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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1erfect' men were accepted as authorities to be appealed to, still, as there are many such perfect men, we should have, in all those cases where the Smr/tis contradict each other in the manner described, no other means of final decision than an appeal to 5ruti. — As to men destitute of the power of inde- pendent judgment, we are not justified in assuming that they will without any reason attach themselves to some particular Smrzti ; for if men's inclinations were so alto- gether unregulated, truth itself would, owing to the multiformity of human opinion, become unstable. We must therefore try to lead their judgment in the right way by pointing out to them the conflict of the Smrztis, and the distinction founded on some of them following Sruti and others not. — The scriptural passage which the purvapakshin has quoted as proving the eminence of Kapila's knowledge would not justify us in believing in such doctrines of Kapila (i. e. of some Kapila) as are contrary to Scripture ; for that passage mentions the bare name of Kapila (without specifying which Kapila is meant), and we meet in tradition with another Kapila, viz. the one who burned the sons of Sagara and had the surname Vasudeva. That passage, moreover, serves another purpose, (viz. the establishment of the doctrine of the highest Self,) and has on that account no force to prove what is not proved by any other means, (viz. the supereminence of Kapila's know- ledge.) On the other hand, we have a ^ruti-passage which proclaims the excellence of Manu *, viz. ' Whatever Manu said is medicine ' (Taitt. Sa#zh. II, 2, io, 2). Manu himself, where he glorifies the seeing of the one Self in everything (' he who equally sees the Self in all beings and all beings in the Self, he as a sacrificer to the Self attains self- 1 After it has been shown that Kapila the dvaitavadin is not mentioned in -Sruti, it is now shown that Manu the sarvatmavadin is mentioned there. II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 2. 295 luminousness,' 1. e. becomes Brahman, Manu Smrzti XII, 91), implicitly blames the doctrine of Kapila. For Kapila, by acknowledging a plurality of Selfs, does not admit the doctrine of there being one universal Self. In the Maha- bharata also the question is raised whether there are many persons (souls) or one ; thereupon the opinion of others is mentioned, ' There are many persons, O King, according to the Sankhya and Yoga philosophers ; ' that opinion is contro- verted ' just as there is one place of origin, (viz.
2raised whether there are many persons (souls) or one ; thereupon the opinion of others is mentioned, ' There are many persons, O King, according to the Sankhya and Yoga philosophers ; ' that opinion is contro- verted ' just as there is one place of origin, (viz. the earth,) for many persons, so I will proclaim to you that universal person raised by his qualities;' and, finally, it is declared that there is one universal Self, ' He is the internal Self of me, of thee, and of all other embodied beings, the internal witness of all, not to be apprehended by any one. He the all-headed, all-armed, all-footed, all-eyed, all-nosed one moves through all beings according to his will and liking/ And Scripture also declares that there is one universal Self, ' When to a man who understands the Self has become all things, what sorrow, what trouble can there be to him who once beheld that unity?' (ts. Up. 7) ; and other similar passages. All which proves that the system of Kapila contradicts the Veda, and the doctrine of Manu who follows the Veda, by its hypothesis of a plurality of Selfs also, not only by the assumption of an independent pradhana. The authoritativeness of the Veda with regard to the matters stated by it is independent and direct, just as the light of the sun is the direct means of our knowledge of form and colour ; the authoritativeness of human dicta, on the other hand, is of an altogether different kind, as it depends on an extraneous basis (viz. the Veda), and is (not immediate but) mediated by a chain of teachers and tradition. Hence the circumstance that the result (of our doctrine) is want of room for certain Smrztis, with regard to matters contradicted by the Veda, furnishes no valid objection. — An additional reason for this our opinion is supplied by the following Sutra. 2. And on account of the non-perception of the 296 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. others (i.e. the effects of the pradhana, according to the Sankhya system). The principles different from the pradhana, but to be viewed as its modifications which the (Sankhya) Smrtti assumes, as, for instance, the great principle, are perceived neither in the Veda nor in ordinary experience. Now things of the nature of the elements and the sense organs, which are well known from the Veda, as well as from experience, may be referred to in Smrz'ti ; but with regard to things which, like Kapila's great principle, are known neither from the Veda nor from experience — no more than, for instance, the objects of a sixth sense — Smr/ti is altogether impossible.
