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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1iled more easily with an intelligent or a non-intelligent cause of the world. II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 8. 309 7. If (it is said that the effect is) non-existent (before its origination) ; we do not allow that because it is a mere negation (without an object). If Brahman, which is intelligent, pure, and devoid of qualities such as sound, and so on, is supposed to be the cause of an effect which is of an opposite nature, i.e. non-intelligent, impure, possessing the qualities of sound, &c, it follows that the effect has to be considered as non-existing before its actual origination. But this con- sequence cannot be acceptable to you — the Vedantin — who maintain the doctrine of the effect existing in the cause already. This objection of yours, we reply, is without any force, on account of its being a mere negation. If you negative the existence of the effect previous to its actual origina- tion, your negation is a mere negation without an object to be negatived. The negation (implied in * non-existent 5) can certainly not have for its object the existence of the effect previous to its origination, since the effect must be viewed as l existent,' through and in the Self of the cause, before its origination as well as after it ; for at the present moment also this effect does not exist independently, apart from the cause ; according to such scriptural passages as, i Whosoever looks for anything elsewhere than in the Self is abandoned by everything' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 6). In so far, on the other hand, as the effect exists through the Self of the cause, its existence is the same before the actual be- ginning of the effect (as after it). — But Brahman, which is devoid of qualities such as sound, &c, is the cause of this world (possessing all those qualities) ! — True, but the effect with all its qualities does not exist without the Self of the cause either now or before the actual beginning (of the effect) ; hence it cannot be said that (according to our doctrine) the effect is non-existing before its actual begin- ning.— This point will be elucidated in detail in the section treating of the non-difference of cause and effect. 8. On account of such consequences at the time 3 1 0 VEDANTA-StjTRAS. of reabsorption (the doctrine maintained hitherto) is objectionable. The purvapakshin raises further objections.
2ted in detail in the section treating of the non-difference of cause and effect. 8. On account of such consequences at the time 3 1 0 VEDANTA-StjTRAS. of reabsorption (the doctrine maintained hitherto) is objectionable. The purvapakshin raises further objections. — If an effect which is distinguished by the qualities of grossness, con- sisting of parts, absence of intelligence, limitation, impurity, &c, is admitted to have Brahman for its cause, it follows that at the time of reabsorption (of the world into Brah- man), the effect, by entering into the state of non-division from its cause, inquinates the latter with its properties. As therefore — on your doctrine — the cause (i. e. Brahman) as well as the effect is, at the time of reabsorption, character- ised by impurity and similar qualities, the doctrine of the Upanishads, according to which an omniscient Brahman is the cause of the world, cannot be upheld.- — Another ob- jection to that doctrine is that in consequence of all distinctions passing at the time of reabsorption into the state of non-distinction there would be no special causes left at the time of a new beginning of the world, and con- sequently the new world could not arise with all the distinctions of enjoying souls, objects to be enjoyed and so on (which are actually observed to exist). — A third ob- jection is that, if we assume the origin of a new world even after the annihilation of all works, &c. (which are the causes of a new world arising) of the enjoying souls which enter into the state of non-difference from the highest Brahman, we are led to the conclusion that also those (souls) which have obtained final release again appear in the new world. — If you finally say, ' Well, let this world remain distinct from the highest Brahman even at the time of reabsorption,' we reply that in that case a reabsorption will not take place at all, and that, moreover, the effect's existing separate from the cause is not possible. — For all these reasons the Vedanta doctrine is objectionable. To this the next Sutra replies. 9. Not so ; as there are parallel instances. There is nothing objectionable in our system. — The objection that the effect when being reabsorbed into its II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 9. 3II cause would inquinate the latter with its qualities does not damage our position ' because there are parallel instances/ i. e. because there are instances of effects not inquinating with their qualities the causes into which they are re- absorbed.
