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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1ength and shortness are explained 2 '). — Nor, again, can it be said that plurality, &c. inherent in the cause originate (like effects) in consequence of some peculiar proximity (in which they are supposed to stand to the effected substance), while sphericity, &c. (not standing in a like proximity) do not ; for when a new substance or a new quality is origin- 1 I. e. forms of extension different from sphericity, &c. 2 The first of the three Sutras quoted comprises, in the present text of the Vai^eshika-sutras, only the following words, ' Kdra^abahutva^ ka,;' the ka of the Sutra implying, according to the commentators, mahattva and pra^aya. — According to the VaLreshikas the form of extension called ami, minute, has for its cause the dvitva inherent in the material causes, i.e. the two atoms from which the minute binary atomic compound originates. — The form of extension called mahat, big, has different causes, among them bahutva, i.e. the plurality residing in the material causes of the resulting 'big' thing ; the cause of the mahattva of a ternary atomic compound, for instance, is the tritva inherent in the three constituent atoms. In other cases mahattva is due to antecedent mahattva, in others to pra^aya, i.e. accumulation. See the Upask&ra on Vai^. Sut. VII, 1, 9; 10. II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, II. 385 ated, all the qualities of the cause stand in the same rela- tion of inherence to their abode (i.e. the causal substance in which they inhere). For these reasons the fact of sphericity, &c. not originating like effects can be explained from the essential nature of sphericity, &c. only, and the same may therefore be maintained with regard to intelli- gence 1. Moreover, from that observed fact also, that from conjunction (sawyoga) there originate substances, &c. be- longing to a class different (from that to which conjunction itself belongs), it follows that the doctrine of effects belong- ing to the same class as the causes from which they spring is too wide. If you remark against this last argument that, as we have to do at present with a substance (viz. Brah- man), it is inappropriate to instance a quality (viz. con- junction) as a parallel case ; we point out that at present we only wish to explain the origination of effects belonging to a different class in general. Nor is there any reason for the restriction that substances only are to be adduced as examples for substances, and qualities only for qualities. Your own Sutrakara adduces a quality as furnishing a parallel case for a substance (VaLr. Sut.
2ent class in general. Nor is there any reason for the restriction that substances only are to be adduced as examples for substances, and qualities only for qualities. Your own Sutrakara adduces a quality as furnishing a parallel case for a substance (VaLr. Sut. IV, 2, 2, ' On account of the conjunction of things perceptible and things imperceptible being imperceptible the body is not com- posed of five elements '). Just as the conjunction which inheres in the perceptible earth and the imperceptible ether is not perceptible, the body also, if it had for its inherent cause the five elements which are part of them perceptible, part of them imperceptible, would itself be imperceptible ; but, as a matter of fact, it is perceptible ; hence it is not composed of the five elements. Here conjunction is a quality and the body a substance. — The origin of effects different in nature (from the cause) has, moreover, been already treated of under II, 1, 6. — Well then, this being so, the matter has been settled there already (why then is it again discussed here?) — Because, we reply, there we argued 1 I.e. if the Vaijeshikas have to admit that it is the nature of sphericity, &c. not to produce like effects, the Vedantin also may maintain that Brahman produces an unlike effect, viz. the non- intelligent world. [34] c c 386 vedanta-sAtras. against the Sankhya, and at present we have to do with the Vafceshika. — But, already once before (II, i, 3) a line of argument equally applicable to a second case was simply declared to extend to the latter also ; (why then do you not simply state now that the arguments used to defeat the Sankhya are equally valid against the Vaueshika ?) — Because here, we reply, at the beginning of the examina- tion of the Vai^eshika system we prefer to discuss the point with arguments specially adapted to the doctrine of the Vaireshikas. 12. In both cases also (in the cases of the adrzsh/a inhering either in the atoms or the soul) action (of the atoms) is not (possible) ; hence absence of that (viz. creation and pralaya). The Sutrakara now proceeds to refute the doctrine of atoms being the cause of the world. — This doctrine arises in the following manner. We see that all ordinary sub- stances which consist of parts as, for instance, pieces of cloth originate from the substances connected with them by the relation of inherence, as for instance threads, conjunc- tion co-operating (with the parts to form the whole).
