Fetching
One moment.
Fetching
One moment.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1and does not thereby reach the highest aim of man although desirous of attaining it ; such D 2 36 vedAnta-s6tras. texts as the one quoted divert him from the objects of natural activity and turn the stream of his thoughts on the inward (the highest) Self. That for him who is engaged in the enquiry into the Self, the true nature of the Self is nothing either to be endeavoured after or to be avoided, we learn from texts such as the following: 'This every- thing, all is that Self ' (Br/. Up. II, 4, 6) ; ' But when the Self only is all this, how should he see another, how should he know another, how should he know the knower?' (Bn. Up. IV, 5, 15) ; ' This Self is Brahman ' (Brl Up. II* 5> J9)» That the knowledge of Brahman refers to something which is not a thing to be done, and therefore is not concerned either with the pursuit or the avoidance of any object, is the very thing we admit ; for just that constitutes our glory, that as soon as we comprehend Brahman, all our duties come to an end and all our work is over. Thus vSruti says, ' If a man understands the Self, saying, " I am he," what could he wish or desire that he should pine after the body?' (Br/. Up. IV, 4, 13.) And similarly Smrzti declares, ' Having understood this the understanding man has done with all work, O Bharata ' (Bha. Gita XV, 20). Therefore Brahman is not represented as the object of injunctions. We now proceed to consider the doctrine of those who maintain that there is no part of the Veda which has the purport of making statements about mere existent things, and is not either an injunction or a prohibition, or supple* mentary to either. This opinion is erroneous, because the soul (purusha), which is the subject of the Upanishads, does not constitute a complement to anything else. Of that soul which is to be comprehended from the Upanishads only, which is non-transmigratory, Brahman, different in nature from the four classes of substances1, which forms a topic of its own and is not a complement to anything else ; of that 1 Viz. things to be originated (for instance, gha/azrc karoti), things to be obtained (gramas ga&£//ati), things to be modified (suvanzazra kundalam karoti), and things to be ceremonially purified (vrihin prokshati). I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. 37 soul it is impossible to say that it is not or is not apprehended ; for the passage, ' That Self is to be described by No, no ! ' (Br/. Up. Ill, 9, 26) designates it as the Self, and that the Self is cannot be denied.
2ati). I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. 37 soul it is impossible to say that it is not or is not apprehended ; for the passage, ' That Self is to be described by No, no ! ' (Br/. Up. Ill, 9, 26) designates it as the Self, and that the Self is cannot be denied. The possible objection that there is no reason to maintain that the soul is known from the Upanishads only, since it is the object of self-conscious- ness, is refuted by the fact that the soul of which the Upanishads treat is merely the witness of that (i. e. of the object of self-consciousness, viz. the ^ivatman). For neither from that part of the Veda which enjoins works nor from reasoning, anybody apprehends that soul which, different from the agent that is the object of self-consciousness, merely witnesses it ; which is permanent in all (transitory) beings; uniform; one; eternally unchanging; the Self of everything. Hence it can neither be denied nor be repre- sented as the mere complement of injunctions ; for of that very person who might deny it it is the Self. And as it is the Self of all, it can neither be striven after nor avoided. All perishable things indeed perish, because they are mere modifications, up to (i. e. exclusive of) the soul. But the soul is imperishable 1, as there is no cause why it should perish ; and eternally unchanging, as there is no cause for its undergoing any modification ; hence it is in its essence eternally pure and free. And from passages, such as * Beyond the soul there is nothing ; this is the goal, the highest road ' (Ka. Up. I, 3, 11), and 'That soul, taught in the Upanishads, I ask thee' (Bri. Up. Ill, 9, 36), it appears that the attribute of resting on the Upanishads is properly given to the soul, as it constitutes their chief topic. To say, therefore, that there is no portion of the Veda referring to existing things, is a mere bold assertion. With regard to the quotations made of the views of men acquainted with the purport of the Sastra (who alone were stated to have declared that the Veda treats of actions) it is to be understood that they, having to do with the enquiry into duty, refer to that part of the Sastra which consists of 1 Whence it follows that it is not something to be avoided like transitory things. 3 8 VEDANTA-SU TR AS. injunctions and prohibitions.