3l as from experience, may be referred to in Smrz'ti ; but with regard to things which, like Kapila's great principle, are known neither from the Veda nor from experience — no more than, for instance, the objects of a sixth sense — Smr/ti is altogether impossible. That some scriptural passages which apparently refer to such things as the great principle have in reality quite a different meaning has already been shown under I, 4, 1. But if that part of Smrz'ti which is concerned with the effects (i. e. the great principle, and so on) is without authority, the part which refers to the cause (the pradhana) will be so likewise. This is what the Sutra means to say. — We have thus established a second reason, proving that the circumstance of there being no room left for certain Smrztis does not constitute a valid objection to our doctrine. — The weakness of the trust in reasoning (apparently favouring the Sankhya doctrine) will be shown later on under II, 1, 4ff. 3. Thereby the Yoga (Smnti) is refuted. This Sutra extends the application of the preceding argu- mentation, and remarks that by the refutation of the Sankhya-smrzti the Yoga-smnti also is to be considered as refuted ; for the latter also assumes, in opposition to Scripture, a pradhana as the independent cause of the world, and the ' great principle,' &c. as its effects, although neither the Veda nor common experience favour these views. — But, if the same reasoning applies to the Yoga also, the latter system is already disposed of by the previous arguments ; of what use then is it formally to extend them to the Yoga? (as the Sutra does.) — We reply that here an ad- II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 3. 297 ditional cause of doubt presents itself, the practice of Yoga being enjoined in the Veda as a means of obtaining perfect knowledge ; so, for instance, Brt. Up. II, 4, 5, ' (The Self) is to be heard, to be thought, to be meditated upon V In the .Sveta^vatara Upanishad, moreover, we find various in- junctions of Yoga-practice connected with the assumption of different positions of the body, &c. ; so, for instance, ' Holding his body with its three erect parts even,' &c. (II, 8). Further, we find very many passages in the Veda which (without expressly enjoining it) point to the Yoga, as, for instance, Ka. Up. II, 6, 11, 'This, the firm holding back of the senses, is what is called Yoga ; ' ' Having received this knowledge and the whole rule of Yoga5 (Ka. Up. II, 6, 18) ; and so on. And in the Yoga-^astra itself the passage, { Now then Yoga, the means of the knowledge of truth/ &c.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1erfect' men were accepted as authorities to be appealed to, still, as there are many such perfect men, we should have, in all those cases where the Smr/tis contradict each other in the manner described, no other means of final decision than an appeal to 5ruti. — As to men destitute of the power of inde- pendent judgment, we are not justified in assuming that they will without any reason attach themselves to some particular Smrzti ; for if men's inclinations were so alto- gether unregulated, truth itself would, owing to the multiformity of human opinion, become unstable. We must therefore try to lead their judgment in the right way by pointing out to them the conflict of the Smrztis, and the distinction founded on some of them following Sruti and others not. — The scriptural passage which the purvapakshin has quoted as proving the eminence of Kapila's knowledge would not justify us in believing in such doctrines of Kapila (i. e. of some Kapila) as are contrary to Scripture ; for that passage mentions the bare name of Kapila (without specifying which Kapila is meant), and we meet in tradition with another Kapila, viz. the one who burned the sons of Sagara and had the surname Vasudeva. That passage, moreover, serves another purpose, (viz. the establishment of the doctrine of the highest Self,) and has on that account no force to prove what is not proved by any other means, (viz. the supereminence of Kapila's know- ledge.) On the other hand, we have a ^ruti-passage which proclaims the excellence of Manu *, viz. ' Whatever Manu said is medicine ' (Taitt. Sa#zh. II, 2, io, 2). Manu himself, where he glorifies the seeing of the one Self in everything (' he who equally sees the Self in all beings and all beings in the Self, he as a sacrificer to the Self attains self- 1 After it has been shown that Kapila the dvaitavadin is not mentioned in -Sruti, it is now shown that Manu the sarvatmavadin is mentioned there. II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 2. 295 luminousness,' 1. e. becomes Brahman, Manu Smrzti XII, 91), implicitly blames the doctrine of Kapila. For Kapila, by acknowledging a plurality of Selfs, does not admit the doctrine of there being one universal Self. In the Maha- bharata also the question is raised whether there are many persons (souls) or one ; thereupon the opinion of others is mentioned, ' There are many persons, O King, according to the Sankhya and Yoga philosophers ; ' that opinion is contro- verted ' just as there is one place of origin, (viz.