3PADA, 9. 3II cause would inquinate the latter with its qualities does not damage our position ' because there are parallel instances/ i. e. because there are instances of effects not inquinating with their qualities the causes into which they are re- absorbed. Things, for instance, made of clay, such as pots, &c, which in their state of separate existence are of various descriptions, do not, when they are reabsorbed into their original matter (i.e. clay), impart to the latter their in- dividual qualities ; nor do golden ornaments impart their individual qualities to their elementary material, i. e. gold, into which they may finally be reabsorbed. Nor does the fourfold complex of organic beings which springs from earth impart its qualities to the latter at the time of re- absorption. You (i. e. the purvapakshin), on the other hand, have not any instances to quote in your favour. For re- absorption could not take place at all if the effect when passing back into its causal substance continued to subsist there with all its individual properties. And 3 that in spite of the non-difference of cause and effect the effect has its Self in the cause, but not the cause in the effect, is a point which we shall render clear later on, under II, 1, 14. Moreover, the objection that the effect would impart its qualities to the cause at the time of reabsorption is formu- lated too narrowly because, the identity of cause and effect being admitted, the same would take place during the time of the subsistence (of the effect, previous to its reabsorption). That the identity of cause and effect (of Brahman and the world) holds good indiscriminately with regard to all time (not only the time of reabsorption), is declared in many scriptural passages, as, for instance, ' This everything is that Self (Bri. Up. II, 4, 6) ; < The Self is all this ' (Kk. Up. VII, 25, 2) ; * The immortal Brahman is this before ' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 11) ; < All this is Brahman ' {Kh. Up. Ill, 14, 1). With regard to the case referred to in the Sruti-passages we refute the assertion of the cause being affected by the 1 Nairn pralayakale karyadharmaj ken navatishMeran na tarhi kararcadharma api tish/Zzeyus tayor abhedat tatrahananyatve*piti. An. Gi. 3 T 2 VEDANTA-S^TRAS. effect and its qualities by showing that the latter are the mere fallacious superimpositions of nescience, and the very same argument holds good with reference to reabsorption also. — We can quote other examples in favour of our doctrine.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1iled more easily with an intelligent or a non-intelligent cause of the world. II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 8. 309 7. If (it is said that the effect is) non-existent (before its origination) ; we do not allow that because it is a mere negation (without an object). If Brahman, which is intelligent, pure, and devoid of qualities such as sound, and so on, is supposed to be the cause of an effect which is of an opposite nature, i.e. non-intelligent, impure, possessing the qualities of sound, &c, it follows that the effect has to be considered as non-existing before its actual origination. But this con- sequence cannot be acceptable to you — the Vedantin — who maintain the doctrine of the effect existing in the cause already. This objection of yours, we reply, is without any force, on account of its being a mere negation. If you negative the existence of the effect previous to its actual origina- tion, your negation is a mere negation without an object to be negatived. The negation (implied in * non-existent 5) can certainly not have for its object the existence of the effect previous to its origination, since the effect must be viewed as l existent,' through and in the Self of the cause, before its origination as well as after it ; for at the present moment also this effect does not exist independently, apart from the cause ; according to such scriptural passages as, i Whosoever looks for anything elsewhere than in the Self is abandoned by everything' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 6). In so far, on the other hand, as the effect exists through the Self of the cause, its existence is the same before the actual be- ginning of the effect (as after it). — But Brahman, which is devoid of qualities such as sound, &c, is the cause of this world (possessing all those qualities) ! — True, but the effect with all its qualities does not exist without the Self of the cause either now or before the actual beginning (of the effect) ; hence it cannot be said that (according to our doctrine) the effect is non-existing before its actual begin- ning.— This point will be elucidated in detail in the section treating of the non-difference of cause and effect. 8. On account of such consequences at the time 3 1 0 VEDANTA-StjTRAS. of reabsorption (the doctrine maintained hitherto) is objectionable. The purvapakshin raises further objections.