3to be understood that they, having to do with the enquiry into duty, refer to that part of the Sastra which consists of 1 Whence it follows that it is not something to be avoided like transitory things. 3 8 VEDANTA-SU TR AS. injunctions and prohibitions. With regard to the other passage quoted (' as action is the purport of the Veda, what- ever does not refer to action is purportless ') we remark that if that passage were taken in an absolutely strict sense (when it would mean that only those words which denote action have a meaning), it would follow that all information about existent things is meaningless1. If, on the other hand, the Veda — in addition to the injunctions of activity and cessation of activity — does give information about existent things as being subservient to some action to be accom- plished, why then should it not give information also about the existent eternally unchangeable Self? For an existent thing, about which information is given, does not become an act (through being stated to be subservient to an act). — But, it will be said, although existent things are not acts, yet, as they are instrumental to action, the information given about such things is merely subservient to action. — This, we reply, does not matter; for although the information may be subservient to action, the things themselves about which information is given are already intimated thereby as things which have the power of bringing about certain actions. Their final end (prayo^ana) indeed may be sub- serviency to some action, but thereby they do not cease to be, in the information given about them, intimated in themselves. — Well, and if they are thus intimated, what is gained thereby for your purpose2? We reply that the information about the Self, which is an existing thing not comprehended from other sources, is of the same nature (as the information about other existent things); for by the comprehension of the Self a stop is put to all false knowledge, which is the cause of transmigration, and thus a 1 That, for instance, in the passage ' he is to sacrifice with Soma/ the word ' soma/ which does not denote an action, is devoid of sense. 2 I.e. for the purpose of showing that the passages conveying in- formation about Brahman as such are justified. You have (the objector maintains) proved hitherto only that passages containing information about existent things are admissible, if those things have a purpose; but how does all this apply to the information about Brahman of which no purpose has been established ? I ABHYAYA, I PAD A, 4.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1and does not thereby reach the highest aim of man although desirous of attaining it ; such D 2 36 vedAnta-s6tras. texts as the one quoted divert him from the objects of natural activity and turn the stream of his thoughts on the inward (the highest) Self. That for him who is engaged in the enquiry into the Self, the true nature of the Self is nothing either to be endeavoured after or to be avoided, we learn from texts such as the following: 'This every- thing, all is that Self ' (Br/. Up. II, 4, 6) ; ' But when the Self only is all this, how should he see another, how should he know another, how should he know the knower?' (Bn. Up. IV, 5, 15) ; ' This Self is Brahman ' (Brl Up. II* 5> J9)» That the knowledge of Brahman refers to something which is not a thing to be done, and therefore is not concerned either with the pursuit or the avoidance of any object, is the very thing we admit ; for just that constitutes our glory, that as soon as we comprehend Brahman, all our duties come to an end and all our work is over. Thus vSruti says, ' If a man understands the Self, saying, " I am he," what could he wish or desire that he should pine after the body?' (Br/. Up. IV, 4, 13.) And similarly Smrzti declares, ' Having understood this the understanding man has done with all work, O Bharata ' (Bha. Gita XV, 20). Therefore Brahman is not represented as the object of injunctions. We now proceed to consider the doctrine of those who maintain that there is no part of the Veda which has the purport of making statements about mere existent things, and is not either an injunction or a prohibition, or supple* mentary to either. This opinion is erroneous, because the soul (purusha), which is the subject of the Upanishads, does not constitute a complement to anything else. Of that soul which is to be comprehended from the Upanishads only, which is non-transmigratory, Brahman, different in nature from the four classes of substances1, which forms a topic of its own and is not a complement to anything else ; of that 1 Viz. things to be originated (for instance, gha/azrc karoti), things to be obtained (gramas ga&£//ati), things to be modified (suvanzazra kundalam karoti), and things to be ceremonially purified (vrihin prokshati). I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. 37 soul it is impossible to say that it is not or is not apprehended ; for the passage, ' That Self is to be described by No, no ! ' (Br/. Up. Ill, 9, 26) designates it as the Self, and that the Self is cannot be denied.
