Fetching
One moment.
Fetching
One moment.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1a, but connect that result rather with the cognition of the intelli- gent Self. — The highest Self is, moreover, spoken of in all Vedanta-texts as possessing just those qualities which are mentioned in the passage quoted above, viz. absence of sound, and the like. Hence it follows, that the pradhana is in the text neither spoken of as the object of knowledge nor denoted by the term avyakta, 6. And there is question and explanation relative to three things only (not to the pradhana). To the same conclusion we are led by the consideration of the circumstance that the Ka/^avallt-upanishad brings forward, as subjects of discussion, only three things, viz. the fire sacrifice, the individual soul, and the highest Self. These three things only Yama explains, bestowing thereby the boons he had granted, and to them only the questions of Na&ketas refer. Nothing else is mentioned or enquired 2 48 vedanta-s£tr as. about. The question relative to the fire sacrifice is con- tained in the passage (Ka. Up. I, i, 13), ' Thou knowest, O Death, the fire sacrifice which leads us to Heaven ; tell it to me, who am full of faith.5 The question as to the indi- vidual soul is contained in I, 1, 20, 'There is that doubt when a man is dead, some saying, he is ; others, he is not. This I should like to know, taught by thee ; this is the third of my boons.5 And the question about the highest Self is asked in the passage (I, 2, 14), 'That which thou seest as neither this nor that, as neither effect nor cause, as neither past nor future, tell me that.5 — The corresponding answers are given in I, 1, 15, 'Yama then told him that fire sacrifice, the beginning of all the worlds, and what bricks are required for the altar, and how many ; ' in the passage met with con- siderably later on (II, 5, 6; 7), 'Well then, O Gautama, I shall tell thee this mystery, the old Brahman and what happens to the Self after reaching death. Some enter the womb in order to have a body as organic beings, others go into inorganic matter according to their work and according to their knowledge ; 5 and in the passage (I, 2, 18), ' The knowing Self is not born nor does it die,' &c. ; which latter passage dilates at length on the highest Self. But there is no ques- tion relative to the pradhana, and hence no opportunity for any remarks on it. Here the Sankhya advances a new objection.
2' The knowing Self is not born nor does it die,' &c. ; which latter passage dilates at length on the highest Self. But there is no ques- tion relative to the pradhana, and hence no opportunity for any remarks on it. Here the Sankhya advances a new objection. Is, he asks, the question relative to the Self which is asked in the pas- sage, ' There is that doubt when a man is dead/ &c, again resumed in the passage, ' That which thou seest as neither this nor that,5 &c., or does the latter passage raise a distinct new question ? If the former, the two questions about the Self coalesce into one, and there are therefore altogether two questions only, one relative to the fire sacrifice, the other relative to the Self. In that case the Sutra has no right to speak of questions and explanations relating to three subjects. — If the latter, you do not consider it a mistake to assume a question in excess of the number of boons granted, and can therefore not object to us if we assume an explanation about the pradhana in excess of the number of questions asked. I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 6. 249 To this we make the following reply. — We by no means assume a question in excess of the number of boons granted, being prevented from doing so by the influence of the opening part of that syntactical whole which constitutes the Ka^avalli-upanishad. The Upanishad starts with the topic of the boons granted by Yama, and all the following part of the Upanishad — which is thrown into the form of a colloquy of Yama and Na^iketas — carries on that topic up to the very end. Yama grants to Na^iketas, who had been sent by his father, three boons. For his first boon Na&ketas chooses kindness on the part of his father towards him, for his second boon the knowledge of the fire sacrifice, for his third boon the knowledge of the Self. That the knowledge of the Self is the third boon appears from the indication contained in the passage (I, 1, 10), * There is that doubt — ; this is the third of my boons.' — If we therefore supposed that the passage, ' That which thou seest as neither this nor that/ &c, raises a new question, we should thereby assume a question in excess of the number of boons granted, and thus destroy the connexion of the entire Upanishad. — But — the Sankhyawill perhaps interpose — it must needs be admitted that the pas- sage last quoted does raise a new question, because the subject enquired about is a new one.
