Fetching
One moment.
Fetching
One moment.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1ether is. Nor, again, can it be maintained that Release is something to be cere- monially purified, and as such depends on an activity. For ceremonial purification (sawskara) results either from the accretion of some excellence or from the removal of some blemish. The former alternative does not apply to Release as it is of the nature of Brahman, to which no excellence can be added ; nor, again, does the latter alter- native apply, since Release is of the nature of Brahman, which is eternally pure. — But, it might be said, Release might be a quality of the Self which is merely hidden and becomes manifest on the Self being purified by some action ; just as the quality of clearness becomes manifest in a mirror when the mirror is cleaned by means of the action of rubbing. — This objection is invalid, we reply, because the Self cannot be the abode of any action. For an action cannot exist without modifying that in which it abides. But if the Self were modified by an action its non-eternality would result therefrom, and texts such as the following, 'unchangeable he is called/ would thus be stultified; an altogether unacceptable result. Hence it is impossible to assume that any action should abide in the Self. On the other hand, the Self cannot be purified by actions abiding in something else as it stands in no relation to that extraneous something. Nor will it avail to point out (as a quasi-analogous case) that the embodied Self (dehin, the individual soul) is purified by certain ritual actions which abide in the body, such as bathing, rinsing one's mouth, wearing the sacrificial thread, and the like. For what is purified by those actions is that Self merely which is joined to the body, i.e. the Self in so far as it is under the power of Nescience. For it is a matter of per- obviating the imputation to moksha of non-eternality which results from the two preceding hypotheses. [34] D 34 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. ception that bathing and similar actions stand in the relation of inherence to the body, and it is therefore only proper to conclude that by such actions only that some- thing is purified which is joined to the body. If a person thinks ' I am free from disease,' he predicates health of that entity only which is connected with and mistakenly identifies itself with the harmonious condition of matter (i.e. the body) resulting from appropriate medical treatment applied to the body (i.e. the ' I ' constituting the subject of predication is only the individual embodied Self).
2is connected with and mistakenly identifies itself with the harmonious condition of matter (i.e. the body) resulting from appropriate medical treatment applied to the body (i.e. the ' I ' constituting the subject of predication is only the individual embodied Self). Analo- gously that I which predicates of itself, that it is purified by bathing and the like, is only the individual soul joined to the body. For it is only this latter principle of egoity (aha^kartrz), the object of the notion of the ego and the agent in all cognition, which accomplishes all actions and enjoys their results. Thus the mantras also declare, ' One of them eats the sweet fruit, the other looks on without eating ' (Mu. Up. Ill, i, t) ; and ' When he is in union with the body, the senses, and the mind, then wise people call him the Enjoyer ' (Ka. Up. Ill, 1,4). Of Brahman, on the other hand, the two following passages declare that it is incapable of receiving any accretion and eternally pure, ' He is the one God, hidden in all beings, all-pervading, the Self within all beings, watching over all works, dwelling in all beings, the witness, the perceiver, the only one ; free from qualities' (Sv. Up. VI, 11); and 'He pervaded all, bright, incorporeal, scatheless, without muscles, pure, un- touched by evil ' (ts. Up. 8). But Release is nothing but being Brahman. Therefore Release is not something to be purified. And as nobody is able to show any other way in which Release could be connected with action, it is im- possible that it should stand in any, even the slightest, relation to any action, excepting knowledge. But, it will be said here, knowledge itself is an activity of the mind. By no means, we reply ; since the two are of different nature. An action is that which is enjoined as being independent of the nature of existing things and de- pendent on the energy of some person's mind; compare, for instance, the following passages, ' To whichever divinity the I ADHYAYA, I PAD A, 4. 35 offering is made on that one let him meditate when about to say vasha^' (Ait. Brahm. Ill, 8, 1) ; and ' Let him meditate in his mind on the sandhya.' Meditation and reflection are indeed mental, but as they depend on the (meditating, &c.) person they may either be performed or not be per- formed or modified.
