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One moment.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1ord * Self with reference to the Giva is quite adequate. Then again there is the other passage, ' That which is that subtle essence, in it all that exists has its self. It is the true. It is the Self. That art thou, O -SVetaketu 5 (Kk. Up. VI, 8, 7, &c). Here the clause 'It is the Self designates the Being of which the entire chapter treats, viz. the subtle Self, by the word ' Self,' and the concluding clause, ' that art thou, O 5vetaketu,' declares the intelligent *Svetaketu to be of the nature of the Self. Fire and water, on the other hand, are non-intelligent, since they are objects (of the mind), and since they are declared to be implicated in the evolution of names and forms. And as at the same time there is no reason for ascribing to them thought in its primary sense — while the employment of the word 'Self furnishes such a reason with reference to the Sat — the thought attributed to them must be explained in a figura- tive sense, like the inclination of the river-bank. Moreover, the thinking on the part of fire and water is to be under- stood as dependent on their being ruled over by the Sat. On the other hand, the thought of the Sat is, on account of the word ' Self,' not to be understood in a figurative sense1. Here the Sankhya comes forward with a new objection. The word c Self,5 he says, may be applied to the pradhana, although unintelligent, because it is sometimes figuratively used in the sense of 'that which effects all purposes of another ; ' as, for instance, a king applies the word ' Self ' to some servant who carries out all the king's intentions, ' Bha- drasena is my (other) Self/ For the pradhana, which effects the enjoyment and the emancipation of the soul, serves the latter in the same way as a minister serves his king in the affairs of peace and war. Or else, it may be said, the one word ' Self may refer to non-intelligent things as well as to intelligent beings, as we see that such expressions as ' the Self of the elements,' ' the Self of the senses,5 are made use of, and as the one word ' light ' (^yotis) denotes a certain 1 So that, on this latter explanation, it is unnecessary to assume a figurative sense of the word ' thinking ' in any of the three pas- sages. I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 7. 55 sacrifice (the ^yotish/oma) as well as a flame. How then does it follow from the word ' Self ' that the thinking (ascribed to the cause of the world) is not to be taken in a figurative sense ? To this last argumentation the Sutrakara replies : 7.
2A, 7. 55 sacrifice (the ^yotish/oma) as well as a flame. How then does it follow from the word ' Self ' that the thinking (ascribed to the cause of the world) is not to be taken in a figurative sense ? To this last argumentation the Sutrakara replies : 7. (The pradh&na cannot be designated by the term ' Self) because release is taught of him who takes his stand on that (the Sat). The non-intelligent pradhana cannot be the object of the term * Self' because in the passage Kh. Up. VI, % fT., where the subtle Sat which is under discussion is at first referred to in the sentence, i That is the Self/ and where the subsequent clause, * That art thou, O vSVetaketu,' declares the intelligent vSVetaketu to have his abode in the Self, a passage sub- sequent to the two quoted (viz. ' a man who has a teacher obtains true knowledge ; for him there is only delay as long as he is not delivered, then he will be perfect') declares final release. For if the non-intelligent pradhana were denoted by the term ' Sat,' and did comprehend — by means of the phrase ' That art thou ' — persons desirous of final release who as such are intelligent, the meaning could only be ' Thou art non -intelligent ; ' so that Scripture would virtually make contradictory statements to the disadvantage of man, and would thus cease to be a means of right know- ledge. But to assume that the faultless ,rastra is not a means of right knowledge, would be contrary to reason. And if the ^stra, considered as a means of right knowledge, should point out to a man desirous of release, but ignorant of the way to it, a non -intelligent Self as the real Self, he would — comparable to the blind man who had caught hold of the ox's tail1 — cling to the view of that being the Self, 1 A wicked man meets in a forest a blind person who has lost his way, and implores him to lead him to his village ; instead of doing so the wicked man persuades the blind one to catch hold of the tail of an ox, which he promises would lead him to his place. The consequence is that the blind man is, owing to his trustfulness, led even farther astray, and injured by the bushes, &c, through which the ox drags him. 56 vedAnta-s6tras. and thus never be able to reach the real Self different from the false Self pointed out to him ; hence he would be de- barred from what constitutes man's good, and would incur evil.
