Fetching
One moment.
Fetching
One moment.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
11 And whereupon then could be established the difference of mere efficient causes such as the potter's staff, &c, and material causes such as clay, &c. ? II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 21. 409 we have again to declare the Bauddha doctrine to be untenable. 21. On the supposition of there being no (cause ; while yet the effect takes place), there results con- tradiction of the admitted principle ; otherwise simultaneousness (of cause and effect). It has been shown that on the doctrine of general non- permanency, the former momentary existence, as having already been merged in non-existence, cannot be the cause of the later one. — Perhaps now the Bauddha will say that an effect may arise even when there is no cause. — That, we reply, implies the abandonment of a principle admitted by yourself, viz. that the mind and the mental modifications originate when in conjunction with four kinds of causes1. Moreover, if anything could originate without a cause, there would be nothing to prevent that anything might originate at any time. — If, on the other hand, you should say that we may assume the antecedent momentary existence to last until the succeeding one has been produced, we point out that that would imply the simultaneousness of cause and effect, and so run counter to an accepted Bauddha tenet, viz. that all things 2 are momentary merely. 1 These four causes are the so-called defining cause (adhipati- pratyaya), the auxiliary cause (sahakaripratyaya), the immediate cause (samanantarapratyaya), and the substantial cause (alambana- pratyaya). — -I extract the explanation from the Brahmavidyabharawa : Adhipatir indriyaw tad dhi ^akshuradirupam utpannasya gTzanasya rupadivishayata^ niya/£Mati niyamaka^ ^aloke adhipatir ity uky&te. Sahak&ri &\6k3,/i. Samanantarapratyaya^ purvag"#anam,bauddhamate hi kshamka^Tzanasa/fttatau purvagTzanam uttarag-Mnasya karana#z tad eva £a mana ity u^yate. Alambana/rc gha/adiA Etan hetun pratiya pr&pya ^akshuradi^anyam ity adi. 2 Sa/ftskara iti, tanmate purvaksha^a eva hetubhuta^ sa^skaro vasaneti £a vyavahriyate karyaw tu tadvishayataya karmavyutpattya sa/raskara^, tatha k& karyakara^atmaka*^ sarva/rc bhavarupa^ ksha- mkam iti prati^artha^. Brahmavidyabharawa. 4 1 o vedanta-sCtras. 22. Cessation dependent on a sublative act of the mind, and cessation not so dependent cannot be established, there being no (complete) interruption.
2a k& karyakara^atmaka*^ sarva/rc bhavarupa^ ksha- mkam iti prati^artha^. Brahmavidyabharawa. 4 1 o vedanta-sCtras. 22. Cessation dependent on a sublative act of the mind, and cessation not so dependent cannot be established, there being no (complete) interruption. The Bauddhas who maintain that universal destruction is going on constantly, assume that ' whatever forms an object of knowledge and is different from the triad is produced (samskrita) and momentary.' To the triad there mentioned they give the names * cessation dependent on a sublative act of the mind/ ' cessation not dependent on such an act/ and ' space.' This triad they hold to be non-substantial, of a merely negative character (abhavamatra), devoid of all positive characteristics. By ' cessation dependent on a sub- lative act of the mind/ we have to understand such destruc- tion of entities as is preceded by an act of thought 1 ; by ' cessation not so dependent ' is meant destruction of the opposite kind 2 ; by ' space ' is meant absence in general of something covering (or occupying space). Out of these three non-existences ' space ' will be refuted later on (Sutra 24) ; the two other ones are refuted in the present Sutra. Cessation which is dependent on a sublative act of the mind, and cessation which is not so dependent are both impossible, ' on account of the absence of interruption/ For both kinds of cessation must have reference either to the series (of momentary existences) or to the single members constituting the series. — The former alternative is impossible, because in all series (of momentary existences) the members of the series stand in an unbroken relation of cause and effect so that the series cannot be interrupted3. — The latter 1 As when a man smashes a jar having previously formed the intention of doing so. 2 I.e. the insensible continual decay of things. — Viparita iti pratiksha«a/# gha/adinazra yuktya sadhyamano * kuralair avagantum a^akya^ siikshmo vina\ro*pratisa#zkhyanirodha^. Brahmav. 3 A series of momentary existences constituting a chain of causes and effects can never be entirely stopped ; for the last momentary existence must be supposed either to produce its effect or not to produce it. In the former case the series is continued ; the latter alternative would imply that the last link does not really II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 23.
