Fetching
One moment.
Fetching
One moment.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
13 T 2 VEDANTA-S^TRAS. effect and its qualities by showing that the latter are the mere fallacious superimpositions of nescience, and the very same argument holds good with reference to reabsorption also. — We can quote other examples in favour of our doctrine. As the magician is not at any time affected by the magical illusion produced by himself, because it is un- real, so the highest Self is not affected by the world- illusion. And as one dreaming person is not affected by the illusory visions of his dream because they do not accompany the waking state and the state of dreamless sleep; so the one permanent witness of the three states (viz. the highest Self which is the one unchanging witness of the creation, subsistence, and reabsorption of the world) is not touched by the mutually exclusive three states. For that the highest Self appears in those three states, is a mere illusion, not more substantial than the snake for which the rope is mistaken in the twilight. With reference to this point teachers knowing the true tradition of the Vedanta have made the following declaration, 'When the individual soul which is held in the bonds of slumber by the beginningless Maya awakes, then it knows the eternal, sleepless, dream- less non-duality' (Gau^ap. Kar. I, 16). So far we have shown that — on our doctrine — there is no danger of the cause being affected at the time of reabsorp- tion by the qualities of the effect, such as grossness and the like. — With regard to the second objection, viz. that if we assume all distinctions to pass (at the time of reabsorption) into the state of non-distinction there would be no special reason for the origin of a new world affected with dis- tinctions, we likewise refer to the 'existence of parallel instances.' For the case is parallel to that of deep sleep and trance. In those states also the soul enters into an essential condition of non-distinction ; nevertheless, wrong knowledge being not yet finally overcome, the old state of distinction re-establishes itself as soon as the soul awakes from its sleep or trance. Compare the scriptural passage, ' All these creatures when they have become merged in the True, know not that they are merged in the True. Whatever these creatures are here, whether a lion, or a II ADHYAYA, I PADA, IO. 313 wolf, or a boar, or a worm, or a midge, or a gnat, or a musquito, that they become again J (Kk. Up. VI, 9, 2 ; 3).
2e, know not that they are merged in the True. Whatever these creatures are here, whether a lion, or a II ADHYAYA, I PADA, IO. 313 wolf, or a boar, or a worm, or a midge, or a gnat, or a musquito, that they become again J (Kk. Up. VI, 9, 2 ; 3). For just as during the subsistence of the world the phe- nomenon of multifarious distinct existence, based on wrong knowledge, proceeds unimpeded like the vision of a dream, although there is only one highest Self devoid of all dis- tinction ; so, we conclude, there remains, even after re- absorption, the power of distinction (potential distinction) founded on wrong knowledge. — Herewith the objection that — according to our doctrine — even the finally released souls would be born again is already disposed of. They will not be born again because in their case wrong know- ledge has been entirely discarded by perfect knowledge. — The last alternative finally (which the purvapakshin had represented as open to the Vedantin), viz. that even at the time of reabsorption the world should remain distinct from Brahman, precludes itself because it is not admitted by the Vedantins themselves. — Hence the system founded on the Upanishads is in every way unobjectionable. 10. And because the objections (raised by the S&rikhya against the Ved&nta doctrine) apply to his view also. The doctrine of our opponent is liable to the very same objections which he urges against us, viz. in the following manner. — The objection that this world cannot have sprung from Brahman on account of its difference of character applies no less to the doctrine of the pradhana being the cause of the world ; for that doctrine also assumes that from a pradhana devoid of sound and other qualities a world is produced which possesses those very qualities. The beginning of an effect different in character being thus admitted, the Sankhya is equally driven to the doctrine that before the actual beginning the effect was non-existent. And, moreover, it being admitted (by the Sankhya also) that at the time of reabsorption the effect passes back into the state of non-distinction from the cause, the case of the Sankhya here also is the same as ours. — And, further, if 3 1 4 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. (as the Sankhya also must admit) at the time of reabsorp- tion the differences of all the special effects are obliterated and pass into a state of general non-distinction, the special fixed conditions, which previous to reabsorption were the causes of the different worldly existence of each soul, can, at the time of a new creation, no longer be determined, there being no cause for
