Fetching
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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1ence of the effect previously to its origination. — Your objection is refuted, we reply, by the consideration that the endeavour of the causal agent may be looked upon as having a purpose in so far as it arranges the causal substance in the form of the effect. That, however, even the form of the effect (is not something previously non-existing, but) belongs to the Self of the cause already because what is devoid of Selfhood cannot be begun at all, we have already shown above. — Nor does a substance become another substance merely by appearing under a different aspect. Devadatta may at one time be seen with his arms and legs closely drawn up to his body, and another time with his arms and legs stretched out, and yet he remains the same substantial being, for he is recognised as such. Thus the persons also by whom we are surrounded, such as fathers, mothers, brothers, &c, remain the same, although we see them in continually changing states and attitudes; for they are always recognised as fathers, mothers, brothers, and so on. If our opponent objects to this last illustrative example on the ground that fathers, mothers, and so on remain the same substantial beings, because the different states in which they appear are not separated from each other by birth or death, while the effect, for instance a jar, appears only after Z 2 340 vedanta-s6tras. the cause, for instance the clay, has undergone destruction as it were (so that the effect may be looked upon as some- thing altogether different from the cause); we rebut this objection by remarking that causal substances also such as milk, for instance, are perceived to exist even after they have entered into the condition of effects such as curds and the like (so that we have no right to say that the cause undergoes destruction). And even in those cases where the continued existence of the cause is not perceived, as, for instance, in the case of seeds of the fig-tree from which there spring sprouts and trees, the term ' birth ' (when applied to the sprout) only means that the causal substance, viz. the seed, becomes visible by becoming a sprout through the continual accretion of similar particles of matter; and the term 'death' only means that, through the secession of those particles, the cause again passes beyond the sphere of visibility.
2l substance, viz. the seed, becomes visible by becoming a sprout through the continual accretion of similar particles of matter; and the term 'death' only means that, through the secession of those particles, the cause again passes beyond the sphere of visibility. Nor can it be said that from such separation by birth and death as described just now it follows that the non-existing becomes existing, and the existing non- existing ; for if that were so, it would also follow that the unborn child in the mother's womb and the new-born babe stretched out on the bed are altogether different beings. It would further follow that a man is not the same person in childhood, manhood, and old age, and that terms such as father and the like are illegitimately used. — The preceding arguments may also be used to refute the (Bauddha doctrine) of all existence being momentary only l. The doctrine that the effect is non-existent previously to its actual origination, moreover, leads to the conclusion that the activity of the causal agent has no object ; for what does not exist cannot possibly be an object ; not any more than the ether can be cleft by swords 'and other weapons for striking or cutting. The object can certainly not be the inherent cause ; for that would lead to the erroneous con- clusion that from the activity of the causal agent, which has for its object the inherent cause, there results something else 1 Which doctrine will be fully discussed in the second pada of this adhyaya. II ADHYAYA, I PADA, I 8. 34 1 (viz. the effect). And if (in order to preclude this erroneous conclusion) the opponent should say that the effect is (not something different from the cause, but) a certain relative power (atuaya) of the inherent cause ; he thereby would simply concede our doctrine, according to which the effect exists in the cause already. We maintain, therefore, as our final conclusion, that milk and other substances are called effects when they are in the state of curds and so on, and that it is impossible, even within hundreds of years, ever to bring about an effect which is different from its cause. The fundamental cause of all appears in the form of this and that effect, up to the last effect of all, just as an actor appears in various robes and costumes, and thereby becomes the basis for all the current notions and terms concerning the phenomenal world. The conclusion here established, on the ground of rea- soning, viz.
3ffect, up to the last effect of all, just as an actor appears in various robes and costumes, and thereby becomes the basis for all the current notions and terms concerning the phenomenal world. The conclusion here established, on the ground of rea- soning, viz. that the effect exists already before its origina- tion, and is non-different from its cause, results also from a different scriptural passage. As under the preceding Sutra a Vedic passage was instanced which speaks of the non-existing, the different passage referred to in the present Sutra is the one (Kk. Up. VI, 3, 1) which refers to that which is. That passage begins, ' Being only was this in the beginning, one without a second,' refers, thereupon, to the doctrine of the Non-existent being the cause of the world (' Others say, Non-being was this in the beginning'), raises an objection against that doctrine (' How could that which is be born of that which is not?'), and, finally, re- affirms the view first set forth, ' Only Being was this in the beginning.' The circumstance that in this passage the effect, which is denoted by the word ' this,' is by Scripture, with reference to the time previous to its origination, co- ordinated with the cause denoted by the term ' Being,' proves that the effect exists in — and is non-different from — the cause. If it were before its origination non-existing and after it inhered in its cause by samavaya, it would be something different from the cause, and that would virtually imply an abandonment of the promise made in the passage, ' That instruction by which we hear what is not heard,' &c. 342 VEDANTA-stiTRAS. (VI, i, 3). The latter assertion is ratified, on the other hand, through the comprehension that the effect exists in — and is not different from — the cause. 19. And like a piece of cloth. As of a folded piece of cloth we do not know clearly whether it is a piece of cloth or some other thing, while on its being unfolded it becomes manifest that the folded thing was a piece of cloth ; and as, so long as it is folded, we per- haps know that it is a piece of cloth but not of what definite length and width it is, while on its being unfolded we know these particulars, and at the same time that the cloth is not different from the folded object ; in the same way an effect, such as a piece of cloth, is non-manifest as long as it exists in its causes, i. e. the threads, &c. merely, while it becomes manifest and is clearly apprehended in consequence of the operations of shuttle, loom, weaver, and so on.