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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1d the same being, and know nothing of the distinctions made by the developed [34] h CX1V VEDANTA-SUTRAS. Vedanta, however valid the latter may be from a purely philosophic point of view. We may refer to one more similar instance from the KMndogya. Upanishad. We there meet in III, 14 with one of the most famous vidyas describing the nature of Brahman, called after its reputed author the vSa^ilya-vidya. This small vidya is decidedly one of the finest and most characteristic texts ; it would be difficult to point out another passage setting forth with greater force and elo- quence and in an equally short compass the central doctrine of the Upanishads. Yet this text, which, beyond doubt, gives utterance to the highest conception of Brahman's nature that S&ndilyaLS thought was able to reach, is by vSankara and his school again declared to form part of the lower vidya only, because it represents Brahman as possess- ing qualities. It is, according to their terminology, not ^ana, i. e. knowledge, but the injunction of a mere upasana, a devout meditation on Brahman in so far as possessing certain definite attributes such as having light for its form, having true thoughts, and so on. The Rdmanu^as, on the other hand, quote this text with preference as clearly describing the nature of their highest, i. e. their one Brah- man. We again allow that vSankara is free to deny that any text which ascribes qualities to Brahman embodies abso- lute truth ; but we also again remark that there is no reason whatever for supposing that wSa/zdftlya, or whoever may have been the author of that vidya, looked upon it as anything else but a statement of the highest truth accessible to man. We return to the question as to the true philosophy of the Upanishads, apart from the systems of the commen- tators.— From what precedes it will appear with sufficient distinctness that, if we understand by philosophy a philo- sophical system coherent in all its parts, free from all contradictions and allowing room for all the different state- ments made in all the chief Upanishads, a philosophy of the Upanishads cannot even be spoken of. The various lucubrations on Brahman, the world, and the human soul of which the Upanishads consist do not allow themselves to be systematised simply because they were never meant to INTRODUCTION. CXV form a system. Skndilyas views as to the nature of Brahman did not in all details agree with those of Ya^Tza- valkya, and Uddalaka differed from both.
2onsist do not allow themselves to be systematised simply because they were never meant to INTRODUCTION. CXV form a system. Skndilyas views as to the nature of Brahman did not in all details agree with those of Ya^Tza- valkya, and Uddalaka differed from both. In this there is nothing to wonder at, and the burden of proof rests alto- gether with those who maintain that a large number of detached philosophic and theological dissertations, ascribed to different authors, doubtless belonging to different periods, and not seldom manifestly contradicting each other, admit of being combined into a perfectly consistent whole. The question, however, assumes a different aspect, if we take the terms ' philosophy ' and 'philosophical system,' not in the strict sense in which 5ankara and other commentators are not afraid of taking them, but as implying merely an agreement in certain fundamental features. In this latter sense we may indeed undertake to indicate the outlines of a philosophy of the Upanishads, only keeping in view that precision in details is not to be aimed at. And here we finally see ourselves driven back altogether on the texts themselves, and have to acknowledge that the help we receive from commentators, to whatever school they may belong, is very inconsiderable. Fortunately it cannot be asserted that the texts on the whole oppose very serious difficulties to a right understanding, however obscure the details often are. Concerning the latter we occasionally depend entirely on the explanations vouchsafed by the scholiasts, but as far as the general drift and spirit of the texts are concerned, we are quite able to judge by our- selves, and are even specially qualified to do so by having no particular system to advocate. The point we will first touch upon is the same from which we started when examining the doctrine of the Sutras, viz. the question whether the Upanishads acknowledge a higher and lower knowledge in vSarikara's sense, i. e. a knowledge of a higher and a lower Brahman. Now this we find not to be the case. Knowledge is in the Upanishads frequently opposed to avidya, by which latter term we have to under- stand ignorance as to Brahman, absence of philosophic knowledge ; and, again, in several places we find the know- ledge of the sacrificial part of the Veda with its supple- h 2 cxvi vedanta-s6tras. mentary disciplines contrasted as inferior with the knowledge of the Self; to which latter distinction the Mundaka. Up.