3nd pass into a state of general non-distinction, the special fixed conditions, which previous to reabsorption were the causes of the different worldly existence of each soul, can, at the time of a new creation, no longer be determined, there being no cause for them ; and if you assume them to be determined without a cause, you are driven to the admission that even the released souls have to re-enter a state of bondage, there being equal absence of a cause (in the case of the released and the non-released souls). And if you try to avoid this conclusion by assuming that at the time of reabsorption some individual differences pass into the state of non-distinction, others not, we reply that in that case the latter could not be considered as effects of the pradhana1. — It thus appears that all those difficulties (raised by the Sankhya) apply to both views, and cannot therefore be urged against either only. But as either of the two doctrines must necessarily be accepted, we are strengthened — by the outcome of the above discussion — in the opinion that the alleged difficulties are no real difficulties 2. ii. If it be said that, in consequence of the ill- foundedness of reasoning, we must frame our con- clusions otherwise ; (we reply that) thus also there would result non-release. In matters to be known from Scripture mere reasoning is not to be relied on for the following reason also. As the thoughts of man are altogether unfettered, reasoning which disregards the holy texts and rests on individual opinion only has no proper foundation. We see how arguments, which some clever men had excogitated with great pains, are shown, by people still more ingenious, to be fallacious, and how the arguments of the latter again are refuted in their turn 1 For if they are effects of the pradhana they must as such be reabsorbed into it at the time of general reabsorption. 2 And that the Vedanta view is preferable because the nullity of the objections has already been demonstrated in its case. II ADHYAYA, I PADA, II. 315 by other men ; so that, on account of the diversity of men's opinions, it is impossible to accept mere reasoning as having a sure foundation. Nor can we get over this difficulty by accepting as well-founded the reasoning of some person of recognised mental eminence, may he now be Kapila or any- body else ; since we observe that even men of the most undoubted mental eminence, such as Kapila, Ka^ada, and other founders of philosophical schools, have contradicted one another.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
13 T 2 VEDANTA-S^TRAS. effect and its qualities by showing that the latter are the mere fallacious superimpositions of nescience, and the very same argument holds good with reference to reabsorption also. — We can quote other examples in favour of our doctrine. As the magician is not at any time affected by the magical illusion produced by himself, because it is un- real, so the highest Self is not affected by the world- illusion. And as one dreaming person is not affected by the illusory visions of his dream because they do not accompany the waking state and the state of dreamless sleep; so the one permanent witness of the three states (viz. the highest Self which is the one unchanging witness of the creation, subsistence, and reabsorption of the world) is not touched by the mutually exclusive three states. For that the highest Self appears in those three states, is a mere illusion, not more substantial than the snake for which the rope is mistaken in the twilight. With reference to this point teachers knowing the true tradition of the Vedanta have made the following declaration, 'When the individual soul which is held in the bonds of slumber by the beginningless Maya awakes, then it knows the eternal, sleepless, dream- less non-duality' (Gau^ap. Kar. I, 16). So far we have shown that — on our doctrine — there is no danger of the cause being affected at the time of reabsorp- tion by the qualities of the effect, such as grossness and the like. — With regard to the second objection, viz. that if we assume all distinctions to pass (at the time of reabsorption) into the state of non-distinction there would be no special reason for the origin of a new world affected with dis- tinctions, we likewise refer to the 'existence of parallel instances.' For the case is parallel to that of deep sleep and trance. In those states also the soul enters into an essential condition of non-distinction ; nevertheless, wrong knowledge being not yet finally overcome, the old state of distinction re-establishes itself as soon as the soul awakes from its sleep or trance. Compare the scriptural passage, ' All these creatures when they have become merged in the True, know not that they are merged in the True. Whatever these creatures are here, whether a lion, or a II ADHYAYA, I PADA, IO. 313 wolf, or a boar, or a worm, or a midge, or a gnat, or a musquito, that they become again J (Kk. Up. VI, 9, 2 ; 3).