3irely stopped ; for the last momentary existence must be supposed either to produce its effect or not to produce it. In the former case the series is continued ; the latter alternative would imply that the last link does not really II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 23. 4 1 I alternative is likewise inadmissible, for it is impossible to maintain that any momentary existence should undergo complete annihilation entirely undefinable and disconnected (with the previous state of existence), since we observe that a thing is recognised in the various states through which it may pass and thus has a connected existence1. And in those cases also where a thing is not clearly recognised (after having undergone a change) we yet infer, on the ground of actual observations made in other cases, that one and the same thing continues to exist without any interrup- tion.— For these reasons the two kinds of cessation which the Bauddhas assume cannot be proved. 23. And on account of the objections presenting themselves in either case. The cessation of Nescience, &c. which, on the assumption of the Bauddhas, is included in the two kinds of cessation discussed hitherto, must take place either in consequence of perfect knowledge together with its auxiliaries, or else of its own accord. But the former alternative would imply the abandonment of the Bauddha doctrine that destruction takes place without a cause, and the latter alternative would involve the uselessness of the Bauddha instruction as to the 'path'2. As therefore both alternatives are open to objections, the Bauddha doctrine must be declared unsatis- factory. exist, since the Bauddhas define the satta of a thing as its causal efficiency (cp. Sarvadanrarcasawgraha). And the non-existence of the last link would retrogressively lead to the non-existence of the whole series. 1 Thus clay is recognised as such whether it appears in the form of a jar, or of the potsherds into which the jar is broken, or of the powder into which the potsherds are ground. — Analogously we infer that even things which seem to vanish altogether, such as a drop of water which has fallen on heated iron, yet continue to exist in some form. 2 The knowledge that everything is transitory, pain, &c. 4 1 2 vedanta-s6tr AS. 24. And in the case of space also (the doctrine of its being a non-entity is untenable) on account of its not differing (from the two other kinds of non- entity). We have shown so far that of the triad declared by the Bauddhas to be devoid of all positive characteristics, and therefore non-definable, two (viz.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
11 And whereupon then could be established the difference of mere efficient causes such as the potter's staff, &c, and material causes such as clay, &c. ? II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 21. 409 we have again to declare the Bauddha doctrine to be untenable. 21. On the supposition of there being no (cause ; while yet the effect takes place), there results con- tradiction of the admitted principle ; otherwise simultaneousness (of cause and effect). It has been shown that on the doctrine of general non- permanency, the former momentary existence, as having already been merged in non-existence, cannot be the cause of the later one. — Perhaps now the Bauddha will say that an effect may arise even when there is no cause. — That, we reply, implies the abandonment of a principle admitted by yourself, viz. that the mind and the mental modifications originate when in conjunction with four kinds of causes1. Moreover, if anything could originate without a cause, there would be nothing to prevent that anything might originate at any time. — If, on the other hand, you should say that we may assume the antecedent momentary existence to last until the succeeding one has been produced, we point out that that would imply the simultaneousness of cause and effect, and so run counter to an accepted Bauddha tenet, viz. that all things 2 are momentary merely. 1 These four causes are the so-called defining cause (adhipati- pratyaya), the auxiliary cause (sahakaripratyaya), the immediate cause (samanantarapratyaya), and the substantial cause (alambana- pratyaya). — -I extract the explanation from the Brahmavidyabharawa : Adhipatir indriyaw tad dhi ^akshuradirupam utpannasya gTzanasya rupadivishayata^ niya/£Mati niyamaka^ ^aloke adhipatir ity uky&te. Sahak&ri &\6k3,/i. Samanantarapratyaya^ purvag"#anam,bauddhamate hi kshamka^Tzanasa/fttatau purvagTzanam uttarag-Mnasya karana#z tad eva £a mana ity u^yate. Alambana/rc gha/adiA Etan hetun pratiya pr&pya ^akshuradi^anyam ity adi. 2 Sa/ftskara iti, tanmate purvaksha^a eva hetubhuta^ sa^skaro vasaneti £a vyavahriyate karyaw tu tadvishayataya karmavyutpattya sa/raskara^, tatha k& karyakara^atmaka*^ sarva/rc bhavarupa^ ksha- mkam iti prati^artha^. Brahmavidyabharawa. 4 1 o vedanta-sCtras. 22. Cessation dependent on a sublative act of the mind, and cessation not so dependent cannot be established, there being no (complete) interruption.
