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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1vaya is the connexion, with the cause, of the effect which is incapable of separate existence. But this also is of no avail ; for as a connexion requires two terms, the effect as long as it has not yet entered into being cannot be con- nected with the cause. And it would be equally unavailing to say that the effect enters into the connexion after it has begun to exist ; for if the Vaueshika admits that the effect 1 The connexion of cause and effect is of course samavaya. II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 1 7. 397 may exist previous to its connexion with the cause, it is no longer ayutasiddha (incapable of separate existence), and thereby the principle that between effect and cause con- junction and disjunction do not take place is violated1. And2 just as conjunction, and not samavaya, is the con- nexion in which every effected substance as soon as it has been produced stands with the all-pervading substances as ether, &c. — although no motion has taken place on the part of the effected substance — so also the connexion of the effect with the cause will be conjunction merely, not sama- vaya. Nor is there any proof for the existence of any connexion, samavaya or sawyoga, apart from the things which it con- nects. If it should be maintained that sawyoga and sama- vaya have such an existence because we observe that there are names and ideas of them in addition to the names and ideas of the things connected, we point out that one and the same thing may be the subject of several names and ideas if it is considered in its relations to what lies without it. Devadatta although being one only forms the object of many different names and notions according as he is con- sidered in himself or in his relations to others ; thus he is thought and spoken of as man, Brahma^a, learned in the Veda, generous, boy, young man, old man, father, son, grandson, brother, son-in-law, &c. So, again, one and the same stroke is, according to the place it is connected with, spoken of and conceived as meaning either ten, or hundred, or thousand, &c. Analogously, two connected things are not only conceived and demoted as connected things, but in addition constitute the object of the ideas and terms 'conjunction' or 'inherence/ which however do not prove 1 If the effect can exist before having entered into connexion with the cause, the subsequent connexion of the two is no longer samavaya but sawyoga ; and that contradicts a fundamental Vaiye- shika principle.
2njunction' or 'inherence/ which however do not prove 1 If the effect can exist before having entered into connexion with the cause, the subsequent connexion of the two is no longer samavaya but sawyoga ; and that contradicts a fundamental Vaiye- shika principle. 2 This clause replies to the objection that only those connexions which have been produced by previous motion are to be considered conjunctions. 39^ VEDANTA-S^JTRAS. themselves to be separate entities. — Things standing thus, the non-existence of separate entities (conjunction, &c), which entities would have to be established on the ground of perception, follows from the fact of their non-perception. — Nor, again 1, does the circumstance of the word and idea of connexion having for its object the things connected involve the connexion's permanent existence, since we have already shown above that one thing may, on account of its relations to other things, be conceived and denoted in dif- ferent ways. Further2, conjunction cannot take place between the atoms, the soul, and the internal organ, because they have no parts ; for we observe that conjunction takes place only of such substances as consist of parts. If the VaLreshika should say that parts of the atoms, soul and mind may be assumed (in order to explain their alleged conjunction), we remark that the assumption of actually non-existing things would involve the result that anything might be established ; for there is no restrictive rule that only such and such non-existing things — whether contradictory to reason or not — should be assumed and not any other, and assumptions depend on one's choice only and may be carried to any extent. If we once allow assumptions, there is no reason why there should not be assumed a further hundred or thousand things, in addition to the six categories assumed by the VaLreshikas. Anybody might then assume anything, and we could neither stop a compassionate man from assuming that this transmigratory world which is the cause of so much misery to living beings is not to be, nor a malicious man from assuming that even the released souls are to enter on a new cycle of existences. 1 A clause meant to preclude the assumption that the permanent existence of the things connected involves the permanent existence of the connexion. 2 It having been shown above that atoms cannot enter into sazwyoga with each other, it is shown now that sa/rcyoga of the soul with the atoms cannot be the cause of the motion of the latter, and that sawyoga of soul and manas cannot be the cause of cognition. II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, I 7.