3n about to say vasha^' (Ait. Brahm. Ill, 8, 1) ; and ' Let him meditate in his mind on the sandhya.' Meditation and reflection are indeed mental, but as they depend on the (meditating, &c.) person they may either be performed or not be per- formed or modified. Knowledge, on the other hand, is the result of the different means of (right) knowledge, and those have for their objects existing things ; knowledge can there- fore not be either made or not made or modified, but depends entirely on existing things, and not either on Vedic statements or on the mind of man. Although mental it thus widely differs from meditation and the like. The meditation, for instance, on man and woman as fire, which is founded on Kh. Up. V, 7, 1 ; 8, 1, ' The fire is man, O Gautama ; the fire is woman, O Gautama,' is on account of its being the result of a Vedic statement, merely an action and dependent on man ; that conception of fire, on the other hand, which refers to the well-known (real) fire, is neither dependent on Vedic statements nor on man, but only on a real thing which is an object of perception ; it is therefore knowledge and not an action. The same remark applies to all things which are the objects of the different means of right knowledge. This being thus that knowledge also which has the existent Brahman for its object is not de- pendent on Vedic injunction. Hence, although imperative and similar forms referring to the knowledge of Brahman are found in the Vedic texts, yet they are ineffective because they refer to something which cannot be enjoined, just as the edge of a razor becomes blunt when it is applied to a stone. For they have for their object something which can neither be endeavoured after nor avoided. — But what then, it will be asked, is the purport of those sentences which, at any rate, have the appearance of injunctions ; such as, * The Self is to be seen, to be heard about?' — They have the purport, we reply, of diverting (men) from the objects of natural activity. For when a man acts intent on external things, and only anxious to attain the objects of his desire and to eschew the objects of his aversion, and does not thereby reach the highest aim of man although desirous of attaining it ; such D 2 36 vedAnta-s6tras. texts as the one quoted divert him from the objects of natural activity and turn the stream of his thoughts on the inward (the highest) Self.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1ether is. Nor, again, can it be maintained that Release is something to be cere- monially purified, and as such depends on an activity. For ceremonial purification (sawskara) results either from the accretion of some excellence or from the removal of some blemish. The former alternative does not apply to Release as it is of the nature of Brahman, to which no excellence can be added ; nor, again, does the latter alter- native apply, since Release is of the nature of Brahman, which is eternally pure. — But, it might be said, Release might be a quality of the Self which is merely hidden and becomes manifest on the Self being purified by some action ; just as the quality of clearness becomes manifest in a mirror when the mirror is cleaned by means of the action of rubbing. — This objection is invalid, we reply, because the Self cannot be the abode of any action. For an action cannot exist without modifying that in which it abides. But if the Self were modified by an action its non-eternality would result therefrom, and texts such as the following, 'unchangeable he is called/ would thus be stultified; an altogether unacceptable result. Hence it is impossible to assume that any action should abide in the Self. On the other hand, the Self cannot be purified by actions abiding in something else as it stands in no relation to that extraneous something. Nor will it avail to point out (as a quasi-analogous case) that the embodied Self (dehin, the individual soul) is purified by certain ritual actions which abide in the body, such as bathing, rinsing one's mouth, wearing the sacrificial thread, and the like. For what is purified by those actions is that Self merely which is joined to the body, i.e. the Self in so far as it is under the power of Nescience. For it is a matter of per- obviating the imputation to moksha of non-eternality which results from the two preceding hypotheses. [34] D 34 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. ception that bathing and similar actions stand in the relation of inherence to the body, and it is therefore only proper to conclude that by such actions only that some- thing is purified which is joined to the body. If a person thinks ' I am free from disease,' he predicates health of that entity only which is connected with and mistakenly identifies itself with the harmonious condition of matter (i.e. the body) resulting from appropriate medical treatment applied to the body (i.e. the ' I ' constituting the subject of predication is only the individual embodied Self).
