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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1you maintain thereby that ideas exist which are not apprehended by any of the means of knowledge, and which are without a knowing being ; which is no better than to assert that a thousand lamps burning inside some impenetrable mass of rocks manifest themselves. And if you should maintain that thereby we admit your doctrine, since it follows from what we have said that the idea itself implies consciousness ; we reply that, as observation shows, the lamp in order to become manifest requires some other intellectual agent furnished with instruments such as the eye, and that therefore the idea also, as equally being a thing to be illuminated, becomes manifest only through an ulterior intelligent principle. And if you finally object that we, when advancing the witnessing Self as self-proved, merely express in other words the Bauddha tenet that the idea is self-manifested, we refute you by remarking that your ideas have the attributes of originating, passing away, being manifold, and so on (while our Self is one and permanent). — We thus have proved that an idea, like a lamp, requires an ulterior intelligent principle to render it manifest. 29. And on account of their difference of nature (the ideas of the waking state) are not like those of a dream. We now apply ourselves to the refutation of the averment made by the Bauddha, that the ideas of posts, and so on, of which we are conscious in the waking state, may arise in the absence of external objects, just as the ideas of a dream, both being ideas alike. — The two sets of ideas, we maintain, cannot be treated on the same footing, on account of the difference of their character. They differ as follows. — The things of which we are conscious in a dream are negated by our waking consciousness. ' I wrongly thought that I had a meeting with a great man ; no such meeting took place, but my mind was dulled by slumber, and so the II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 30. 425 false idea arose/ In an analogous manner the things of which we are conscious when under the influence of a magic illusion, and the like, are negated by our ordinary con- sciousness. Those things, on the other hand, of which we are conscious in our waking state, such as posts and the like, are never negated in any state. — Moreover, the visions of a dream are acts of remembrance, while the visions of the waking state are acts of immediate consciousness ; and the distinction between remembrance and immediate con- sciousness is directly cognised by every one as being founded on the absence or presence of the object.
2are acts of remembrance, while the visions of the waking state are acts of immediate consciousness ; and the distinction between remembrance and immediate con- sciousness is directly cognised by every one as being founded on the absence or presence of the object. When, for instance, a man remembers his absent son, he does not directly perceive him, but merely wishes so to perceive him. As thus the distinction between the two states is evident to every one, it is impossible to formulate the inference that waking consciousness is false because it is mere consciousness, such as dreaming consciousness ; for we certainly cannot allow would-be philosophers to deny the truth of what is directly evident to themselves. Just because they feel the absurdity of denying what is evident to themselves, and are consequently unable to demonstrate the baselessness of the ideas of the waking state from those ideas themselves, they attempt to demonstrate it from their having certain attributes in common with the ideas of the dreaming state. But if some attribute cannot belong to a thing on account of the latter' s own nature, it cannot belong to it on account of the thing having certain attributes in common with some other thing. Fire, which is felt to be hot, cannot be demonstrated to be cold, on the ground of its having attributes in common with water. And the dif- ference of nature between the waking and the sleeping state we have already shown. 30. The existence (of mental impressions) is not possible (on the Bauddha view) on account of the absence of perception (of external things). We now proceed to that theory of yours, according to which the variety of ideas can be explained from the 426 VEDANTA-S^TRAS. variety of mental impressions, without any reference to external things, and remark that on your doctrine the existence of mental impressions is impossible, as you do not admit the perception of external things. For the variety of mental impressions is caused altogether by the variety of the things perceived. How, indeed, could various impressions originate if no external things were perceived? The hypothesis of a beginningless series of mental impressions would lead only to a baseless regressus ad i nf i n i t u m, sublative of the entire phenomenal world, and would in no way establish your position. — The same argu- ment, i. e.
3hings were perceived? The hypothesis of a beginningless series of mental impressions would lead only to a baseless regressus ad i nf i n i t u m, sublative of the entire phenomenal world, and would in no way establish your position. — The same argu- ment, i. e. the one founded on the impossibility of mental impressions which are not caused by external things, refutes also the positive and negative judgments, on the ground of which the denier of an external world above attempted to show that ideas are caused by mental impressions, not by external things. We rather have on our side a positive and a negative judgment whereby to establish our doctrine of the existence of external things, viz. ' the perception of external things is admitted to take place also without mental impressions,' and 'mental impressions are not ad- mitted to originate independently of the perception of external things.' — Moreover, an impression is a kind of modification, and modifications cannot, as experi- ence teaches, take place unless there is some substratum which is modified. But, according to your doctrine, such a substratum of impressions does not exist, since you say that it cannot be cognised through any means of knowledge. 31. And on account of the momentariness (of the alayavi^ana, it cannot be the abode of mental impressions). If you maintain that the so-called internal cognition (alayavi^ana 1) assumed by you may constitute the abode 1 The vi^zanaskandha comprises vi^/zanas of two different kinds, the alayavigTzana and the pravrz'ttivi^zana. The alayavi^ana com- prises the series of cognitions or ideas which refer to the ego ; the pravMtivi^Tzana comprises those ideas which refer to apparently external objects, such as colour and the like. The ideas of the II ADHYAYA, 2 PA DA, 32. 427 of the mental impressions, we deny that, because that cognition also being admittedly momentary, and hence non-permanent, cannot be the abode of impressions any more than the quasi-external cognitions (pravrztti-vi^ana). For unless there exists one continuous principle equally connected with the past, the present, and the future 19 or an absolutely unchangeable (Self) which cognises everything, we are unable to account for remembrance, recognition, and so on, which are subject to mental impressions dependent on place, time, and cause. If, on the other hand, you declare your alayavi^/zana to be something permanent, you thereby abandon your tenet of the alayavi^Tzana as well as everything else being momentary.