava- gamad atmanas tathavidhabrahmatvasiddhir ity artha/L Dvaita- grahipratyakshadivirodhat katham atmano*dvitiyabrahmatvam ity a\rankya ta^atvadihetuna brahmatiriktavastvabhavasiddher adhya- kshadinam atatvavedakapramawyad avirodhad yuktam atmano idvitiyabrahmatvam ity aha prapaw^asyeti. 2 Let us finally assume, merely for argument's sake, that a vailakshawya of cause and effect is not admissible, and enquire whether that assumption can be reconciled more easily with an intelligent or a non-intelligent cause of the world. II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 8. 309 7. If (it is said that the effect is) non-existent (before its origination) ; we do not allow that because it is a mere negation (without an object).
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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