3We see that all ordinary sub- stances which consist of parts as, for instance, pieces of cloth originate from the substances connected with them by the relation of inherence, as for instance threads, conjunc- tion co-operating (with the parts to form the whole). We thence draw the general conclusion that whatever consists of parts has originated from those substances with which it is connected by the relation of inherence, conjunction co- operating. That thing now at which the distinction of whole and parts stops and which marks the limit of division into minuter parts is the atom. — This whole world, with its mountains, oceans, and so on, is composed of parts ; because it is composed of parts it has a beginning and an end 1 ; an effect may not be assumed without a cause ; therefore the atoms are the cause of the world. Such is Ka/zada's doctrine. — As we observe four elementary substances con- sisting of parts, viz. earth, water, fire, and air (wind), we have to assume four different kinds of atoms. These atoms marking the limit of subdivision into minuter parts can- 1 Like other things, let us say a piece of cloth, which consists of parts. II ADHYAYA, 2 PAD A, 12. 387 not be divided themselves ; hence when the elements are destroyed they can be divided down to atoms only ; this state of atomic division of the elements constitutes the pralaya (the periodical destruction of the world). After that when the time for creation comes, motion (karman) springs up in the aerial atoms. This motion which is due to the unseen principle 1 joins the atom in which it resides to another atom ; thus binary compounds, &c. are produced, and finally the element of air. In a like manner are pro- duced fire, water, earth, the body with its organs. Thus the whole world originates from atoms. From the qualities inhering in the atoms the qualities belonging to the binary compounds are produced, just as the qualities of the cloth result from the qualities of the threads. — Such, in short, is the teaching of the followers of Ka;zada. This doctrine we controvert in the following manner. — It must be admitted that the atoms when they are in a state of isolation require action (motion) to bring about their conjunction ; for we observe that the conjunction of threads and the like is effected by action. Action again, which is itself an effect, requires some operative cause by which it is brought about ; for unless some such cause exists, no original motion can take place in the atoms.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1ength and shortness are explained 2 '). — Nor, again, can it be said that plurality, &c. inherent in the cause originate (like effects) in consequence of some peculiar proximity (in which they are supposed to stand to the effected substance), while sphericity, &c. (not standing in a like proximity) do not ; for when a new substance or a new quality is origin- 1 I. e. forms of extension different from sphericity, &c. 2 The first of the three Sutras quoted comprises, in the present text of the Vai^eshika-sutras, only the following words, ' Kdra^abahutva^ ka,;' the ka of the Sutra implying, according to the commentators, mahattva and pra^aya. — According to the VaLreshikas the form of extension called ami, minute, has for its cause the dvitva inherent in the material causes, i.e. the two atoms from which the minute binary atomic compound originates. — The form of extension called mahat, big, has different causes, among them bahutva, i.e. the plurality residing in the material causes of the resulting 'big' thing ; the cause of the mahattva of a ternary atomic compound, for instance, is the tritva inherent in the three constituent atoms. In other cases mahattva is due to antecedent mahattva, in others to pra^aya, i.e. accumulation. See the Upask&ra on Vai^. Sut. VII, 1, 9; 10. II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, II. 385 ated, all the qualities of the cause stand in the same rela- tion of inherence to their abode (i.e. the causal substance in which they inhere). For these reasons the fact of sphericity, &c. not originating like effects can be explained from the essential nature of sphericity, &c. only, and the same may therefore be maintained with regard to intelli- gence 1. Moreover, from that observed fact also, that from conjunction (sawyoga) there originate substances, &c. be- longing to a class different (from that to which conjunction itself belongs), it follows that the doctrine of effects belong- ing to the same class as the causes from which they spring is too wide. If you remark against this last argument that, as we have to do at present with a substance (viz. Brah- man), it is inappropriate to instance a quality (viz. con- junction) as a parallel case ; we point out that at present we only wish to explain the origination of effects belonging to a different class in general. Nor is there any reason for the restriction that substances only are to be adduced as examples for substances, and qualities only for qualities. Your own Sutrakara adduces a quality as furnishing a parallel case for a substance (VaLr. Sut.