2a k& karyakara^atmaka*^ sarva/rc bhavarupa^ ksha- mkam iti prati^artha^. Brahmavidyabharawa. 4 1 o vedanta-sCtras. 22. Cessation dependent on a sublative act of the mind, and cessation not so dependent cannot be established, there being no (complete) interruption. The Bauddhas who maintain that universal destruction is going on constantly, assume that ' whatever forms an object of knowledge and is different from the triad is produced (samskrita) and momentary.' To the triad there mentioned they give the names * cessation dependent on a sublative act of the mind/ ' cessation not dependent on such an act/ and ' space.' This triad they hold to be non-substantial, of a merely negative character (abhavamatra), devoid of all positive characteristics. By ' cessation dependent on a sub- lative act of the mind/ we have to understand such destruc- tion of entities as is preceded by an act of thought 1 ; by ' cessation not so dependent ' is meant destruction of the opposite kind 2 ; by ' space ' is meant absence in general of something covering (or occupying space). Out of these three non-existences ' space ' will be refuted later on (Sutra 24) ; the two other ones are refuted in the present Sutra. Cessation which is dependent on a sublative act of the mind, and cessation which is not so dependent are both impossible, ' on account of the absence of interruption/ For both kinds of cessation must have reference either to the series (of momentary existences) or to the single members constituting the series. — The former alternative is impossible, because in all series (of momentary existences) the members of the series stand in an unbroken relation of cause and effect so that the series cannot be interrupted3. — The latter 1 As when a man smashes a jar having previously formed the intention of doing so. 2 I.e. the insensible continual decay of things. — Viparita iti pratiksha«a/# gha/adinazra yuktya sadhyamano * kuralair avagantum a^akya^ siikshmo vina\ro*pratisa#zkhyanirodha^. Brahmav. 3 A series of momentary existences constituting a chain of causes and effects can never be entirely stopped ; for the last momentary existence must be supposed either to produce its effect or not to produce it. In the former case the series is continued ; the latter alternative would imply that the last link does not really II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 23.
3irely stopped ; for the last momentary existence must be supposed either to produce its effect or not to produce it. In the former case the series is continued ; the latter alternative would imply that the last link does not really II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 23. 4 1 I alternative is likewise inadmissible, for it is impossible to maintain that any momentary existence should undergo complete annihilation entirely undefinable and disconnected (with the previous state of existence), since we observe that a thing is recognised in the various states through which it may pass and thus has a connected existence1. And in those cases also where a thing is not clearly recognised (after having undergone a change) we yet infer, on the ground of actual observations made in other cases, that one and the same thing continues to exist without any interrup- tion.— For these reasons the two kinds of cessation which the Bauddhas assume cannot be proved. 23. And on account of the objections presenting themselves in either case. The cessation of Nescience, &c. which, on the assumption of the Bauddhas, is included in the two kinds of cessation discussed hitherto, must take place either in consequence of perfect knowledge together with its auxiliaries, or else of its own accord. But the former alternative would imply the abandonment of the Bauddha doctrine that destruction takes place without a cause, and the latter alternative would involve the uselessness of the Bauddha instruction as to the 'path'2. As therefore both alternatives are open to objections, the Bauddha doctrine must be declared unsatis- factory. exist, since the Bauddhas define the satta of a thing as its causal efficiency (cp. Sarvadanrarcasawgraha). And the non-existence of the last link would retrogressively lead to the non-existence of the whole series. 1 Thus clay is recognised as such whether it appears in the form of a jar, or of the potsherds into which the jar is broken, or of the powder into which the potsherds are ground. — Analogously we infer that even things which seem to vanish altogether, such as a drop of water which has fallen on heated iron, yet continue to exist in some form. 2 The knowledge that everything is transitory, pain, &c. 4 1 2 vedanta-s6tr AS. 24. And in the case of space also (the doctrine of its being a non-entity is untenable) on account of its not differing (from the two other kinds of non- entity). We have shown so far that of the triad declared by the Bauddhas to be devoid of all positive characteristics, and therefore non-definable, two (viz.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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