2e, know not that they are merged in the True. Whatever these creatures are here, whether a lion, or a II ADHYAYA, I PADA, IO. 313 wolf, or a boar, or a worm, or a midge, or a gnat, or a musquito, that they become again J (Kk. Up. VI, 9, 2 ; 3). For just as during the subsistence of the world the phe- nomenon of multifarious distinct existence, based on wrong knowledge, proceeds unimpeded like the vision of a dream, although there is only one highest Self devoid of all dis- tinction ; so, we conclude, there remains, even after re- absorption, the power of distinction (potential distinction) founded on wrong knowledge. — Herewith the objection that — according to our doctrine — even the finally released souls would be born again is already disposed of. They will not be born again because in their case wrong know- ledge has been entirely discarded by perfect knowledge. — The last alternative finally (which the purvapakshin had represented as open to the Vedantin), viz. that even at the time of reabsorption the world should remain distinct from Brahman, precludes itself because it is not admitted by the Vedantins themselves. — Hence the system founded on the Upanishads is in every way unobjectionable. 10. And because the objections (raised by the S&rikhya against the Ved&nta doctrine) apply to his view also. The doctrine of our opponent is liable to the very same objections which he urges against us, viz. in the following manner. — The objection that this world cannot have sprung from Brahman on account of its difference of character applies no less to the doctrine of the pradhana being the cause of the world ; for that doctrine also assumes that from a pradhana devoid of sound and other qualities a world is produced which possesses those very qualities. The beginning of an effect different in character being thus admitted, the Sankhya is equally driven to the doctrine that before the actual beginning the effect was non-existent. And, moreover, it being admitted (by the Sankhya also) that at the time of reabsorption the effect passes back into the state of non-distinction from the cause, the case of the Sankhya here also is the same as ours. — And, further, if 3 1 4 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. (as the Sankhya also must admit) at the time of reabsorp- tion the differences of all the special effects are obliterated and pass into a state of general non-distinction, the special fixed conditions, which previous to reabsorption were the causes of the different worldly existence of each soul, can, at the time of a new creation, no longer be determined, there being no cause for
3nd pass into a state of general non-distinction, the special fixed conditions, which previous to reabsorption were the causes of the different worldly existence of each soul, can, at the time of a new creation, no longer be determined, there being no cause for them ; and if you assume them to be determined without a cause, you are driven to the admission that even the released souls have to re-enter a state of bondage, there being equal absence of a cause (in the case of the released and the non-released souls). And if you try to avoid this conclusion by assuming that at the time of reabsorption some individual differences pass into the state of non-distinction, others not, we reply that in that case the latter could not be considered as effects of the pradhana1. — It thus appears that all those difficulties (raised by the Sankhya) apply to both views, and cannot therefore be urged against either only. But as either of the two doctrines must necessarily be accepted, we are strengthened — by the outcome of the above discussion — in the opinion that the alleged difficulties are no real difficulties 2. ii. If it be said that, in consequence of the ill- foundedness of reasoning, we must frame our con- clusions otherwise ; (we reply that) thus also there would result non-release. In matters to be known from Scripture mere reasoning is not to be relied on for the following reason also. As the thoughts of man are altogether unfettered, reasoning which disregards the holy texts and rests on individual opinion only has no proper foundation. We see how arguments, which some clever men had excogitated with great pains, are shown, by people still more ingenious, to be fallacious, and how the arguments of the latter again are refuted in their turn 1 For if they are effects of the pradhana they must as such be reabsorbed into it at the time of general reabsorption. 2 And that the Vedanta view is preferable because the nullity of the objections has already been demonstrated in its case. II ADHYAYA, I PADA, II. 315 by other men ; so that, on account of the diversity of men's opinions, it is impossible to accept mere reasoning as having a sure foundation. Nor can we get over this difficulty by accepting as well-founded the reasoning of some person of recognised mental eminence, may he now be Kapila or any- body else ; since we observe that even men of the most undoubted mental eminence, such as Kapila, Ka^ada, and other founders of philosophical schools, have contradicted one another.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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