3atoms cannot enter into sazwyoga with each other, it is shown now that sa/rcyoga of the soul with the atoms cannot be the cause of the motion of the latter, and that sawyoga of soul and manas cannot be the cause of cognition. II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, I 7. 399 Further, it is not possible that a binary atomic compound, which consists of parts, should be connected with the simple indivisible atoms by an intimate connexion (sa/^lesha) any more than they can thus be connected with ether ; for between ether and earth, &c. there does not exist that kind of intimate connexion which exists, for instance, between wood and varnish1. Let it then be said (the Vafoeshika, resumes) that the samavaya relation must be assumed, because otherwise the relation of that which abides and that which forms the abode — which relation actually exists between the effected substance and the causal substance — is not possible. — That would, we reply, involve the vice of mutual dependence ; for only when the separateness of cause and effect is established, the relation of the abode and that which abides can be established ; and only when the latter relation is esta- blished, the relation of separateness can be established. For the Vedantins acknowledge neither the separateness of cause and effect, nor their standing to each other in the relation of abode and thing abiding, since according to their doctrine the effect is only a certain state of the cause2.— Moreover, as the atoms are limited (not of infinite exten- sion), they must in reality consist of as many parts as we acknowledge regions of space3, whether those be six or eight or ten, and consequently they cannot be permanent ; conclusions contrary to the VaLreshika doctrine of the indi- visibility and permanency of the atoms. — If the VaLreshika replies that those very parts which are owing to the exist- ence of the different regions of space are his (indestructible) 1 Ekasambandhyakarsha/ze yatra sambandhyantarakarshawaw tatra samlesha^, sa tu savayavdna^z ^atukash/Mdinazra dnsh/o na tu niravayavai^ savayavanam, ato dvyamikasya savayavasya niravayavena parama^una sa nopapadyate. Brahmavidyabh. 2 In answer to the question how, in that case, the practically recognised relation of abode, &c. existing between the cause and the effect is accounted for. 3 For they must in that case have a northern end, an eastern end, &c. 400 VEDANTA-S^JTRAS. atoms ; we deny that because all things whatever, forming a series of substances of ever-increasing minuteness, are capable of dissolution, until the highest cause (Brahman) is reached.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1vaya is the connexion, with the cause, of the effect which is incapable of separate existence. But this also is of no avail ; for as a connexion requires two terms, the effect as long as it has not yet entered into being cannot be con- nected with the cause. And it would be equally unavailing to say that the effect enters into the connexion after it has begun to exist ; for if the Vaueshika admits that the effect 1 The connexion of cause and effect is of course samavaya. II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 1 7. 397 may exist previous to its connexion with the cause, it is no longer ayutasiddha (incapable of separate existence), and thereby the principle that between effect and cause con- junction and disjunction do not take place is violated1. And2 just as conjunction, and not samavaya, is the con- nexion in which every effected substance as soon as it has been produced stands with the all-pervading substances as ether, &c. — although no motion has taken place on the part of the effected substance — so also the connexion of the effect with the cause will be conjunction merely, not sama- vaya. Nor is there any proof for the existence of any connexion, samavaya or sawyoga, apart from the things which it con- nects. If it should be maintained that sawyoga and sama- vaya have such an existence because we observe that there are names and ideas of them in addition to the names and ideas of the things connected, we point out that one and the same thing may be the subject of several names and ideas if it is considered in its relations to what lies without it. Devadatta although being one only forms the object of many different names and notions according as he is con- sidered in himself or in his relations to others ; thus he is thought and spoken of as man, Brahma^a, learned in the Veda, generous, boy, young man, old man, father, son, grandson, brother, son-in-law, &c. So, again, one and the same stroke is, according to the place it is connected with, spoken of and conceived as meaning either ten, or hundred, or thousand, &c. Analogously, two connected things are not only conceived and demoted as connected things, but in addition constitute the object of the ideas and terms 'conjunction' or 'inherence/ which however do not prove 1 If the effect can exist before having entered into connexion with the cause, the subsequent connexion of the two is no longer samavaya but sawyoga ; and that contradicts a fundamental Vaiye- shika principle.