3ured by the bushes, &c, through which the ox drags him. 56 vedAnta-s6tras. and thus never be able to reach the real Self different from the false Self pointed out to him ; hence he would be de- barred from what constitutes man's good, and would incur evil. We must therefore conclude that, just as the jastra teaches the agnihotra and similar performances in their true nature as means for those who are desirous of the heavenly world, so the passage ' that is the Self, that art thou, G iSvetaketu,' teaches the Self in its true nature also. Only on that condition release for him whose thoughts are true can be taught by means of the simile in which the person to be released is compared to the man grasping the heated axe (Kk. Up. VI, 16). For in the other case, if the doctrine of the Sat constituting the Self had a secondary meaning only, the cognition founded on the passage ' that art thou ' would be of the nature of a fanciful combination only 1, like the knowledge derived from the passage, ' I am the hymn ' (Ait. Ar. II, 1, 2, 6), and would lead to a mere transitory reward; so that the simile quoted could not convey the doctrine of release. Therefore the word ' Self is applied to the subtle Sat not in a merely figurative sense. In the case of the faithful servant, on the other hand, the word 'Self can — in such phrases as 'Bhadrasena is my Self — be taken in a figurative sense, because the difference between master and servant is well established by per- ception. Moreover, to assume that, because words are sometimes seen to be used in figurative senses, a figurative sense may be resorted to in the case of those things also for which words (i.e.Vedic words) are the only means of knowledge, is altogether indefensible ; for an assumption of that nature would lead to a general want of confidence. The assertion that the word ' Self ' may (primarily) signify what is non-intelligent as well as what is intelligent, just as the word '^yotis ' signifies a certain sacrifice as well as light, is inadmissible, because we have no right to attribute to words a plurality of meanings. Hence (we rather assume that) the word ' Self ' in its primary meaning refers to what is intelligent only and is then, by a figurative Cp. above, p. 30. I ADHYAYA, I pAdA, 8.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1ord * Self with reference to the Giva is quite adequate. Then again there is the other passage, ' That which is that subtle essence, in it all that exists has its self. It is the true. It is the Self. That art thou, O -SVetaketu 5 (Kk. Up. VI, 8, 7, &c). Here the clause 'It is the Self designates the Being of which the entire chapter treats, viz. the subtle Self, by the word ' Self,' and the concluding clause, ' that art thou, O 5vetaketu,' declares the intelligent *Svetaketu to be of the nature of the Self. Fire and water, on the other hand, are non-intelligent, since they are objects (of the mind), and since they are declared to be implicated in the evolution of names and forms. And as at the same time there is no reason for ascribing to them thought in its primary sense — while the employment of the word 'Self furnishes such a reason with reference to the Sat — the thought attributed to them must be explained in a figura- tive sense, like the inclination of the river-bank. Moreover, the thinking on the part of fire and water is to be under- stood as dependent on their being ruled over by the Sat. On the other hand, the thought of the Sat is, on account of the word ' Self,' not to be understood in a figurative sense1. Here the Sankhya comes forward with a new objection. The word c Self,5 he says, may be applied to the pradhana, although unintelligent, because it is sometimes figuratively used in the sense of 'that which effects all purposes of another ; ' as, for instance, a king applies the word ' Self ' to some servant who carries out all the king's intentions, ' Bha- drasena is my (other) Self/ For the pradhana, which effects the enjoyment and the emancipation of the soul, serves the latter in the same way as a minister serves his king in the affairs of peace and war. Or else, it may be said, the one word ' Self may refer to non-intelligent things as well as to intelligent beings, as we see that such expressions as ' the Self of the elements,' ' the Self of the senses,5 are made use of, and as the one word ' light ' (^yotis) denotes a certain 1 So that, on this latter explanation, it is unnecessary to assume a figurative sense of the word ' thinking ' in any of the three pas- sages. I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 7. 55 sacrifice (the ^yotish/oma) as well as a flame. How then does it follow from the word ' Self ' that the thinking (ascribed to the cause of the world) is not to be taken in a figurative sense ? To this last argumentation the Sutrakara replies : 7.
