Fetching
One moment.
Fetching
One moment.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1h Scripture which teaches that an intelligent If we attempt to infer the nature of the universal cause from its effects on the ground of parallel instances, as, for instance, that of an earthen jar whose material cause is clay, we must remember that the jar has sprung from clay not without the co-operation of an intelligent being, viz. the potter. 366 vedanta-s^tras. cause exists. — For the reason detailed in the above, i.e. on account of the impossibility of the ' orderly arrangement ' (of the world), a non-intelligent cause of the world is not to be inferred. — The word 'and' (in the Sutra) adds other reasons on account of which the pradhana cannot be inferred, viz. { on account of the non-possibility of endowment,' &c. For it cannot be maintained x that all outward and inward effects are ' endowed ' with the nature of pleasure, pain, and dulness, because pleasure, &c. are known as inward (mental) states, while sound, &c. (i.e. the sense-objects) are known as being of a different nature (i. e. as outward things), and moreover as being the operative causes of pleasure, &c. 2 And, further, although the sense-object such as sound and so on is one, yet we observe that owing to the difference of the mental impressions (produced by it) differences exist in the effects it produces, one person being affected by it pleasantly, another painfully, and so on 3. — (Turning to the next Sankhya argument which infers the existence of the pradhana from the limitation of all effects), we remark that he who concludes that all inward and outward effects depend on a conjunction of several things, because they are limited (a conclusion based on the observation that some limited effects such as root and sprout, &c. depend on the conjunc- tion of several things), is driven to the conclusion that the three constituents of the pradhana, viz. Goodness, Passion, and Darkness, likewise depend on the conjunction of several 1 As had been asserted above for the purpose of inferring there- from, according to the principle of the equality of cause and effect, the existence of the three constituents of the pradhana. 2 And a thing cannot consist of that of which it is the cause. 3 Which differences cannot be reconciled with the Sankhya hypothesis of the object itself consisting of either pleasure or pain, &c. — ' If things consisted in themselves of pleasure, pain, &c, then sandal ointment (which is cooling, and on that account pleasant in summer) would be pleasant in winter also; for sandal never is anything but sandal.
2elf consisting of either pleasure or pain, &c. — ' If things consisted in themselves of pleasure, pain, &c, then sandal ointment (which is cooling, and on that account pleasant in summer) would be pleasant in winter also; for sandal never is anything but sandal. — And as thistles never are anything but thistles they ought, on the Sankhya hypothesis, to be eaten with enjoyment not only by camels but by men also/ Bha\ II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 2. 367 antecedents1; for they also are limited2. — Further3, it is impossible to use the relation of cause and effect as a reason for assuming that all effects whatever have a non-intelligent principle for their antecedent ; for we have shown already that that relation exists in the case of couches and chairs also, over whose production intelligence presides. 2. And on account of (the impossibility of) ac- tivity. Leaving the arrangement of the world, we now pass on to the activity by which it is produced. — The three gu;zas, passing out of the state of equipoise and entering into the condition of mutual subordination and superordination, originate activities tending towards the production of particular effects. — Now these activities also cannot be ascribed to a non-intelligent pradhana left to itself, as no such activity is seen in clay and similar substances, or in chariots and the like. For we observe that clay and the like, and chariots — which are in their own nature non- intelligent — enter on activities tending towards particular effects only when they are acted upon by intelligent beings such as potters, &c. in the one case, and horses and the like in the other case. From what is seen we determine what is not seen. Hence a non-intelligent cause of the world is not to be inferred because, on that hypothesis, the activity without which the world cannot be produced would be impossible. But, the Sankhya rejoins, we do likewise not observe activity on the part of mere intelligent beings. — True ; we however see activity on the part of non-intelligent things such as chariots and the like when they are in conjunction with intelligent beings. — But, the Sankhya again objects, we never actually observe activity on the part of an intel- 1 Sazrcsargapurvakatvaprasariga iti guwdnaw sa^sr/sh/anekava- stuprakrz'tikatvaprasaktir ity artha^. An. Gi. 2 For they limit one another. 3 To proceed to the argument ' from the separateness of cause and effect ' (Sa. KL 15). 368 vedanta-s6tras. ligent being even when in conjunction with a non-intelligent thing.