2is connected with and mistakenly identifies itself with the harmonious condition of matter (i.e. the body) resulting from appropriate medical treatment applied to the body (i.e. the ' I ' constituting the subject of predication is only the individual embodied Self). Analo- gously that I which predicates of itself, that it is purified by bathing and the like, is only the individual soul joined to the body. For it is only this latter principle of egoity (aha^kartrz), the object of the notion of the ego and the agent in all cognition, which accomplishes all actions and enjoys their results. Thus the mantras also declare, ' One of them eats the sweet fruit, the other looks on without eating ' (Mu. Up. Ill, i, t) ; and ' When he is in union with the body, the senses, and the mind, then wise people call him the Enjoyer ' (Ka. Up. Ill, 1,4). Of Brahman, on the other hand, the two following passages declare that it is incapable of receiving any accretion and eternally pure, ' He is the one God, hidden in all beings, all-pervading, the Self within all beings, watching over all works, dwelling in all beings, the witness, the perceiver, the only one ; free from qualities' (Sv. Up. VI, 11); and 'He pervaded all, bright, incorporeal, scatheless, without muscles, pure, un- touched by evil ' (ts. Up. 8). But Release is nothing but being Brahman. Therefore Release is not something to be purified. And as nobody is able to show any other way in which Release could be connected with action, it is im- possible that it should stand in any, even the slightest, relation to any action, excepting knowledge. But, it will be said here, knowledge itself is an activity of the mind. By no means, we reply ; since the two are of different nature. An action is that which is enjoined as being independent of the nature of existing things and de- pendent on the energy of some person's mind; compare, for instance, the following passages, ' To whichever divinity the I ADHYAYA, I PAD A, 4. 35 offering is made on that one let him meditate when about to say vasha^' (Ait. Brahm. Ill, 8, 1) ; and ' Let him meditate in his mind on the sandhya.' Meditation and reflection are indeed mental, but as they depend on the (meditating, &c.) person they may either be performed or not be per- formed or modified.
3n about to say vasha^' (Ait. Brahm. Ill, 8, 1) ; and ' Let him meditate in his mind on the sandhya.' Meditation and reflection are indeed mental, but as they depend on the (meditating, &c.) person they may either be performed or not be per- formed or modified. Knowledge, on the other hand, is the result of the different means of (right) knowledge, and those have for their objects existing things ; knowledge can there- fore not be either made or not made or modified, but depends entirely on existing things, and not either on Vedic statements or on the mind of man. Although mental it thus widely differs from meditation and the like. The meditation, for instance, on man and woman as fire, which is founded on Kh. Up. V, 7, 1 ; 8, 1, ' The fire is man, O Gautama ; the fire is woman, O Gautama,' is on account of its being the result of a Vedic statement, merely an action and dependent on man ; that conception of fire, on the other hand, which refers to the well-known (real) fire, is neither dependent on Vedic statements nor on man, but only on a real thing which is an object of perception ; it is therefore knowledge and not an action. The same remark applies to all things which are the objects of the different means of right knowledge. This being thus that knowledge also which has the existent Brahman for its object is not de- pendent on Vedic injunction. Hence, although imperative and similar forms referring to the knowledge of Brahman are found in the Vedic texts, yet they are ineffective because they refer to something which cannot be enjoined, just as the edge of a razor becomes blunt when it is applied to a stone. For they have for their object something which can neither be endeavoured after nor avoided. — But what then, it will be asked, is the purport of those sentences which, at any rate, have the appearance of injunctions ; such as, * The Self is to be seen, to be heard about?' — They have the purport, we reply, of diverting (men) from the objects of natural activity. For when a man acts intent on external things, and only anxious to attain the objects of his desire and to eschew the objects of his aversion, and does not thereby reach the highest aim of man although desirous of attaining it ; such D 2 36 vedAnta-s6tras. texts as the one quoted divert him from the objects of natural activity and turn the stream of his thoughts on the inward (the highest) Self.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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