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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1Anumanasiddhasya £etanasya na pravrz'ttyajrayateti dar^ayitum evakara^. Katham anumanam ity apekshayazrc tatprakaraw sMayati kevaleti. Vailakshawyaw pra#a- dimattvam. An. Gi. II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 3. 369 to be the movers of chariots and other non-intelligent things. The motive power of intelligence is therefore incontrovertible. — But — an objection will be raised — your Self even if joined to a body is incapable of exercising mov- ing power, for motion cannot be effected by that the nature of which is pure intelligence. — A thing, we reply, which is itself devoid of motion may nevertheless move other things. The magnet is itself devoid of motion, and yet it moves iron ; and colours and the other objects of sense, although themselves devoid of motion, produce movements in the eyes and the other organs of sense. So the Lord also who is all-present, the Self of all, all -knowing and all-powerful may, although himself unmoving, move the universe. — If it finally be objected that (on the Vedanta doctrine) there is no room for a moving power as in consequence of the oneness (aduality) of Brahman no motion can take place ; we reply that such objections have repeatedly been refuted by our pointing to the fact of the Lord being fictitiously connected with Maya, which consists of name and form presented by Nescience. — Hence motion can be reconciled with the doctrine of an all-knowing first cause ; but not with the doctrine of a non-intelligent first cause. 3. If it be said (that the pradhana moves) like milk or water, (we reply that) there also (the motion is due to intelligence). Well, the Sankhya resumes, listen then to the following instances. — As non-sentient milk flows forth from its own nature merely for the nourishment of the young animal, and as non-sentient water, from its own nature, flows along for the benefit of mankind ; so the pradhana also, although non- intelligent, may be supposed to move from its own nature merely for the purpose of effecting the highest end of man. This argumentation, we reply, is unsound again ; for as the adherents of both doctrines admit that motion is not observed in the case of merely non-intelligent things such as chariots, &c, we infer that water and milk also move only because they are directed by intelligent powers. Scriptural passages, moreover (such as ' He who dwells in [34] B b 3 yO VEDANTA-StjTRAS. the water and within the water, who rules the water within,' Bri. Up. Ill, 7, 4 ; and, ' By the command of that Akshara, O Gargi, some rivers flow to the East,' &c, Bri. Up.
2passages, moreover (such as ' He who dwells in [34] B b 3 yO VEDANTA-StjTRAS. the water and within the water, who rules the water within,' Bri. Up. Ill, 7, 4 ; and, ' By the command of that Akshara, O Gargi, some rivers flow to the East,' &c, Bri. Up. Ill, 8, 9), declare that everything in this world which flows is directed by the Lord. Hence the instances of milk and water as belonging themselves to that class of cases which prove our general principle l cannot be used to show that the latter is too wide. — Moreover, the cow, which is an intelligent being and loves her calf, makes her milk flow by her wish to do so, and the milk is in addition drawn forth by the sucking of the calf. Nor does water move either with absolute independence — for its flow depends on the declivity of the soil and similar circumstances — or independently of an intelligent principle, for we have shown that the latter is present in all cases. — If, finally, our opponent should point to Sutra II, 1, 34 as contradicting the present Sutra, we remark that there we have merely shown on the ground of ordinary experience that an effect may take place in itself independently of any external instrumental cause ; a con- clusion which does not contradict the doctrine, based on Scripture, that all effects depend on the Lord. 4. And because (the pradhana), on account of there existing nothing beyond it, stands in no rela- tion ; (it cannot be active.) The three gu/zas of the Sahkhyas when in a state of equi- poise form the pradhana. Beyond the pradMna there exists no external principle which could either impel the pradhana to activity or restrain it from activity. The soul (purusha), as we know, is indifferent, neither moves to — nor restrains from — action. As therefore the pradhana stands in no relation, it is impossible to see why it should sometimes modify itself into the great principle (mahat) and sometimes not. The activity and non-activity (by turns) of the Lord, 1 Viz. that whatever moves or acts does so under the influence of intelligence. — Sadhyapakshanikshiptatva^ sadhyavati pakshe pravish/atvam eva tak ka sapakshanikshiptatvasyapy upalaksha«am, anupanyaso na vyabhi^arabhumir ity artha^. An. Gi. IT ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 5. 37 1 on the other hand, are not contrary to reason, on account of his omniscience and omnipotence, and his being con- nected with the power of illusion (maya). 5. Nor (can it be said that the pradhana modifies itself spontaneously) like grass, &c. (which turn into milk) ; for (milk) does not exist elsewhere (but in the female animal).