3of the number of boons granted, and thus destroy the connexion of the entire Upanishad. — But — the Sankhyawill perhaps interpose — it must needs be admitted that the pas- sage last quoted does raise a new question, because the subject enquired about is a new one. For the former question refers to the individual soul, as we conclude from the doubt ex- pressed in the words, ' There is that doubt when a man is dead — some saying, he is ; others, he is not.' Now this individual soul, as having definite attributes, &c, cannot constitute the object of a question expressed in such terms as, * This which thou seest as neither this nor that,' &c. ; the highest Self, on the other hand, may be enquired about in such terms, since it is above all attributes. The appearance of the two questions is, moreover, seen to differ ; for the former question refers to existence and non-existence, while the latter is concerned with an entity raised above all definite attributes, &c. Hence we conclude that the latter question, in which the former one cannot be recognised, is a separate question, and does not merely resume the subject of the former one. — All this argumentation is not valid, we reply, since we maintain the unitv of the highest Self and the 2 ;0 VEDANTA-StJTRAS. individual Self. If the individual Self were different from the highest Self, we should have to declare that the two questions are separate independent questions, but the two are not really different, as we know from other scrip- tural passages, such as ' Thou art that.' And in the Upani- shad under discussion also the answer to the question, ( That which thou seest as neither this nor that,' viz. the passage, ' The knowing Self is not born, it dies not ' — which answer is given in the form of a denial of the birth and death of the Self — clearly shows that the embodied Self and the highest Self are non-different. For there is room for a denial of something only when that something is possible, and the possibility of birth and death exists in the embodied Self only, since it is connected with the body, but not in the highest Self. — There is, moreover, another passage conveying the same meaning, viz. II, 4, 4, 'The wise when he knows that that by which he perceives all objects in sleep or in waking, is the great omnipresent Self, grieves no more.' This passage makes the cessation of all grief dependent on the knowledge of the individual Self, in so far as it possesses the qualities of greatness and omnipresence, and thereby declares that the individual Self is not different from the highest Self.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1a, but connect that result rather with the cognition of the intelli- gent Self. — The highest Self is, moreover, spoken of in all Vedanta-texts as possessing just those qualities which are mentioned in the passage quoted above, viz. absence of sound, and the like. Hence it follows, that the pradhana is in the text neither spoken of as the object of knowledge nor denoted by the term avyakta, 6. And there is question and explanation relative to three things only (not to the pradhana). To the same conclusion we are led by the consideration of the circumstance that the Ka/^avallt-upanishad brings forward, as subjects of discussion, only three things, viz. the fire sacrifice, the individual soul, and the highest Self. These three things only Yama explains, bestowing thereby the boons he had granted, and to them only the questions of Na&ketas refer. Nothing else is mentioned or enquired 2 48 vedanta-s£tr as. about. The question relative to the fire sacrifice is con- tained in the passage (Ka. Up. I, i, 13), ' Thou knowest, O Death, the fire sacrifice which leads us to Heaven ; tell it to me, who am full of faith.5 The question as to the indi- vidual soul is contained in I, 1, 20, 'There is that doubt when a man is dead, some saying, he is ; others, he is not. This I should like to know, taught by thee ; this is the third of my boons.5 And the question about the highest Self is asked in the passage (I, 2, 14), 'That which thou seest as neither this nor that, as neither effect nor cause, as neither past nor future, tell me that.5 — The corresponding answers are given in I, 1, 15, 'Yama then told him that fire sacrifice, the beginning of all the worlds, and what bricks are required for the altar, and how many ; ' in the passage met with con- siderably later on (II, 5, 6; 7), 'Well then, O Gautama, I shall tell thee this mystery, the old Brahman and what happens to the Self after reaching death. Some enter the womb in order to have a body as organic beings, others go into inorganic matter according to their work and according to their knowledge ; 5 and in the passage (I, 2, 18), ' The knowing Self is not born nor does it die,' &c. ; which latter passage dilates at length on the highest Self. But there is no ques- tion relative to the pradhana, and hence no opportunity for any remarks on it. Here the Sankhya advances a new objection.