3nekava- stuprakrz'tikatvaprasaktir ity artha^. An. Gi. 2 For they limit one another. 3 To proceed to the argument ' from the separateness of cause and effect ' (Sa. KL 15). 368 vedanta-s6tras. ligent being even when in conjunction with a non-intelligent thing. — Very well ; the question then arises : Does the activity belong to that in which it is actually observed (as the Sankhya says), or to that on account of the conjunction with which it is observed (as the Vedantin avers)? — We must, the Sankhya replies, attribute activity to that in which it is actually seen, since both (i. e. the activity and its abode) are matter of observation. A mere intelligent being, on the other hand, is never observed as the abode of activity while a chariot is. The 1 existence of an intelligent Self joined to a body and so on which are the abode of activity can be established (by inference) only ; the inference being based on the difference observed between living bodies and mere non-intelligent things, such as chariots and the like. For this very reason, viz. that intelligence is observed only where a body is observed while it is never seen without a body, the Materialists consider intelligence to be a mere attribute of the body. — Hence activity belongs only to what is non-intelligent. To all this we — the Vedantins — make the following reply. — We do not mean to say that activity does not belong to those non-intelligent things in which it is observed ; it does indeed belong to them ; but it results from an intelligent principle, because it exists when the latter is present and does not exist when the latter is absent. Just as the effects of burning and shining, which have their abode in wood and similar material, are indeed not observed when there is mere fire (i. e. are not due to mere fire ; as mere fire, i. e. fire without wood, &c, does not exist), but at the same time result from fire only as they are seen when fire is present and are not seen when fire is absent ; so, as the Materialists also admit, only intelligent bodies are observed 1 The next sentences furnish the answer to the question how the intelligent Self is known at all if it is not the object of per- ception.— Pratyakshatvabhave katham atmasiddhir ity asankya anumanad ity aha, pravrz'ttiti. Anumanasiddhasya £etanasya na pravrz'ttyajrayateti dar^ayitum evakara^. Katham anumanam ity apekshayazrc tatprakaraw sMayati kevaleti. Vailakshawyaw pra#a- dimattvam. An. Gi. II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 3. 369 to be the movers of chariots and other non-intelligent things.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1h Scripture which teaches that an intelligent If we attempt to infer the nature of the universal cause from its effects on the ground of parallel instances, as, for instance, that of an earthen jar whose material cause is clay, we must remember that the jar has sprung from clay not without the co-operation of an intelligent being, viz. the potter. 366 vedanta-s^tras. cause exists. — For the reason detailed in the above, i.e. on account of the impossibility of the ' orderly arrangement ' (of the world), a non-intelligent cause of the world is not to be inferred. — The word 'and' (in the Sutra) adds other reasons on account of which the pradhana cannot be inferred, viz. { on account of the non-possibility of endowment,' &c. For it cannot be maintained x that all outward and inward effects are ' endowed ' with the nature of pleasure, pain, and dulness, because pleasure, &c. are known as inward (mental) states, while sound, &c. (i.e. the sense-objects) are known as being of a different nature (i. e. as outward things), and moreover as being the operative causes of pleasure, &c. 2 And, further, although the sense-object such as sound and so on is one, yet we observe that owing to the difference of the mental impressions (produced by it) differences exist in the effects it produces, one person being affected by it pleasantly, another painfully, and so on 3. — (Turning to the next Sankhya argument which infers the existence of the pradhana from the limitation of all effects), we remark that he who concludes that all inward and outward effects depend on a conjunction of several things, because they are limited (a conclusion based on the observation that some limited effects such as root and sprout, &c. depend on the conjunc- tion of several things), is driven to the conclusion that the three constituents of the pradhana, viz. Goodness, Passion, and Darkness, likewise depend on the conjunction of several 1 As had been asserted above for the purpose of inferring there- from, according to the principle of the equality of cause and effect, the existence of the three constituents of the pradhana. 2 And a thing cannot consist of that of which it is the cause. 3 Which differences cannot be reconciled with the Sankhya hypothesis of the object itself consisting of either pleasure or pain, &c. — ' If things consisted in themselves of pleasure, pain, &c, then sandal ointment (which is cooling, and on that account pleasant in summer) would be pleasant in winter also; for sandal never is anything but sandal.