3science and omnipotence, and his being con- nected with the power of illusion (maya). 5. Nor (can it be said that the pradhana modifies itself spontaneously) like grass, &c. (which turn into milk) ; for (milk) does not exist elsewhere (but in the female animal). Let this be (the Saiikhya resumes). Just as grass, herbs, water, &c. independently of any other instrumental cause transform themselves, by their own nature, into milk ; so, we assume, the pradhana also transforms itself into the great principle, and so on. And, if you ask how we know that grass transforms itself independently of any instru- mental cause ; we reply, ' Because no such cause is ob- served.' For if we did perceive some such cause, we certainly should apply it to grass, &c. according to our liking, and thereby produce milk. But as a matter of fact we do no such thing. Hence the transformation of grass and the like must be considered to be due to its own nature merely ; and we may infer therefrom that the transformation of the pradhana is of the same kind. To this we make the following reply. — The transformation of the pradhana might be ascribed to its own nature merely if we really could admit that grass modifies itself in the manner stated by you ; but we are unable to admit that, since another instrumental cause is observed. How ? ' Because it does not exist elsewhere.' For grass becomes milk only when it is eaten by a cow or some other female animal, not if it is left either uneaten or is eaten by a bull. If the transformation had no special cause, grass would become milk even on other conditions than that of entering a cow's body. Nor would the circumstance of men not being able to produce milk according to their liking prove that there is no instrumental cause ; for while some effects can be produced by men, others result from divine action only1. The fact, however, is that men aho are able, by 1 It might be held that for the transformation of grass into milk no other cause is required than the digestive heat of the cow's B b 2 372 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. applying a means in their power, to produce milk from grass and herbs ; for when they wish to procure a more abundant supply of milk they feed the cow more plentifully and thus obtain more milk from her. — For these reasons the spontaneous modification of the pradhana cannot be proved from the instance of grass and the like. 6. Even if we admit (the Sankhya position refuted in what precedes, it is invalidated by other ob- jections) on account of the absence of a purpose (on the part of the pradhana).
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1Anumanasiddhasya £etanasya na pravrz'ttyajrayateti dar^ayitum evakara^. Katham anumanam ity apekshayazrc tatprakaraw sMayati kevaleti. Vailakshawyaw pra#a- dimattvam. An. Gi. II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 3. 369 to be the movers of chariots and other non-intelligent things. The motive power of intelligence is therefore incontrovertible. — But — an objection will be raised — your Self even if joined to a body is incapable of exercising mov- ing power, for motion cannot be effected by that the nature of which is pure intelligence. — A thing, we reply, which is itself devoid of motion may nevertheless move other things. The magnet is itself devoid of motion, and yet it moves iron ; and colours and the other objects of sense, although themselves devoid of motion, produce movements in the eyes and the other organs of sense. So the Lord also who is all-present, the Self of all, all -knowing and all-powerful may, although himself unmoving, move the universe. — If it finally be objected that (on the Vedanta doctrine) there is no room for a moving power as in consequence of the oneness (aduality) of Brahman no motion can take place ; we reply that such objections have repeatedly been refuted by our pointing to the fact of the Lord being fictitiously connected with Maya, which consists of name and form presented by Nescience. — Hence motion can be reconciled with the doctrine of an all-knowing first cause ; but not with the doctrine of a non-intelligent first cause. 3. If it be said (that the pradhana moves) like milk or water, (we reply that) there also (the motion is due to intelligence). Well, the Sankhya resumes, listen then to the following instances. — As non-sentient milk flows forth from its own nature merely for the nourishment of the young animal, and as non-sentient water, from its own nature, flows along for the benefit of mankind ; so the pradhana also, although non- intelligent, may be supposed to move from its own nature merely for the purpose of effecting the highest end of man. This argumentation, we reply, is unsound again ; for as the adherents of both doctrines admit that motion is not observed in the case of merely non-intelligent things such as chariots, &c, we infer that water and milk also move only because they are directed by intelligent powers. Scriptural passages, moreover (such as ' He who dwells in [34] B b 3 yO VEDANTA-StjTRAS. the water and within the water, who rules the water within,' Bri. Up. Ill, 7, 4 ; and, ' By the command of that Akshara, O Gargi, some rivers flow to the East,' &c, Bri. Up.