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1you maintain thereby that ideas exist which are not apprehended by any of the means of knowledge, and which are without a knowing being ; which is no better than to assert that a thousand lamps burning inside some impenetrable mass of rocks manifest themselves. And if you should maintain that thereby we admit your doctrine, since it follows from what we have said that the idea itself implies consciousness ; we reply that, as observation shows, the lamp in order to become manifest requires some other intellectual agent furnished with instruments such as the eye, and that therefore the idea also, as equally being a thing to be illuminated, becomes manifest only through an ulterior intelligent principle. And if you finally object that we, when advancing the witnessing Self as self-proved, merely express in other words the Bauddha tenet that the idea is self-manifested, we refute you by remarking that your ideas have the attributes of originating, passing away, being manifold, and so on (while our Self is one and permanent). — We thus have proved that an idea, like a lamp, requires an ulterior intelligent principle to render it manifest. 29. And on account of their difference of nature (the ideas of the waking state) are not like those of a dream. We now apply ourselves to the refutation of the averment made by the Bauddha, that the ideas of posts, and so on, of which we are conscious in the waking state, may arise in the absence of external objects, just as the ideas of a dream, both being ideas alike. — The two sets of ideas, we maintain, cannot be treated on the same footing, on account of the difference of their character. They differ as follows. — The things of which we are conscious in a dream are negated by our waking consciousness. ' I wrongly thought that I had a meeting with a great man ; no such meeting took place, but my mind was dulled by slumber, and so the II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 30. 425 false idea arose/ In an analogous manner the things of which we are conscious when under the influence of a magic illusion, and the like, are negated by our ordinary con- sciousness. Those things, on the other hand, of which we are conscious in our waking state, such as posts and the like, are never negated in any state. — Moreover, the visions of a dream are acts of remembrance, while the visions of the waking state are acts of immediate consciousness ; and the distinction between remembrance and immediate con- sciousness is directly cognised by every one as being founded on the absence or presence of the object.
2are acts of remembrance, while the visions of the waking state are acts of immediate consciousness ; and the distinction between remembrance and immediate con- sciousness is directly cognised by every one as being founded on the absence or presence of the object. When, for instance, a man remembers his absent son, he does not directly perceive him, but merely wishes so to perceive him. As thus the distinction between the two states is evident to every one, it is impossible to formulate the inference that waking consciousness is false because it is mere consciousness, such as dreaming consciousness ; for we certainly cannot allow would-be philosophers to deny the truth of what is directly evident to themselves. Just because they feel the absurdity of denying what is evident to themselves, and are consequently unable to demonstrate the baselessness of the ideas of the waking state from those ideas themselves, they attempt to demonstrate it from their having certain attributes in common with the ideas of the dreaming state. But if some attribute cannot belong to a thing on account of the latter' s own nature, it cannot belong to it on account of the thing having certain attributes in common with some other thing. Fire, which is felt to be hot, cannot be demonstrated to be cold, on the ground of its having attributes in common with water. And the dif- ference of nature between the waking and the sleeping state we have already shown. 30. The existence (of mental impressions) is not possible (on the Bauddha view) on account of the absence of perception (of external things). We now proceed to that theory of yours, according to which the variety of ideas can be explained from the 426 VEDANTA-S^TRAS. variety of mental impressions, without any reference to external things, and remark that on your doctrine the existence of mental impressions is impossible, as you do not admit the perception of external things. For the variety of mental impressions is caused altogether by the variety of the things perceived. How, indeed, could various impressions originate if no external things were perceived? The hypothesis of a beginningless series of mental impressions would lead only to a baseless regressus ad i nf i n i t u m, sublative of the entire phenomenal world, and would in no way establish your position. — The same argu- ment, i. e.
3hings were perceived? The hypothesis of a beginningless series of mental impressions would lead only to a baseless regressus ad i nf i n i t u m, sublative of the entire phenomenal world, and would in no way establish your position. — The same argu- ment, i. e. the one founded on the impossibility of mental impressions which are not caused by external things, refutes also the positive and negative judgments, on the ground of which the denier of an external world above attempted to show that ideas are caused by mental impressions, not by external things. We rather have on our side a positive and a negative judgment whereby to establish our doctrine of the existence of external things, viz. ' the perception of external things is admitted to take place also without mental impressions,' and 'mental impressions are not ad- mitted to originate independently of the perception of external things.' — Moreover, an impression is a kind of modification, and modifications cannot, as experi- ence teaches, take place unless there is some substratum which is modified. But, according to your doctrine, such a substratum of impressions does not exist, since you say that it cannot be cognised through any means of knowledge. 31. And on account of the momentariness (of the alayavi^ana, it cannot be the abode of mental impressions). If you maintain that the so-called internal cognition (alayavi^ana 1) assumed by you may constitute the abode 1 The vi^zanaskandha comprises vi^/zanas of two different kinds, the alayavigTzana and the pravrz'ttivi^zana. The alayavi^ana com- prises the series of cognitions or ideas which refer to the ego ; the pravMtivi^Tzana comprises those ideas which refer to apparently external objects, such as colour and the like. The ideas of the II ADHYAYA, 2 PA DA, 32. 427 of the mental impressions, we deny that, because that cognition also being admittedly momentary, and hence non-permanent, cannot be the abode of impressions any more than the quasi-external cognitions (pravrztti-vi^ana). For unless there exists one continuous principle equally connected with the past, the present, and the future 19 or an absolutely unchangeable (Self) which cognises everything, we are unable to account for remembrance, recognition, and so on, which are subject to mental impressions dependent on place, time, and cause. If, on the other hand, you declare your alayavi^/zana to be something permanent, you thereby abandon your tenet of the alayavi^Tzana as well as everything else being momentary.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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