2elf consisting of either pleasure or pain, &c. — ' If things consisted in themselves of pleasure, pain, &c, then sandal ointment (which is cooling, and on that account pleasant in summer) would be pleasant in winter also; for sandal never is anything but sandal. — And as thistles never are anything but thistles they ought, on the Sankhya hypothesis, to be eaten with enjoyment not only by camels but by men also/ Bha\ II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 2. 367 antecedents1; for they also are limited2. — Further3, it is impossible to use the relation of cause and effect as a reason for assuming that all effects whatever have a non-intelligent principle for their antecedent ; for we have shown already that that relation exists in the case of couches and chairs also, over whose production intelligence presides. 2. And on account of (the impossibility of) ac- tivity. Leaving the arrangement of the world, we now pass on to the activity by which it is produced. — The three gu;zas, passing out of the state of equipoise and entering into the condition of mutual subordination and superordination, originate activities tending towards the production of particular effects. — Now these activities also cannot be ascribed to a non-intelligent pradhana left to itself, as no such activity is seen in clay and similar substances, or in chariots and the like. For we observe that clay and the like, and chariots — which are in their own nature non- intelligent — enter on activities tending towards particular effects only when they are acted upon by intelligent beings such as potters, &c. in the one case, and horses and the like in the other case. From what is seen we determine what is not seen. Hence a non-intelligent cause of the world is not to be inferred because, on that hypothesis, the activity without which the world cannot be produced would be impossible. But, the Sankhya rejoins, we do likewise not observe activity on the part of mere intelligent beings. — True ; we however see activity on the part of non-intelligent things such as chariots and the like when they are in conjunction with intelligent beings. — But, the Sankhya again objects, we never actually observe activity on the part of an intel- 1 Sazrcsargapurvakatvaprasariga iti guwdnaw sa^sr/sh/anekava- stuprakrz'tikatvaprasaktir ity artha^. An. Gi. 2 For they limit one another. 3 To proceed to the argument ' from the separateness of cause and effect ' (Sa. KL 15). 368 vedanta-s6tras. ligent being even when in conjunction with a non-intelligent thing.
3nekava- stuprakrz'tikatvaprasaktir ity artha^. An. Gi. 2 For they limit one another. 3 To proceed to the argument ' from the separateness of cause and effect ' (Sa. KL 15). 368 vedanta-s6tras. ligent being even when in conjunction with a non-intelligent thing. — Very well ; the question then arises : Does the activity belong to that in which it is actually observed (as the Sankhya says), or to that on account of the conjunction with which it is observed (as the Vedantin avers)? — We must, the Sankhya replies, attribute activity to that in which it is actually seen, since both (i. e. the activity and its abode) are matter of observation. A mere intelligent being, on the other hand, is never observed as the abode of activity while a chariot is. The 1 existence of an intelligent Self joined to a body and so on which are the abode of activity can be established (by inference) only ; the inference being based on the difference observed between living bodies and mere non-intelligent things, such as chariots and the like. For this very reason, viz. that intelligence is observed only where a body is observed while it is never seen without a body, the Materialists consider intelligence to be a mere attribute of the body. — Hence activity belongs only to what is non-intelligent. To all this we — the Vedantins — make the following reply. — We do not mean to say that activity does not belong to those non-intelligent things in which it is observed ; it does indeed belong to them ; but it results from an intelligent principle, because it exists when the latter is present and does not exist when the latter is absent. Just as the effects of burning and shining, which have their abode in wood and similar material, are indeed not observed when there is mere fire (i. e. are not due to mere fire ; as mere fire, i. e. fire without wood, &c, does not exist), but at the same time result from fire only as they are seen when fire is present and are not seen when fire is absent ; so, as the Materialists also admit, only intelligent bodies are observed 1 The next sentences furnish the answer to the question how the intelligent Self is known at all if it is not the object of per- ception.— Pratyakshatvabhave katham atmasiddhir ity asankya anumanad ity aha, pravrz'ttiti. Anumanasiddhasya £etanasya na pravrz'ttyajrayateti dar^ayitum evakara^. Katham anumanam ity apekshayazrc tatprakaraw sMayati kevaleti. Vailakshawyaw pra#a- dimattvam. An. Gi. II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 3. 369 to be the movers of chariots and other non-intelligent things.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
No commentary for this page.