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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1ation of the pradhana cannot be proved from the instance of grass and the like. 6. Even if we admit (the Sankhya position refuted in what precedes, it is invalidated by other ob- jections) on account of the absence of a purpose (on the part of the pradhana). Even if we, accommodating ourselves to your (the San- khya's) belief, should admit what has been disproved in the preceding Sutra, viz. that the pradhana is spontaneously active, still your opinion would lie open to an objection ' on account of the absence of a purpose/ For if the spontaneous activity of the pradhana has, as you say, no reference to anything else, it will have no reference not only to any aiding principle, but also to any purpose or motive, and conse- quently your doctrine that the pradhana is active in order to effect the purpose of man will become untenable. If you reply that the pradhana does not indeed regard any aiding principle, but does regard a purpose, we remark that in that case we must distinguish between the different pos- sible purposes, viz. either enjoyment (on the part of the soul), or final release, or both. If enjoyment, what enjoy- ment, we ask, can belong to the soul which is naturally incapable of any accretion (of pleasure or pain) * ? Moreover, there would in that case be no opportunity for release2. — If release, then the activity of the pradhana would be purposeless, as even antecedently to it the soul is in the body ; but a reflecting person will acknowledge that there also the omniscient Lord is active. Bha. 1 Anadheyatuayasya sukhadukhapraptiparihdrarupatwayajunyas- yety artha^. An. Gi. 2 For the soul as being of an entirely inactive nature cannot of itself aim at release, and the pradhana aims — ex hypothesi — only at the soul's undergoing varied experience. II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 7. 373 state of release ; moreover, there would then be no occasion for the perception of sounds, &C.1 — If both, then, on account of the infinite number of the objects of pradhana to be enjoyed (by the soul)2, there would be no opportunity for final release. Nor can the satisfaction of a desire be con- sidered as the purpose of the activity of the pradhana ; for neither the non-intelligent pradhana nor the essentially pure soul can feel any desire.
2d (by the soul)2, there would be no opportunity for final release. Nor can the satisfaction of a desire be con- sidered as the purpose of the activity of the pradhana ; for neither the non-intelligent pradhana nor the essentially pure soul can feel any desire. — If, finally, you should assume the pradhana to be active, because otherwise the power of sight (belonging to the soul on account of its intelligent nature) and the creative power (belonging to the pradhana) would be purposeless ; it would follow that, as the creative power of the pradhana does not cease at any time any more than the soul's power of sight does, the apparent world would never come to an end, so that no final release of the soul could take place3. — It is, therefore, impossible to maintain that the pradhana enters on its activity for the purposes of the soul. 7. And if you say (that the soul may move the pradhana) as the (lame) man (moves the blind one) or as the magnet (moves the iron) ; thus also (the difficulty is not overcome). Well then — the Sankhya resumes, endeavouring to defend his position by parallel instances — let us say that, as some lame man devoid of the power of motion, but possessing the power of sight, having mounted the back of a blind man who is able to move but not to see, makes the latter move ; or as the magnet not moving itself, moves the iron, so the soul moves the pradhana. — Thus also, we reply, you do not free your doctrine from all shortcomings ; for this your new position involves an abandonment of your old 1 I. e. for the various items constituting enjoyment or experience. 2 TYz'tiye *pi katipaya,rabdadyupalabdhir va samastatadupalabdhir v& bhoga iti vikalpyadye sarvesham ekadaiva mukti/$ syad iti manvano dvitiyaw pratyaha ubhayarthateti. An. Gi. 8 The MSS. of Ananda Giri omit sawsaranu/^edat ; the BM- mati's reading is: Sarga^aktyanu^^edavad drz'kraktyanu/^edat. ; 74 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. position, according to which the pradhana is moving of itself, and the (indifferent, inactive) soul possesses no moving power. And how should the indifferent soul move the pradhana ? A man, although lame, may make a blind man move by means of words and the like ; but the soul which is devoid of action and qualities cannot possibly put forth any moving energy. Nor can it be said that it moves the pradhana by its mere proximity as the magnet moves the iron ; for from the permanency of proximity (of soul and pradhana) a permanency of motion would follow.