2A, 7. 55 sacrifice (the ^yotish/oma) as well as a flame. How then does it follow from the word ' Self ' that the thinking (ascribed to the cause of the world) is not to be taken in a figurative sense ? To this last argumentation the Sutrakara replies : 7. (The pradh&na cannot be designated by the term ' Self) because release is taught of him who takes his stand on that (the Sat). The non-intelligent pradhana cannot be the object of the term * Self' because in the passage Kh. Up. VI, % fT., where the subtle Sat which is under discussion is at first referred to in the sentence, i That is the Self/ and where the subsequent clause, * That art thou, O vSVetaketu,' declares the intelligent vSVetaketu to have his abode in the Self, a passage sub- sequent to the two quoted (viz. ' a man who has a teacher obtains true knowledge ; for him there is only delay as long as he is not delivered, then he will be perfect') declares final release. For if the non-intelligent pradhana were denoted by the term ' Sat,' and did comprehend — by means of the phrase ' That art thou ' — persons desirous of final release who as such are intelligent, the meaning could only be ' Thou art non -intelligent ; ' so that Scripture would virtually make contradictory statements to the disadvantage of man, and would thus cease to be a means of right know- ledge. But to assume that the faultless ,rastra is not a means of right knowledge, would be contrary to reason. And if the ^stra, considered as a means of right knowledge, should point out to a man desirous of release, but ignorant of the way to it, a non -intelligent Self as the real Self, he would — comparable to the blind man who had caught hold of the ox's tail1 — cling to the view of that being the Self, 1 A wicked man meets in a forest a blind person who has lost his way, and implores him to lead him to his village ; instead of doing so the wicked man persuades the blind one to catch hold of the tail of an ox, which he promises would lead him to his place. The consequence is that the blind man is, owing to his trustfulness, led even farther astray, and injured by the bushes, &c, through which the ox drags him. 56 vedAnta-s6tras. and thus never be able to reach the real Self different from the false Self pointed out to him ; hence he would be de- barred from what constitutes man's good, and would incur evil.
3ured by the bushes, &c, through which the ox drags him. 56 vedAnta-s6tras. and thus never be able to reach the real Self different from the false Self pointed out to him ; hence he would be de- barred from what constitutes man's good, and would incur evil. We must therefore conclude that, just as the jastra teaches the agnihotra and similar performances in their true nature as means for those who are desirous of the heavenly world, so the passage ' that is the Self, that art thou, G iSvetaketu,' teaches the Self in its true nature also. Only on that condition release for him whose thoughts are true can be taught by means of the simile in which the person to be released is compared to the man grasping the heated axe (Kk. Up. VI, 16). For in the other case, if the doctrine of the Sat constituting the Self had a secondary meaning only, the cognition founded on the passage ' that art thou ' would be of the nature of a fanciful combination only 1, like the knowledge derived from the passage, ' I am the hymn ' (Ait. Ar. II, 1, 2, 6), and would lead to a mere transitory reward; so that the simile quoted could not convey the doctrine of release. Therefore the word ' Self is applied to the subtle Sat not in a merely figurative sense. In the case of the faithful servant, on the other hand, the word 'Self can — in such phrases as 'Bhadrasena is my Self — be taken in a figurative sense, because the difference between master and servant is well established by per- ception. Moreover, to assume that, because words are sometimes seen to be used in figurative senses, a figurative sense may be resorted to in the case of those things also for which words (i.e.Vedic words) are the only means of knowledge, is altogether indefensible ; for an assumption of that nature would lead to a general want of confidence. The assertion that the word ' Self ' may (primarily) signify what is non-intelligent as well as what is intelligent, just as the word '^yotis ' signifies a certain sacrifice as well as light, is inadmissible, because we have no right to attribute to words a plurality of meanings. Hence (we rather assume that) the word ' Self ' in its primary meaning refers to what is intelligent only and is then, by a figurative Cp. above, p. 30. I ADHYAYA, I pAdA, 8.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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