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1ence of the effect previously to its origination. — Your objection is refuted, we reply, by the consideration that the endeavour of the causal agent may be looked upon as having a purpose in so far as it arranges the causal substance in the form of the effect. That, however, even the form of the effect (is not something previously non-existing, but) belongs to the Self of the cause already because what is devoid of Selfhood cannot be begun at all, we have already shown above. — Nor does a substance become another substance merely by appearing under a different aspect. Devadatta may at one time be seen with his arms and legs closely drawn up to his body, and another time with his arms and legs stretched out, and yet he remains the same substantial being, for he is recognised as such. Thus the persons also by whom we are surrounded, such as fathers, mothers, brothers, &c, remain the same, although we see them in continually changing states and attitudes; for they are always recognised as fathers, mothers, brothers, and so on. If our opponent objects to this last illustrative example on the ground that fathers, mothers, and so on remain the same substantial beings, because the different states in which they appear are not separated from each other by birth or death, while the effect, for instance a jar, appears only after Z 2 340 vedanta-s6tras. the cause, for instance the clay, has undergone destruction as it were (so that the effect may be looked upon as some- thing altogether different from the cause); we rebut this objection by remarking that causal substances also such as milk, for instance, are perceived to exist even after they have entered into the condition of effects such as curds and the like (so that we have no right to say that the cause undergoes destruction). And even in those cases where the continued existence of the cause is not perceived, as, for instance, in the case of seeds of the fig-tree from which there spring sprouts and trees, the term ' birth ' (when applied to the sprout) only means that the causal substance, viz. the seed, becomes visible by becoming a sprout through the continual accretion of similar particles of matter; and the term 'death' only means that, through the secession of those particles, the cause again passes beyond the sphere of visibility.
2l substance, viz. the seed, becomes visible by becoming a sprout through the continual accretion of similar particles of matter; and the term 'death' only means that, through the secession of those particles, the cause again passes beyond the sphere of visibility. Nor can it be said that from such separation by birth and death as described just now it follows that the non-existing becomes existing, and the existing non- existing ; for if that were so, it would also follow that the unborn child in the mother's womb and the new-born babe stretched out on the bed are altogether different beings. It would further follow that a man is not the same person in childhood, manhood, and old age, and that terms such as father and the like are illegitimately used. — The preceding arguments may also be used to refute the (Bauddha doctrine) of all existence being momentary only l. The doctrine that the effect is non-existent previously to its actual origination, moreover, leads to the conclusion that the activity of the causal agent has no object ; for what does not exist cannot possibly be an object ; not any more than the ether can be cleft by swords 'and other weapons for striking or cutting. The object can certainly not be the inherent cause ; for that would lead to the erroneous con- clusion that from the activity of the causal agent, which has for its object the inherent cause, there results something else 1 Which doctrine will be fully discussed in the second pada of this adhyaya. II ADHYAYA, I PADA, I 8. 34 1 (viz. the effect). And if (in order to preclude this erroneous conclusion) the opponent should say that the effect is (not something different from the cause, but) a certain relative power (atuaya) of the inherent cause ; he thereby would simply concede our doctrine, according to which the effect exists in the cause already. We maintain, therefore, as our final conclusion, that milk and other substances are called effects when they are in the state of curds and so on, and that it is impossible, even within hundreds of years, ever to bring about an effect which is different from its cause. The fundamental cause of all appears in the form of this and that effect, up to the last effect of all, just as an actor appears in various robes and costumes, and thereby becomes the basis for all the current notions and terms concerning the phenomenal world. The conclusion here established, on the ground of rea- soning, viz.
3ffect, up to the last effect of all, just as an actor appears in various robes and costumes, and thereby becomes the basis for all the current notions and terms concerning the phenomenal world. The conclusion here established, on the ground of rea- soning, viz. that the effect exists already before its origina- tion, and is non-different from its cause, results also from a different scriptural passage. As under the preceding Sutra a Vedic passage was instanced which speaks of the non-existing, the different passage referred to in the present Sutra is the one (Kk. Up. VI, 3, 1) which refers to that which is. That passage begins, ' Being only was this in the beginning, one without a second,' refers, thereupon, to the doctrine of the Non-existent being the cause of the world (' Others say, Non-being was this in the beginning'), raises an objection against that doctrine (' How could that which is be born of that which is not?'), and, finally, re- affirms the view first set forth, ' Only Being was this in the beginning.' The circumstance that in this passage the effect, which is denoted by the word ' this,' is by Scripture, with reference to the time previous to its origination, co- ordinated with the cause denoted by the term ' Being,' proves that the effect exists in — and is non-different from — the cause. If it were before its origination non-existing and after it inhered in its cause by samavaya, it would be something different from the cause, and that would virtually imply an abandonment of the promise made in the passage, ' That instruction by which we hear what is not heard,' &c. 342 VEDANTA-stiTRAS. (VI, i, 3). The latter assertion is ratified, on the other hand, through the comprehension that the effect exists in — and is not different from — the cause. 19. And like a piece of cloth. As of a folded piece of cloth we do not know clearly whether it is a piece of cloth or some other thing, while on its being unfolded it becomes manifest that the folded thing was a piece of cloth ; and as, so long as it is folded, we per- haps know that it is a piece of cloth but not of what definite length and width it is, while on its being unfolded we know these particulars, and at the same time that the cloth is not different from the folded object ; in the same way an effect, such as a piece of cloth, is non-manifest as long as it exists in its causes, i. e. the threads, &c. merely, while it becomes manifest and is clearly apprehended in consequence of the operations of shuttle, loom, weaver, and so on.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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