3tion and qualities cannot possibly put forth any moving energy. Nor can it be said that it moves the pradhana by its mere proximity as the magnet moves the iron ; for from the permanency of proximity (of soul and pradhana) a permanency of motion would follow. The proximity of the magnet, on the other hand (to the iron), is not permanent, but depends on a certain activity and the adjustment of the magnet in a certain position ; hence the (lame) man and the magnet do not supply really parallel instances. — The pradhana then being non-intelligent and the soul indifferent, and there being no third principle to connect them, there can be no connexion of the two. If we attempted to establish a connexion on the ground of capability (of being seen on the part of the pradhana, of seeing on the part of the soul), the permanency of such capability would imply the impossibility of final release. — Moreover, here as well as before (in the preceding Sutra) the different alternatives connected with the absence of purpose (on the pradhana's part) have to be considered *. — The highest Self, on the other hand (which is the cause of the world, according to the Vedantins), is characterised by non-activity inherent in its own nature, and, at the same time, by moving power inherent in Miyd and is thus superior (to the soul of the Sankhyas). 8. And, again, (the pradhana cannot be active) because the relation of principal (and subordinate matter) is impossible (between the three gu/zas). For the following reason also activity on the part of the pradhana is not possible. — The condition of the pradhana 1 On the theory that the soul is the cause of the pradhana's activity we again have to ask whether the pradhana acts for the soul's enjoyment or for its release, &c. II ADHYAVA, 2 PAD A, 9. 375 consists in the three gu;zas, viz. goodness, passion, and darkness, abiding in themselves in a state of equipoise without standing to one another in the relation of mutual superiority or inferiority. In that state the gu?zas cannot possibly enter into the relation of mutual subserviency because thereby they would forfeit their essential character- istic, viz. absolute independence. And as there exists no extraneous principle to stir up the gu/zas, the production of the great principle and the other effects — which would require for its operative cause a non-balanced state of the gu/zas — is impossible. 9. And although another inference be made, (the objections remain in force) on account of the (pra- dh&na) being devoid of the power of intelligence.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1ation of the pradhana cannot be proved from the instance of grass and the like. 6. Even if we admit (the Sankhya position refuted in what precedes, it is invalidated by other ob- jections) on account of the absence of a purpose (on the part of the pradhana). Even if we, accommodating ourselves to your (the San- khya's) belief, should admit what has been disproved in the preceding Sutra, viz. that the pradhana is spontaneously active, still your opinion would lie open to an objection ' on account of the absence of a purpose/ For if the spontaneous activity of the pradhana has, as you say, no reference to anything else, it will have no reference not only to any aiding principle, but also to any purpose or motive, and conse- quently your doctrine that the pradhana is active in order to effect the purpose of man will become untenable. If you reply that the pradhana does not indeed regard any aiding principle, but does regard a purpose, we remark that in that case we must distinguish between the different pos- sible purposes, viz. either enjoyment (on the part of the soul), or final release, or both. If enjoyment, what enjoy- ment, we ask, can belong to the soul which is naturally incapable of any accretion (of pleasure or pain) * ? Moreover, there would in that case be no opportunity for release2. — If release, then the activity of the pradhana would be purposeless, as even antecedently to it the soul is in the body ; but a reflecting person will acknowledge that there also the omniscient Lord is active. Bha. 1 Anadheyatuayasya sukhadukhapraptiparihdrarupatwayajunyas- yety artha^. An. Gi. 2 For the soul as being of an entirely inactive nature cannot of itself aim at release, and the pradhana aims — ex hypothesi — only at the soul's undergoing varied experience. II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 7. 373 state of release ; moreover, there would then be no occasion for the perception of sounds, &C.1 — If both, then, on account of the infinite number of the objects of pradhana to be enjoyed (by the soul)2, there would be no opportunity for final release. Nor can the satisfaction of a desire be con- sidered as the purpose of the activity of the pradhana ; for neither the non-intelligent pradhana nor the essentially pure soul can feel any desire.