3ledge ; and, again, in several places we find the know- ledge of the sacrificial part of the Veda with its supple- h 2 cxvi vedanta-s6tras. mentary disciplines contrasted as inferior with the knowledge of the Self; to which latter distinction the Mundaka. Up. (I, 4) applies the terms apara and para vidyL But a formal recognition of the essential difference of Brahman being viewed, on the one hand, as possessing distinctive attributes, and, on the other hand, as devoid of all such attributes is not to be met with anywhere. Brahman is indeed sometimes described as sagu?za and sometimes as nirgu^a (to use later terms) ; but it is nowhere said that thereon rests a distinc- tion of two different kinds of knowledge leading to altogether different results. The knowledge of Brahman is one, under whatever aspects it is viewed ; hence the circumstance (already exemplified above) that in the same vidyas it is spoken of as sagu/za as well as nirgu^a. When the mind of the writer dwells on the fact that Brahman is that from which all this world originates, and in which it rests, he naturally applies to it distinctive attributes pointing at its relation to the world ; Brahman, then, is called the Self and life of all, the inward ruler, the omniscient Lord, and so on. When, on the other hand, the author follows out the idea that Brahman may be viewed in itself as the mysterious reality of which the whole expanse of the world is only an outward manifestation, then it strikes him that no idea or term derived from sensible experience can rightly be applied to it, that nothing more may be predicated of it but that it is neither this nor that. But these are only two aspects of the cognition of one and the same entity. Closely connected with the question as to the double nature of the Brahman of the Upanishads is the question as to their teaching M&ya. — From Colebrooke downwards the majority of European writers have inclined towards the opinion that the doctrine of Maya, i. e. of the unreal illusory character of the sensible world, does not constitute a feature of the primitive philosophy of the Upanishads, but was introduced into the system at some later period, whether by Badaraya^a or vSankara or somebody else. The opposite view, viz. that the doctrine of Maya forms an integral element of the teaching of the Upanishads, is implied in them everywhere, and enunciated more or less distinctly in INTRODUCTION. CXVU more than one place, has in recent times been advocated with much force by Mr. Gough in the ninth chapter of his Philosophy of the Upanishads.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1d the same being, and know nothing of the distinctions made by the developed [34] h CX1V VEDANTA-SUTRAS. Vedanta, however valid the latter may be from a purely philosophic point of view. We may refer to one more similar instance from the KMndogya. Upanishad. We there meet in III, 14 with one of the most famous vidyas describing the nature of Brahman, called after its reputed author the vSa^ilya-vidya. This small vidya is decidedly one of the finest and most characteristic texts ; it would be difficult to point out another passage setting forth with greater force and elo- quence and in an equally short compass the central doctrine of the Upanishads. Yet this text, which, beyond doubt, gives utterance to the highest conception of Brahman's nature that S&ndilyaLS thought was able to reach, is by vSankara and his school again declared to form part of the lower vidya only, because it represents Brahman as possess- ing qualities. It is, according to their terminology, not ^ana, i. e. knowledge, but the injunction of a mere upasana, a devout meditation on Brahman in so far as possessing certain definite attributes such as having light for its form, having true thoughts, and so on. The Rdmanu^as, on the other hand, quote this text with preference as clearly describing the nature of their highest, i. e. their one Brah- man. We again allow that vSankara is free to deny that any text which ascribes qualities to Brahman embodies abso- lute truth ; but we also again remark that there is no reason whatever for supposing that wSa/zdftlya, or whoever may have been the author of that vidya, looked upon it as anything else but a statement of the highest truth accessible to man. We return to the question as to the true philosophy of the Upanishads, apart from the systems of the commen- tators.— From what precedes it will appear with sufficient distinctness that, if we understand by philosophy a philo- sophical system coherent in all its parts, free from all contradictions and allowing room for all the different state- ments made in all the chief Upanishads, a philosophy of the Upanishads cannot even be spoken of. The various lucubrations on Brahman, the world, and the human soul of which the Upanishads consist do not allow themselves to be systematised simply because they were never meant to INTRODUCTION. CXV form a system. Skndilyas views as to the nature of Brahman did not in all details agree with those of Ya^Tza- valkya, and Uddalaka differed from both.