2' The knowing Self is not born nor does it die,' &c. ; which latter passage dilates at length on the highest Self. But there is no ques- tion relative to the pradhana, and hence no opportunity for any remarks on it. Here the Sankhya advances a new objection. Is, he asks, the question relative to the Self which is asked in the pas- sage, ' There is that doubt when a man is dead/ &c, again resumed in the passage, ' That which thou seest as neither this nor that,5 &c., or does the latter passage raise a distinct new question ? If the former, the two questions about the Self coalesce into one, and there are therefore altogether two questions only, one relative to the fire sacrifice, the other relative to the Self. In that case the Sutra has no right to speak of questions and explanations relating to three subjects. — If the latter, you do not consider it a mistake to assume a question in excess of the number of boons granted, and can therefore not object to us if we assume an explanation about the pradhana in excess of the number of questions asked. I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 6. 249 To this we make the following reply. — We by no means assume a question in excess of the number of boons granted, being prevented from doing so by the influence of the opening part of that syntactical whole which constitutes the Ka^avalli-upanishad. The Upanishad starts with the topic of the boons granted by Yama, and all the following part of the Upanishad — which is thrown into the form of a colloquy of Yama and Na^iketas — carries on that topic up to the very end. Yama grants to Na^iketas, who had been sent by his father, three boons. For his first boon Na&ketas chooses kindness on the part of his father towards him, for his second boon the knowledge of the fire sacrifice, for his third boon the knowledge of the Self. That the knowledge of the Self is the third boon appears from the indication contained in the passage (I, 1, 10), * There is that doubt — ; this is the third of my boons.' — If we therefore supposed that the passage, ' That which thou seest as neither this nor that/ &c, raises a new question, we should thereby assume a question in excess of the number of boons granted, and thus destroy the connexion of the entire Upanishad. — But — the Sankhyawill perhaps interpose — it must needs be admitted that the pas- sage last quoted does raise a new question, because the subject enquired about is a new one.
3of the number of boons granted, and thus destroy the connexion of the entire Upanishad. — But — the Sankhyawill perhaps interpose — it must needs be admitted that the pas- sage last quoted does raise a new question, because the subject enquired about is a new one. For the former question refers to the individual soul, as we conclude from the doubt ex- pressed in the words, ' There is that doubt when a man is dead — some saying, he is ; others, he is not.' Now this individual soul, as having definite attributes, &c, cannot constitute the object of a question expressed in such terms as, * This which thou seest as neither this nor that,' &c. ; the highest Self, on the other hand, may be enquired about in such terms, since it is above all attributes. The appearance of the two questions is, moreover, seen to differ ; for the former question refers to existence and non-existence, while the latter is concerned with an entity raised above all definite attributes, &c. Hence we conclude that the latter question, in which the former one cannot be recognised, is a separate question, and does not merely resume the subject of the former one. — All this argumentation is not valid, we reply, since we maintain the unitv of the highest Self and the 2 ;0 VEDANTA-StJTRAS. individual Self. If the individual Self were different from the highest Self, we should have to declare that the two questions are separate independent questions, but the two are not really different, as we know from other scrip- tural passages, such as ' Thou art that.' And in the Upani- shad under discussion also the answer to the question, ( That which thou seest as neither this nor that,' viz. the passage, ' The knowing Self is not born, it dies not ' — which answer is given in the form of a denial of the birth and death of the Self — clearly shows that the embodied Self and the highest Self are non-different. For there is room for a denial of something only when that something is possible, and the possibility of birth and death exists in the embodied Self only, since it is connected with the body, but not in the highest Self. — There is, moreover, another passage conveying the same meaning, viz. II, 4, 4, 'The wise when he knows that that by which he perceives all objects in sleep or in waking, is the great omnipresent Self, grieves no more.' This passage makes the cessation of all grief dependent on the knowledge of the individual Self, in so far as it possesses the qualities of greatness and omnipresence, and thereby declares that the individual Self is not different from the highest Self.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
No commentary for this page.