2ted in detail in the section treating of the non-difference of cause and effect. 8. On account of such consequences at the time 3 1 0 VEDANTA-StjTRAS. of reabsorption (the doctrine maintained hitherto) is objectionable. The purvapakshin raises further objections. — If an effect which is distinguished by the qualities of grossness, con- sisting of parts, absence of intelligence, limitation, impurity, &c, is admitted to have Brahman for its cause, it follows that at the time of reabsorption (of the world into Brah- man), the effect, by entering into the state of non-division from its cause, inquinates the latter with its properties. As therefore — on your doctrine — the cause (i. e. Brahman) as well as the effect is, at the time of reabsorption, character- ised by impurity and similar qualities, the doctrine of the Upanishads, according to which an omniscient Brahman is the cause of the world, cannot be upheld.- — Another ob- jection to that doctrine is that in consequence of all distinctions passing at the time of reabsorption into the state of non-distinction there would be no special causes left at the time of a new beginning of the world, and con- sequently the new world could not arise with all the distinctions of enjoying souls, objects to be enjoyed and so on (which are actually observed to exist). — A third ob- jection is that, if we assume the origin of a new world even after the annihilation of all works, &c. (which are the causes of a new world arising) of the enjoying souls which enter into the state of non-difference from the highest Brahman, we are led to the conclusion that also those (souls) which have obtained final release again appear in the new world. — If you finally say, ' Well, let this world remain distinct from the highest Brahman even at the time of reabsorption,' we reply that in that case a reabsorption will not take place at all, and that, moreover, the effect's existing separate from the cause is not possible. — For all these reasons the Vedanta doctrine is objectionable. To this the next Sutra replies. 9. Not so ; as there are parallel instances. There is nothing objectionable in our system. — The objection that the effect when being reabsorbed into its II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 9. 3II cause would inquinate the latter with its qualities does not damage our position ' because there are parallel instances/ i. e. because there are instances of effects not inquinating with their qualities the causes into which they are re- absorbed.
3PADA, 9. 3II cause would inquinate the latter with its qualities does not damage our position ' because there are parallel instances/ i. e. because there are instances of effects not inquinating with their qualities the causes into which they are re- absorbed. Things, for instance, made of clay, such as pots, &c, which in their state of separate existence are of various descriptions, do not, when they are reabsorbed into their original matter (i.e. clay), impart to the latter their in- dividual qualities ; nor do golden ornaments impart their individual qualities to their elementary material, i. e. gold, into which they may finally be reabsorbed. Nor does the fourfold complex of organic beings which springs from earth impart its qualities to the latter at the time of re- absorption. You (i. e. the purvapakshin), on the other hand, have not any instances to quote in your favour. For re- absorption could not take place at all if the effect when passing back into its causal substance continued to subsist there with all its individual properties. And 3 that in spite of the non-difference of cause and effect the effect has its Self in the cause, but not the cause in the effect, is a point which we shall render clear later on, under II, 1, 14. Moreover, the objection that the effect would impart its qualities to the cause at the time of reabsorption is formu- lated too narrowly because, the identity of cause and effect being admitted, the same would take place during the time of the subsistence (of the effect, previous to its reabsorption). That the identity of cause and effect (of Brahman and the world) holds good indiscriminately with regard to all time (not only the time of reabsorption), is declared in many scriptural passages, as, for instance, ' This everything is that Self (Bri. Up. II, 4, 6) ; < The Self is all this ' (Kk. Up. VII, 25, 2) ; * The immortal Brahman is this before ' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 11) ; < All this is Brahman ' {Kh. Up. Ill, 14, 1). With regard to the case referred to in the Sruti-passages we refute the assertion of the cause being affected by the 1 Nairn pralayakale karyadharmaj ken navatishMeran na tarhi kararcadharma api tish/Zzeyus tayor abhedat tatrahananyatve*piti. An. Gi. 3 T 2 VEDANTA-S^TRAS. effect and its qualities by showing that the latter are the mere fallacious superimpositions of nescience, and the very same argument holds good with reference to reabsorption also. — We can quote other examples in favour of our doctrine.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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