2raised whether there are many persons (souls) or one ; thereupon the opinion of others is mentioned, ' There are many persons, O King, according to the Sankhya and Yoga philosophers ; ' that opinion is contro- verted ' just as there is one place of origin, (viz. the earth,) for many persons, so I will proclaim to you that universal person raised by his qualities;' and, finally, it is declared that there is one universal Self, ' He is the internal Self of me, of thee, and of all other embodied beings, the internal witness of all, not to be apprehended by any one. He the all-headed, all-armed, all-footed, all-eyed, all-nosed one moves through all beings according to his will and liking/ And Scripture also declares that there is one universal Self, ' When to a man who understands the Self has become all things, what sorrow, what trouble can there be to him who once beheld that unity?' (ts. Up. 7) ; and other similar passages. All which proves that the system of Kapila contradicts the Veda, and the doctrine of Manu who follows the Veda, by its hypothesis of a plurality of Selfs also, not only by the assumption of an independent pradhana. The authoritativeness of the Veda with regard to the matters stated by it is independent and direct, just as the light of the sun is the direct means of our knowledge of form and colour ; the authoritativeness of human dicta, on the other hand, is of an altogether different kind, as it depends on an extraneous basis (viz. the Veda), and is (not immediate but) mediated by a chain of teachers and tradition. Hence the circumstance that the result (of our doctrine) is want of room for certain Smrztis, with regard to matters contradicted by the Veda, furnishes no valid objection. — An additional reason for this our opinion is supplied by the following Sutra. 2. And on account of the non-perception of the 296 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. others (i.e. the effects of the pradhana, according to the Sankhya system). The principles different from the pradhana, but to be viewed as its modifications which the (Sankhya) Smrtti assumes, as, for instance, the great principle, are perceived neither in the Veda nor in ordinary experience. Now things of the nature of the elements and the sense organs, which are well known from the Veda, as well as from experience, may be referred to in Smrz'ti ; but with regard to things which, like Kapila's great principle, are known neither from the Veda nor from experience — no more than, for instance, the objects of a sixth sense — Smr/ti is altogether impossible.
3l as from experience, may be referred to in Smrz'ti ; but with regard to things which, like Kapila's great principle, are known neither from the Veda nor from experience — no more than, for instance, the objects of a sixth sense — Smr/ti is altogether impossible. That some scriptural passages which apparently refer to such things as the great principle have in reality quite a different meaning has already been shown under I, 4, 1. But if that part of Smrz'ti which is concerned with the effects (i. e. the great principle, and so on) is without authority, the part which refers to the cause (the pradhana) will be so likewise. This is what the Sutra means to say. — We have thus established a second reason, proving that the circumstance of there being no room left for certain Smrztis does not constitute a valid objection to our doctrine. — The weakness of the trust in reasoning (apparently favouring the Sankhya doctrine) will be shown later on under II, 1, 4ff. 3. Thereby the Yoga (Smnti) is refuted. This Sutra extends the application of the preceding argu- mentation, and remarks that by the refutation of the Sankhya-smrzti the Yoga-smnti also is to be considered as refuted ; for the latter also assumes, in opposition to Scripture, a pradhana as the independent cause of the world, and the ' great principle,' &c. as its effects, although neither the Veda nor common experience favour these views. — But, if the same reasoning applies to the Yoga also, the latter system is already disposed of by the previous arguments ; of what use then is it formally to extend them to the Yoga? (as the Sutra does.) — We reply that here an ad- II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 3. 297 ditional cause of doubt presents itself, the practice of Yoga being enjoined in the Veda as a means of obtaining perfect knowledge ; so, for instance, Brt. Up. II, 4, 5, ' (The Self) is to be heard, to be thought, to be meditated upon V In the .Sveta^vatara Upanishad, moreover, we find various in- junctions of Yoga-practice connected with the assumption of different positions of the body, &c. ; so, for instance, ' Holding his body with its three erect parts even,' &c. (II, 8). Further, we find very many passages in the Veda which (without expressly enjoining it) point to the Yoga, as, for instance, Ka. Up. II, 6, 11, 'This, the firm holding back of the senses, is what is called Yoga ; ' ' Having received this knowledge and the whole rule of Yoga5 (Ka. Up. II, 6, 18) ; and so on. And in the Yoga-^astra itself the passage, { Now then Yoga, the means of the knowledge of truth/ &c.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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