2ati). I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. 37 soul it is impossible to say that it is not or is not apprehended ; for the passage, ' That Self is to be described by No, no ! ' (Br/. Up. Ill, 9, 26) designates it as the Self, and that the Self is cannot be denied. The possible objection that there is no reason to maintain that the soul is known from the Upanishads only, since it is the object of self-conscious- ness, is refuted by the fact that the soul of which the Upanishads treat is merely the witness of that (i. e. of the object of self-consciousness, viz. the ^ivatman). For neither from that part of the Veda which enjoins works nor from reasoning, anybody apprehends that soul which, different from the agent that is the object of self-consciousness, merely witnesses it ; which is permanent in all (transitory) beings; uniform; one; eternally unchanging; the Self of everything. Hence it can neither be denied nor be repre- sented as the mere complement of injunctions ; for of that very person who might deny it it is the Self. And as it is the Self of all, it can neither be striven after nor avoided. All perishable things indeed perish, because they are mere modifications, up to (i. e. exclusive of) the soul. But the soul is imperishable 1, as there is no cause why it should perish ; and eternally unchanging, as there is no cause for its undergoing any modification ; hence it is in its essence eternally pure and free. And from passages, such as * Beyond the soul there is nothing ; this is the goal, the highest road ' (Ka. Up. I, 3, 11), and 'That soul, taught in the Upanishads, I ask thee' (Bri. Up. Ill, 9, 36), it appears that the attribute of resting on the Upanishads is properly given to the soul, as it constitutes their chief topic. To say, therefore, that there is no portion of the Veda referring to existing things, is a mere bold assertion. With regard to the quotations made of the views of men acquainted with the purport of the Sastra (who alone were stated to have declared that the Veda treats of actions) it is to be understood that they, having to do with the enquiry into duty, refer to that part of the Sastra which consists of 1 Whence it follows that it is not something to be avoided like transitory things. 3 8 VEDANTA-SU TR AS. injunctions and prohibitions.
3to be understood that they, having to do with the enquiry into duty, refer to that part of the Sastra which consists of 1 Whence it follows that it is not something to be avoided like transitory things. 3 8 VEDANTA-SU TR AS. injunctions and prohibitions. With regard to the other passage quoted (' as action is the purport of the Veda, what- ever does not refer to action is purportless ') we remark that if that passage were taken in an absolutely strict sense (when it would mean that only those words which denote action have a meaning), it would follow that all information about existent things is meaningless1. If, on the other hand, the Veda — in addition to the injunctions of activity and cessation of activity — does give information about existent things as being subservient to some action to be accom- plished, why then should it not give information also about the existent eternally unchangeable Self? For an existent thing, about which information is given, does not become an act (through being stated to be subservient to an act). — But, it will be said, although existent things are not acts, yet, as they are instrumental to action, the information given about such things is merely subservient to action. — This, we reply, does not matter; for although the information may be subservient to action, the things themselves about which information is given are already intimated thereby as things which have the power of bringing about certain actions. Their final end (prayo^ana) indeed may be sub- serviency to some action, but thereby they do not cease to be, in the information given about them, intimated in themselves. — Well, and if they are thus intimated, what is gained thereby for your purpose2? We reply that the information about the Self, which is an existing thing not comprehended from other sources, is of the same nature (as the information about other existent things); for by the comprehension of the Self a stop is put to all false knowledge, which is the cause of transmigration, and thus a 1 That, for instance, in the passage ' he is to sacrifice with Soma/ the word ' soma/ which does not denote an action, is devoid of sense. 2 I.e. for the purpose of showing that the passages conveying in- formation about Brahman as such are justified. You have (the objector maintains) proved hitherto only that passages containing information about existent things are admissible, if those things have a purpose; but how does all this apply to the information about Brahman of which no purpose has been established ? I ABHYAYA, I PAD A, 4.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
No commentary for this page.