2onsist do not allow themselves to be systematised simply because they were never meant to INTRODUCTION. CXV form a system. Skndilyas views as to the nature of Brahman did not in all details agree with those of Ya^Tza- valkya, and Uddalaka differed from both. In this there is nothing to wonder at, and the burden of proof rests alto- gether with those who maintain that a large number of detached philosophic and theological dissertations, ascribed to different authors, doubtless belonging to different periods, and not seldom manifestly contradicting each other, admit of being combined into a perfectly consistent whole. The question, however, assumes a different aspect, if we take the terms ' philosophy ' and 'philosophical system,' not in the strict sense in which 5ankara and other commentators are not afraid of taking them, but as implying merely an agreement in certain fundamental features. In this latter sense we may indeed undertake to indicate the outlines of a philosophy of the Upanishads, only keeping in view that precision in details is not to be aimed at. And here we finally see ourselves driven back altogether on the texts themselves, and have to acknowledge that the help we receive from commentators, to whatever school they may belong, is very inconsiderable. Fortunately it cannot be asserted that the texts on the whole oppose very serious difficulties to a right understanding, however obscure the details often are. Concerning the latter we occasionally depend entirely on the explanations vouchsafed by the scholiasts, but as far as the general drift and spirit of the texts are concerned, we are quite able to judge by our- selves, and are even specially qualified to do so by having no particular system to advocate. The point we will first touch upon is the same from which we started when examining the doctrine of the Sutras, viz. the question whether the Upanishads acknowledge a higher and lower knowledge in vSarikara's sense, i. e. a knowledge of a higher and a lower Brahman. Now this we find not to be the case. Knowledge is in the Upanishads frequently opposed to avidya, by which latter term we have to under- stand ignorance as to Brahman, absence of philosophic knowledge ; and, again, in several places we find the know- ledge of the sacrificial part of the Veda with its supple- h 2 cxvi vedanta-s6tras. mentary disciplines contrasted as inferior with the knowledge of the Self; to which latter distinction the Mundaka. Up.
3ledge ; and, again, in several places we find the know- ledge of the sacrificial part of the Veda with its supple- h 2 cxvi vedanta-s6tras. mentary disciplines contrasted as inferior with the knowledge of the Self; to which latter distinction the Mundaka. Up. (I, 4) applies the terms apara and para vidyL But a formal recognition of the essential difference of Brahman being viewed, on the one hand, as possessing distinctive attributes, and, on the other hand, as devoid of all such attributes is not to be met with anywhere. Brahman is indeed sometimes described as sagu?za and sometimes as nirgu^a (to use later terms) ; but it is nowhere said that thereon rests a distinc- tion of two different kinds of knowledge leading to altogether different results. The knowledge of Brahman is one, under whatever aspects it is viewed ; hence the circumstance (already exemplified above) that in the same vidyas it is spoken of as sagu/za as well as nirgu^a. When the mind of the writer dwells on the fact that Brahman is that from which all this world originates, and in which it rests, he naturally applies to it distinctive attributes pointing at its relation to the world ; Brahman, then, is called the Self and life of all, the inward ruler, the omniscient Lord, and so on. When, on the other hand, the author follows out the idea that Brahman may be viewed in itself as the mysterious reality of which the whole expanse of the world is only an outward manifestation, then it strikes him that no idea or term derived from sensible experience can rightly be applied to it, that nothing more may be predicated of it but that it is neither this nor that. But these are only two aspects of the cognition of one and the same entity. Closely connected with the question as to the double nature of the Brahman of the Upanishads is the question as to their teaching M&ya. — From Colebrooke downwards the majority of European writers have inclined towards the opinion that the doctrine of Maya, i. e. of the unreal illusory character of the sensible world, does not constitute a feature of the primitive philosophy of the Upanishads, but was introduced into the system at some later period, whether by Badaraya^a or vSankara or somebody else. The opposite view, viz. that the doctrine of Maya forms an integral element of the teaching of the Upanishads, is implied in them everywhere, and enunciated more or less distinctly in INTRODUCTION. CXVU more than one place, has in recent times been advocated with much force by Mr. Gough in the ninth chapter of his Philosophy of the Upanishads.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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