2d (by the soul)2, there would be no opportunity for final release. Nor can the satisfaction of a desire be con- sidered as the purpose of the activity of the pradhana ; for neither the non-intelligent pradhana nor the essentially pure soul can feel any desire. — If, finally, you should assume the pradhana to be active, because otherwise the power of sight (belonging to the soul on account of its intelligent nature) and the creative power (belonging to the pradhana) would be purposeless ; it would follow that, as the creative power of the pradhana does not cease at any time any more than the soul's power of sight does, the apparent world would never come to an end, so that no final release of the soul could take place3. — It is, therefore, impossible to maintain that the pradhana enters on its activity for the purposes of the soul. 7. And if you say (that the soul may move the pradhana) as the (lame) man (moves the blind one) or as the magnet (moves the iron) ; thus also (the difficulty is not overcome). Well then — the Sankhya resumes, endeavouring to defend his position by parallel instances — let us say that, as some lame man devoid of the power of motion, but possessing the power of sight, having mounted the back of a blind man who is able to move but not to see, makes the latter move ; or as the magnet not moving itself, moves the iron, so the soul moves the pradhana. — Thus also, we reply, you do not free your doctrine from all shortcomings ; for this your new position involves an abandonment of your old 1 I. e. for the various items constituting enjoyment or experience. 2 TYz'tiye *pi katipaya,rabdadyupalabdhir va samastatadupalabdhir v& bhoga iti vikalpyadye sarvesham ekadaiva mukti/$ syad iti manvano dvitiyaw pratyaha ubhayarthateti. An. Gi. 8 The MSS. of Ananda Giri omit sawsaranu/^edat ; the BM- mati's reading is: Sarga^aktyanu^^edavad drz'kraktyanu/^edat. ; 74 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. position, according to which the pradhana is moving of itself, and the (indifferent, inactive) soul possesses no moving power. And how should the indifferent soul move the pradhana ? A man, although lame, may make a blind man move by means of words and the like ; but the soul which is devoid of action and qualities cannot possibly put forth any moving energy. Nor can it be said that it moves the pradhana by its mere proximity as the magnet moves the iron ; for from the permanency of proximity (of soul and pradhana) a permanency of motion would follow.
3tion and qualities cannot possibly put forth any moving energy. Nor can it be said that it moves the pradhana by its mere proximity as the magnet moves the iron ; for from the permanency of proximity (of soul and pradhana) a permanency of motion would follow. The proximity of the magnet, on the other hand (to the iron), is not permanent, but depends on a certain activity and the adjustment of the magnet in a certain position ; hence the (lame) man and the magnet do not supply really parallel instances. — The pradhana then being non-intelligent and the soul indifferent, and there being no third principle to connect them, there can be no connexion of the two. If we attempted to establish a connexion on the ground of capability (of being seen on the part of the pradhana, of seeing on the part of the soul), the permanency of such capability would imply the impossibility of final release. — Moreover, here as well as before (in the preceding Sutra) the different alternatives connected with the absence of purpose (on the pradhana's part) have to be considered *. — The highest Self, on the other hand (which is the cause of the world, according to the Vedantins), is characterised by non-activity inherent in its own nature, and, at the same time, by moving power inherent in Miyd and is thus superior (to the soul of the Sankhyas). 8. And, again, (the pradhana cannot be active) because the relation of principal (and subordinate matter) is impossible (between the three gu/zas). For the following reason also activity on the part of the pradhana is not possible. — The condition of the pradhana 1 On the theory that the soul is the cause of the pradhana's activity we again have to ask whether the pradhana acts for the soul's enjoyment or for its release, &c. II ADHYAVA, 2 PAD A, 9. 375 consists in the three gu;zas, viz. goodness, passion, and darkness, abiding in themselves in a state of equipoise without standing to one another in the relation of mutual superiority or inferiority. In that state the gu?zas cannot possibly enter into the relation of mutual subserviency because thereby they would forfeit their essential character- istic, viz. absolute independence. And as there exists no extraneous principle to stir up the gu/zas, the production of the great principle and the other effects — which would require for its operative cause a non-balanced state of the gu/zas — is impossible. 9. And although another inference be made, (the objections remain in force) on account of the (pra- dh&na) being devoid of the power of intelligence.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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