2passages, moreover (such as ' He who dwells in [34] B b 3 yO VEDANTA-StjTRAS. the water and within the water, who rules the water within,' Bri. Up. Ill, 7, 4 ; and, ' By the command of that Akshara, O Gargi, some rivers flow to the East,' &c, Bri. Up. Ill, 8, 9), declare that everything in this world which flows is directed by the Lord. Hence the instances of milk and water as belonging themselves to that class of cases which prove our general principle l cannot be used to show that the latter is too wide. — Moreover, the cow, which is an intelligent being and loves her calf, makes her milk flow by her wish to do so, and the milk is in addition drawn forth by the sucking of the calf. Nor does water move either with absolute independence — for its flow depends on the declivity of the soil and similar circumstances — or independently of an intelligent principle, for we have shown that the latter is present in all cases. — If, finally, our opponent should point to Sutra II, 1, 34 as contradicting the present Sutra, we remark that there we have merely shown on the ground of ordinary experience that an effect may take place in itself independently of any external instrumental cause ; a con- clusion which does not contradict the doctrine, based on Scripture, that all effects depend on the Lord. 4. And because (the pradhana), on account of there existing nothing beyond it, stands in no rela- tion ; (it cannot be active.) The three gu/zas of the Sahkhyas when in a state of equi- poise form the pradhana. Beyond the pradMna there exists no external principle which could either impel the pradhana to activity or restrain it from activity. The soul (purusha), as we know, is indifferent, neither moves to — nor restrains from — action. As therefore the pradhana stands in no relation, it is impossible to see why it should sometimes modify itself into the great principle (mahat) and sometimes not. The activity and non-activity (by turns) of the Lord, 1 Viz. that whatever moves or acts does so under the influence of intelligence. — Sadhyapakshanikshiptatva^ sadhyavati pakshe pravish/atvam eva tak ka sapakshanikshiptatvasyapy upalaksha«am, anupanyaso na vyabhi^arabhumir ity artha^. An. Gi. IT ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 5. 37 1 on the other hand, are not contrary to reason, on account of his omniscience and omnipotence, and his being con- nected with the power of illusion (maya). 5. Nor (can it be said that the pradhana modifies itself spontaneously) like grass, &c. (which turn into milk) ; for (milk) does not exist elsewhere (but in the female animal).
3science and omnipotence, and his being con- nected with the power of illusion (maya). 5. Nor (can it be said that the pradhana modifies itself spontaneously) like grass, &c. (which turn into milk) ; for (milk) does not exist elsewhere (but in the female animal). Let this be (the Saiikhya resumes). Just as grass, herbs, water, &c. independently of any other instrumental cause transform themselves, by their own nature, into milk ; so, we assume, the pradhana also transforms itself into the great principle, and so on. And, if you ask how we know that grass transforms itself independently of any instru- mental cause ; we reply, ' Because no such cause is ob- served.' For if we did perceive some such cause, we certainly should apply it to grass, &c. according to our liking, and thereby produce milk. But as a matter of fact we do no such thing. Hence the transformation of grass and the like must be considered to be due to its own nature merely ; and we may infer therefrom that the transformation of the pradhana is of the same kind. To this we make the following reply. — The transformation of the pradhana might be ascribed to its own nature merely if we really could admit that grass modifies itself in the manner stated by you ; but we are unable to admit that, since another instrumental cause is observed. How ? ' Because it does not exist elsewhere.' For grass becomes milk only when it is eaten by a cow or some other female animal, not if it is left either uneaten or is eaten by a bull. If the transformation had no special cause, grass would become milk even on other conditions than that of entering a cow's body. Nor would the circumstance of men not being able to produce milk according to their liking prove that there is no instrumental cause ; for while some effects can be produced by men, others result from divine action only1. The fact, however, is that men aho are able, by 1 It might be held that for the transformation of grass into milk no other cause is required than the digestive heat of the cow's B b 2 372 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. applying a means in their power, to produce milk from grass and herbs ; for when they wish to procure a more abundant supply of milk they feed the cow more plentifully and thus obtain more milk from her. — For these reasons the spontaneous modification of the pradhana cannot be proved from the instance of grass and the like. 6. Even if we admit (the Sankhya position refuted in what precedes, it is invalidated by other ob- jections) on account of the absence of a purpose (on the part of the pradhana).
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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