2njunction' or 'inherence/ which however do not prove 1 If the effect can exist before having entered into connexion with the cause, the subsequent connexion of the two is no longer samavaya but sawyoga ; and that contradicts a fundamental Vaiye- shika principle. 2 This clause replies to the objection that only those connexions which have been produced by previous motion are to be considered conjunctions. 39^ VEDANTA-S^JTRAS. themselves to be separate entities. — Things standing thus, the non-existence of separate entities (conjunction, &c), which entities would have to be established on the ground of perception, follows from the fact of their non-perception. — Nor, again 1, does the circumstance of the word and idea of connexion having for its object the things connected involve the connexion's permanent existence, since we have already shown above that one thing may, on account of its relations to other things, be conceived and denoted in dif- ferent ways. Further2, conjunction cannot take place between the atoms, the soul, and the internal organ, because they have no parts ; for we observe that conjunction takes place only of such substances as consist of parts. If the VaLreshika should say that parts of the atoms, soul and mind may be assumed (in order to explain their alleged conjunction), we remark that the assumption of actually non-existing things would involve the result that anything might be established ; for there is no restrictive rule that only such and such non-existing things — whether contradictory to reason or not — should be assumed and not any other, and assumptions depend on one's choice only and may be carried to any extent. If we once allow assumptions, there is no reason why there should not be assumed a further hundred or thousand things, in addition to the six categories assumed by the VaLreshikas. Anybody might then assume anything, and we could neither stop a compassionate man from assuming that this transmigratory world which is the cause of so much misery to living beings is not to be, nor a malicious man from assuming that even the released souls are to enter on a new cycle of existences. 1 A clause meant to preclude the assumption that the permanent existence of the things connected involves the permanent existence of the connexion. 2 It having been shown above that atoms cannot enter into sazwyoga with each other, it is shown now that sa/rcyoga of the soul with the atoms cannot be the cause of the motion of the latter, and that sawyoga of soul and manas cannot be the cause of cognition. II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, I 7.
3atoms cannot enter into sazwyoga with each other, it is shown now that sa/rcyoga of the soul with the atoms cannot be the cause of the motion of the latter, and that sawyoga of soul and manas cannot be the cause of cognition. II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, I 7. 399 Further, it is not possible that a binary atomic compound, which consists of parts, should be connected with the simple indivisible atoms by an intimate connexion (sa/^lesha) any more than they can thus be connected with ether ; for between ether and earth, &c. there does not exist that kind of intimate connexion which exists, for instance, between wood and varnish1. Let it then be said (the Vafoeshika, resumes) that the samavaya relation must be assumed, because otherwise the relation of that which abides and that which forms the abode — which relation actually exists between the effected substance and the causal substance — is not possible. — That would, we reply, involve the vice of mutual dependence ; for only when the separateness of cause and effect is established, the relation of the abode and that which abides can be established ; and only when the latter relation is esta- blished, the relation of separateness can be established. For the Vedantins acknowledge neither the separateness of cause and effect, nor their standing to each other in the relation of abode and thing abiding, since according to their doctrine the effect is only a certain state of the cause2.— Moreover, as the atoms are limited (not of infinite exten- sion), they must in reality consist of as many parts as we acknowledge regions of space3, whether those be six or eight or ten, and consequently they cannot be permanent ; conclusions contrary to the VaLreshika doctrine of the indi- visibility and permanency of the atoms. — If the VaLreshika replies that those very parts which are owing to the exist- ence of the different regions of space are his (indestructible) 1 Ekasambandhyakarsha/ze yatra sambandhyantarakarshawaw tatra samlesha^, sa tu savayavdna^z ^atukash/Mdinazra dnsh/o na tu niravayavai^ savayavanam, ato dvyamikasya savayavasya niravayavena parama^una sa nopapadyate. Brahmavidyabh. 2 In answer to the question how, in that case, the practically recognised relation of abode, &c. existing between the cause and the effect is accounted for. 3 For they must in that case have a northern end, an eastern end, &c. 400 VEDANTA-S^JTRAS. atoms ; we deny that because all things whatever, forming a series of substances of ever-increasing minuteness, are capable of dissolution, until the highest cause (Brahman) is reached.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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