2ent class in general. Nor is there any reason for the restriction that substances only are to be adduced as examples for substances, and qualities only for qualities. Your own Sutrakara adduces a quality as furnishing a parallel case for a substance (VaLr. Sut. IV, 2, 2, ' On account of the conjunction of things perceptible and things imperceptible being imperceptible the body is not com- posed of five elements '). Just as the conjunction which inheres in the perceptible earth and the imperceptible ether is not perceptible, the body also, if it had for its inherent cause the five elements which are part of them perceptible, part of them imperceptible, would itself be imperceptible ; but, as a matter of fact, it is perceptible ; hence it is not composed of the five elements. Here conjunction is a quality and the body a substance. — The origin of effects different in nature (from the cause) has, moreover, been already treated of under II, 1, 6. — Well then, this being so, the matter has been settled there already (why then is it again discussed here?) — Because, we reply, there we argued 1 I.e. if the Vaijeshikas have to admit that it is the nature of sphericity, &c. not to produce like effects, the Vedantin also may maintain that Brahman produces an unlike effect, viz. the non- intelligent world. [34] c c 386 vedanta-sAtras. against the Sankhya, and at present we have to do with the Vafceshika. — But, already once before (II, i, 3) a line of argument equally applicable to a second case was simply declared to extend to the latter also ; (why then do you not simply state now that the arguments used to defeat the Sankhya are equally valid against the Vaueshika ?) — Because here, we reply, at the beginning of the examina- tion of the Vai^eshika system we prefer to discuss the point with arguments specially adapted to the doctrine of the Vaireshikas. 12. In both cases also (in the cases of the adrzsh/a inhering either in the atoms or the soul) action (of the atoms) is not (possible) ; hence absence of that (viz. creation and pralaya). The Sutrakara now proceeds to refute the doctrine of atoms being the cause of the world. — This doctrine arises in the following manner. We see that all ordinary sub- stances which consist of parts as, for instance, pieces of cloth originate from the substances connected with them by the relation of inherence, as for instance threads, conjunc- tion co-operating (with the parts to form the whole).
3We see that all ordinary sub- stances which consist of parts as, for instance, pieces of cloth originate from the substances connected with them by the relation of inherence, as for instance threads, conjunc- tion co-operating (with the parts to form the whole). We thence draw the general conclusion that whatever consists of parts has originated from those substances with which it is connected by the relation of inherence, conjunction co- operating. That thing now at which the distinction of whole and parts stops and which marks the limit of division into minuter parts is the atom. — This whole world, with its mountains, oceans, and so on, is composed of parts ; because it is composed of parts it has a beginning and an end 1 ; an effect may not be assumed without a cause ; therefore the atoms are the cause of the world. Such is Ka/zada's doctrine. — As we observe four elementary substances con- sisting of parts, viz. earth, water, fire, and air (wind), we have to assume four different kinds of atoms. These atoms marking the limit of subdivision into minuter parts can- 1 Like other things, let us say a piece of cloth, which consists of parts. II ADHYAYA, 2 PAD A, 12. 387 not be divided themselves ; hence when the elements are destroyed they can be divided down to atoms only ; this state of atomic division of the elements constitutes the pralaya (the periodical destruction of the world). After that when the time for creation comes, motion (karman) springs up in the aerial atoms. This motion which is due to the unseen principle 1 joins the atom in which it resides to another atom ; thus binary compounds, &c. are produced, and finally the element of air. In a like manner are pro- duced fire, water, earth, the body with its organs. Thus the whole world originates from atoms. From the qualities inhering in the atoms the qualities belonging to the binary compounds are produced, just as the qualities of the cloth result from the qualities of the threads. — Such, in short, is the teaching of the followers of Ka;zada. This doctrine we controvert in the following manner. — It must be admitted that the atoms when they are in a state of isolation require action (motion) to bring about their conjunction ; for we observe that the conjunction of threads and the like is effected by action. Action again, which is itself an effect, requires some operative cause by which it is brought about ; for unless some such cause exists, no original motion can take place in the atoms.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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